CAMPAIGN PLANNING / OPERATIONAL ART Primer AY 07

JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL (JAWS)

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS

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CAMPAIGN PLANNING / OPERATIONAL ART
Primer AY 07

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS iii

PLANNING TORNADO vi

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER I – Structure of Joint Military Planning 5
- Strategic Direction 5
- Strategic Communication 7

CHAPTER II – Joint Strategic Planning 9
- Security Cooperation 10
- Force Planning 11
- Joint Operation Planning 11
  - Operational Phasing Model 13
  - Organization and Responsibility 17

CHAPTER III – Contingency Planning 21
- Levels of Planning Detail 22
- Contingency Plan Management 22

CHAPTER IV – Crisis Action Planning 25
- Relationship to Contingency Planning 25

CHAPTER V – JOPP Planning and Functions 31
- Planning Functions 31

CHAPTER VI – Joint Operation Planning Process 33

CHAPTER VII – Strategic Guidance/Strategic Direction — **Function I** 37

CHAPTER VIII – Planning Initiation 39
Step 1 – Planning Initiation 39

CHAPTER IX – Mission Analysis 41

Step 2 – Mission Analysis 41

- Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) 43
    - Staff Planners Role in JIPOE 44
    - Step 1 – Defining the Operational Environment 46
    - Step 2 – Describe the Effects of the Operational Environment 47
    - Step 3 – Evaluate the Adversary 57
    - Step 4 – Determine Adversary Courses of Action (COAs) 60

CHAPTER X – Mission Analysis Key-Steps 63

- Key-Step – 1: Determine Own Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks 63
- Key-Step – 2: Analysis of Higher CDR's Mission and Intent 63
- Key-Step – 3: Determine Known Facts Current Status or Conditions (and Assumptions) 64
- Key-Step – 4: Determine operational limitations: Constraints/Restraints 64
- Key-Step – 5: Determine own military endstates, objectives and initial effects. 65
    - Military End State 66
    - Conflict Termination 66
    - Objectives 68
    - Effects 68
- Key-Step – 6: Determine Own and Enemy's Center(s) of Gravity (COG) and Critical Factors 70
    - Critical Factors 72
    - Decisive Points 73
- Key-Step – 7: Conduct Initial Force Structure Analysis (Apportioned Forces) 74
    - Availability of Forces for Joint Operations 74
- Key-Step – 8: Conduct Initial Risk Assessment 74
- Key-Step – 9: Determine CDR's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) 78
- Key-Step – 10: Develop Mission Statement 80
- Key-Step – 11: Develop Mission Analysis Brief 80
- Key-Step – 12: Prepare Initial Staff Estimates 81
- Key-Step – 13: Publish Initial CDR's Planning Guidance and Intent 82
    - MOP, MOE 84

CHAPTER XI – Concept Development — **Function II** 87

CHAPTER XII – Stability Planning and Considerations 89

CHAPTER XIII – COA Development 101

Step 3 – Course of Action (COA) Development 101

- Political Considerations 105
- Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO's) 106
- Lines of Operation (LOO's) 109
- Tentative Courses of Action 111
- Planning Directive/Staff Estimates 119

CHAPTER XIV – COA Analysis and Wargaming 121
Step 4 – COA Analysis and Wargaming 121
- COA Analysis 121
- Wargaming 122
- Synchronization Matrix 126
- Branches and Sequels 131

CHAPTER XV – COA Comparison 133
Step 5 – COA Comparison 133
- Governing Factors 133

CHAPTER XVI – COA Approval 139
Step 6 – COA Approval 139
- Commanders Estimate 139

CHAPTER XVII – Plan Development – **Function III** 145
Step 7 – Plan or Order Development 145
- Plan or Order Development 145
- Supporting Plan Development 149

CHAPTER XVIII – Plan Assessment – **Function IV** 159
- Planning and Assessment during Execution 159
- Assessment Process and Measures 163

SUMMARY 169

APPENDIX A: Time Lines and Dates 171
APPENDIX B: References 173
APPENDIX C: Commander's Estimate 175
APPENDIX D: Glossary, Acronyms, and Abbreviations 183
APPENDIX E: Operational Plan Annexes 203
APPENDIX F: Command Relationships 205
APPENDIX G: Chain of Command 207
APPENDIX H: Change Recommendation Sheet 209

PLANNING TORNADO

"To a conscientious commander, time is the most vital factor in his planning. By proper foresight and correct preliminary action, he knows he can conserve the most precious elements he controls, the lives of his men. So he thinks ahead as far as he can. He keeps his tactical plan simple. He tries to eliminate as many variable factors as he is able. He has a firsthand look at as much of the ground as circumstances render accessible to him. He checks each task in the plan with the man to whom he intends to assign it. Then — having secured in almost every instance his subordinates' wholehearted acceptance of the contemplated mission and agreement on its feasibility — only then does he issue an order."

General Mathew B. Ridgway
***The Korean War*, 1967**

INTRODUCTION

> ***"Plans are useless, but planning is everything"***
> **-General Dwight D. Eisenhower**

This document is published to assist Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) students at the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) during their Operational Art and Campaigning instruction. It is intended to supplement, not replace, Joint Doctrine publications. This primer contains information from several source documents and should not be used solely to quote Joint Doctrine or DOD policy, nor does it relieve the student from reading and understanding Joint Doctrine as published.

The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) share the same basic approach and problem-solving elements, such as mission analysis and course-of-action development. The combination of JOPES and JOPP promotes coherent planning across all levels of war and command echelons, whether the requirement is for a limited, single-phase operation such as noncombatant evacuation or for a multi-phase campaign involving high intensity combat operations. **JOPES** formally integrates the planning activities of the entire JPEC during the initial planning and plan refinement that occurs both in peacetime and when faced with an imminent crisis. While JOPES activities span many organizational levels, **the focus is on the interaction which ultimately helps the President and SecDef decide when, where, and how to commit US military capabilities** in response to a foreseen contingency or an unforeseen crisis. **JOPP** is a less formal but proven analytical process, which provides a methodical approach to planning at any organizational level and at any point before and during joint operations. **The focus of JOPP is on the interaction between an organization's commander, staff, the commanders and staffs of the next higher and lower commands, and supporting commanders and their staffs to develop a joint operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD) for a specific mission.**

The JAWS Primer presents the JOPP as described by Joint Doctrine in its logical flow and will enable planners to sequentially follow the process. Its focus is on the concepts of operational planning and key Joint Doctrine with the main references being Joint Pubs 3-0, 5-0 and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I. JP 3-0 is now signed (17 Sept 2006) but 5-0 remains in the signature draft form (23 Oct 2006) as of this printing. The JAWS Primer concentrates its efforts on how Combatant Commanders (CCDR) and their staffs work through the JOPP. A joint force commander (JFC) subordinate to the CCDR may be assigned by the CCDR as required; you will see these references throughout this document.

There are two related but distinct categories of Joint Operation Planning; Contingency Planning and Crisis Action Planning (CAP). Contingency Planning's focus is on hypothetical situations in the future, while CAP deals with actual or near term emerging events that may involve the use of military force. These two categories differ in their respective products and may differ in the time available to plan. The Contingency

Planning process is highly structured to support iterative, concurrent, and parallel planning throughout the planning community to produce thorough and fully coordinated contingency plans when time permits. However, the process is shortened in CAP, as necessary, to support the dynamic requirements of time sensitive/constrained events. During actual military operations, the process adapts to accommodate greater decentralization of joint operation planning activities. Contingency Planning and CAP share common planning activities (processes, collaborative tools, data bases and info grid) and are interrelated.

Through campaign plans CCDR's define objectives, describe concepts of operations, communicate intent to subordinates, sequence operations, organize forces, establish command relationships, assign tasks, and synchronize air, land, sea and space operations and their sustainment. In addition, by means of a campaign plan, CCDR's give the President, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) information needed for inter-theater coordination at the national level.

These campaign plans are the operational extension of a CCDR theater strategy and vision of the sequence of operations needed to attain the strategic or operational objectives assigned by higher authority, within a given time and space.

To succeed in creating an effective campaign plan, the operational commander must consider and apply a myriad of considerations in its development; these considerations, functions and steps are discussed within this document. Used but not discussed in detail here are many components of Operational Design. Operational design is a process for developing the intellectual framework that will underpin campaign or operation plans and their subsequent execution. JP 3-0 goes into great detail on Operational Art and Design. Campaign planning takes a comprehensive view of the CCDR's theater and defines the framework in which an operation plan (OPLAN) fits. Campaign planning offers purpose and a common objective to a series of OPLANs. Existing OPLANs, operation plans in concept format (CONPLANs), or functional plans (FUNCPLANs) may also provide the basis for development of campaign plans. Through theater and subordinate campaign plans, strategic and operational planners synchronize national and theater ends, ways, and means to attain national strategic, supporting theater strategic, and operational level objectives.

Preparation of campaign plans involves more than just the CCDR's staff. Campaign planning is accomplished in coordination with; higher military headquarters; subordinate component headquarters; military allies or coalition partners; other government agencies; and international organizations. This list of decision-makers and their staff's is known as the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). The JPEC consists of the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the Services and their major commands, the combatant commands and their component commands, Sub-unified commands and subordinate components, joint task forces and the combat support agencies.

Campaigns are not isolated from other government efforts to achieve national strategic objectives. Military power is used in conjunction with other instruments of national

power — diplomatic, economic, and informational (DIME) — to achieve strategic objectives. Depending on the nature of the operation, a military campaign may be the main effort, or it may be used to support diplomatic or economic efforts. A campaign must be coordinated with nonmilitary efforts to ensure that all actions work in harmony to achieve the ends of policy. *A complete understanding of the strategic and operational objectives is essential for campaign planning*.

You will also find that this document includes the necessary processes and procedures to implement the Adaptive Planning (AP) process. The Secretary of Defense signed the AP Roadmap on 13 December 2005 directing that as AP matures it will succeed the Department's current planning and execution system. AP is defined as "the Joint capability to create and revise plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances require. AP occurs in a networked, collaborative environment, requires regular involvement of senior DOD leaders, and results in plans containing a range of viable options. At full maturity, AP will form the backbone of a future Joint adaptive planning and execution system, supporting the development and execution of plans. AP will preserve the best characteristics of present day contingency and crisis planning with a common process. Both the Contingency Planning Guidance and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan direct the use of AP processes and prototype tools for the development of top priority contingency plans during the current planning cycle. Further, the Secretary of Defense has directed that contingency plans undergo a six month cyclic review process as an interim step towards the maintenance of "living plans." (JOPES Vol. I, 29 Sep 2006)

JAWS JOPP will be reviewed continually and updated annually. POC for comment is Col Mike Santacroce/USMC JAWS faculty at santacrocem@jfsc.ndu.edu, 757-443-6307.

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CHAPTER I

Structure of Joint Military Planning

1. **Strategic Direction**

a. **Strategic direction** is the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies. As an overarching term, strategic direction encompasses the processes and products by which the President, SecDef, and CJCS provide strategic guidance. Strategic guidance from civilian and military policymakers is a prerequisite for developing a military campaign plan.

b. The President provides strategic guidance through the National Security Strategy (NSS), national security presidential directives, and other strategic documents in conjunction with additional guidance from other members of the National Security Council (NSC), see Figure 1 (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006).

Figure 1. National Strategic Direction

(1) The National Security Council System. The NSC is the principal forum for deliberation of national security policy issues requiring Presidential decision. The NSC system provides the framework for establishing national strategy and policy objectives. The NSC develops policy options, considers implications, coordinates operational problems that require interdepartmental consideration, develops recommendations for the President, and monitors policy implementation. The Chairman discharges a substantial part of the

statutory responsibilities as the principal military adviser to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense through the institutional channels of the NSC. The Chairman regularly attends NSC meetings and presents the views of the JCS and the combatant commanders. The NSC prepares National Security Directives (NSDs) that, with Presidential approval, implement national security policy. These policy decisions provide the basis for both military planning and programming.

c. The SecDef develops the National Defense Strategy (NDS), which establishes broad defense policy goals and priorities for the development, employment, and sustainment of US military forces based on the NSS. For contingency plans, the office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) prepares the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), which is signed by the President and provides written policy guidance to the CJCS and CCDRs for reviewing and preparing contingency plans.

d. The CJCS develops the National Military Strategy (NMS) and refines OSD guidance through Joint Doctrine (joint publications), policies and procedures (CJCSIs and CJCSMs) such as CJCSI 3110 series (JSCP) that describes how to employ the military in support of national security objectives.

e. Strategic direction and supporting national-level activities, in concert with the efforts of CCDRs, ensure the following:

(1) National strategic objectives and termination criteria are clearly defined, understood, and achievable.

(2) The Active Component is ready for combat and Reserve Components are appropriately manned, trained, and equipped in accordance with Title 10 responsibilities and prepared to become part of the total force upon mobilization.

(3) Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems and efforts focus on the operational environment.

(4) Strategic guidance is current and timely.

(5) DOD, other intergovernmental organizations, allies, and coalition partners are fully integrated at the earliest time during planning and subsequent operations.

(6) All required support assets are ready.

(7) Multinational partners are available and integrated early in the planning process.

(8) Forces and associated sustaining capabilities deploy ready to support the JFC's CONOPS.

2. **Strategic Communication**

a. Strategic communication is a natural extension of strategic direction, and supports the President's strategic guidance, the SecDef's NDS, and the CJCS's NMS. Strategic Communication planning and execution focus capabilities that apply information as an instrument of national power to create, strengthen or preserve an information environment favorable to US national interests. Strategic communication planning establishes unity of US themes and messages, emphasizes success, accurately confirms or refutes external reporting on US operations, and reinforces the legitimacy of US goals. This is an interagency effort, which provides an opportunity to advance US regional and global partnerships. Coordination, approval, and implementation of a strategic communication strategy and specific information objectives, audiences, themes, and actions will be developed and synchronized with other US agencies and approved by the SecDef.

b. Joint operation planning must include appropriate strategic communication components and ensure collaboration with the Department of State's diplomatic missions. CCDRs consider strategic communication during peacetime security cooperation planning, and incorporate themes, messages, and other relevant factors in their security cooperation plans (SCPs). During contingency and CAP, CCDRs review strategic communication guidance during mission analysis, and their staffs address strategic communication issues, as appropriate, in their staff estimates. CCDRs will brief the SecDef on their strategic communication planning during Contingency Planning and crisis-action planning IPRs, discussed in Chapter III, Contingency Planning.

c. The predominant military activities that promote strategic communications themes and messages are information operations (IO), public affairs (PA), and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD).

(1) **PA and IO Relationship.** PA has a role in all aspects of DOD's missions and functions. Communication of operational matters to internal and external audiences is one part of PA's function. In performing duties as one of the primary spokesmen, the public deconflicted with IO. While audiences and intent differ, both PA and IO ultimately support the dissemination of information, themes, and messages adapted to their audiences. Many of the nation's adversaries' leaders rely on limiting their population's knowledge to remain in power; PA and IO provide ways to get the joint forces' messages to these populations. There also is a mutually supporting relationship between the military's PA and DSPD efforts and similar PA and PD activities conducted by US embassies and other agencies.

(2) **Synchronization.** Synchronized planning of PA, DSPD, and IO is essential for effective strategic communication. Interagency efforts provide and promote international support for nations in the region and provide an opportunity to advance our regional and global partnerships. CCDRs should ensure that their IO, PA, and DSPD planning is consistent with overall US Government (USG) strategic communication objectives. Since PA and IO

both ultimately support the dissemination of information, themes, and messages adapted to their audiences, their activities must be closely coordinated and synchronized to ensure consistent themes and messages are communicated to avoid credibility losses for both the joint force and PA spokesmen.

d. Strategic Communication Process. The figure below (Figure 2) represents DOD support to the USG strategic communication process. Standing groups, called Strategic Communication Integration Groups (SCIG), at the Interagency, DOD, and combatant command levels will synchronize strategic communication and assess effects on our national, regional and global objectives. Strategic communication will be a readily recognizable process within combatant commands. The process may consist of boards, cells and working groups, and will be coordinated at an appropriate level within the command to positively impact decision cycles. Integration of strategic communication will include not only PA and IO but other directorates and external organizations, as appropriate, that affect strategic communication objectives.



Figure 2. DOD Support of USG Strategic Communication

e. Strategic communication/Plan levels. Level 3 (CONPLAN) and level 4 (OPLAN) plans include a strategic communication annex (Annex "Y"). This annex will contain a proposed strategic communication strategy, which includes synchronized information objectives, audiences, themes, and actions to deliver these communications for interagency coordination and implementation. The strategic communication matrix in JOPES Vol. I offers a worksheet to ensure key strategic communication points are considered.

f. Implementation of a strategic communication strategy requires multiple assets and associated activities to deliver themes and messages. These can include US and international public diplomacy means such as senior communicators and figures at home and abroad, respective US and other foreign embassies in the participating nations, public affairs activities, and specific marketing initiatives. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006)

CHAPTER II

Joint Strategic Planning



Figure 3. Joint Strategic Planning

1. Joint Strategic Planning. Joint planning integrates military actions with those of other instruments of national power and our multinational partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve a specified end state. Joint strategic planning provides strategic guidance and direction to the Armed Forces of the United States and consists of three subsets: **security cooperation planning, force planning and joint operation planning** (Figure 3).

a. Joint strategic planning occurs primarily at the national- strategic and theater-strategic levels to help the President, SecDef , and other members of the NSC formulate political-military assessments, define political and military objectives and end states, develop strategic concepts and options, and allocate resources. At the national- strategic level, the CJCS, in consultation with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), performs joint strategic planning to:

(1) Advise and assist the President and SecDef regarding the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States and the preparation of policy guidance.

(2) Advise the SecDef on program recommendations and budget proposals to conform to priorities established in strategic plans.

(3) Transmit the strategic guidance and direction of the President and SecDef to the combatant commands, military Services, and combat support agencies.

b. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the primary means by which the CJCS performs joint strategic planning. The products of the JSPS, such as the NMS

and the JSCP provide the strategic guidance and direction for joint strategic planning by the CCDR and for the other categories of military planning. CCDRs prepare strategic estimates, strategies, and plans to accomplish their assigned missions based on strategic guidance and direction from the President, SecDef, and CJCS. *CCDR's and their subordinate JFCs primarily accomplish theater strategic and operational level planning.* It is at this level where campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within their operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by; establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish strategic objectives; sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives; initiating actions; and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events.

2. Security Cooperation. The means by which the Department of Defense (DOD) encourages and enables countries and organizations to work with us to achieve strategic objectives. Security cooperation consists of a focused program of bilateral and multilateral defense activities conducted with foreign countries to serve mutual security interests and build defense partnerships. Security cooperation efforts also should be aligned with and support strategic communication themes, messages, and actions. The SecDef identifies security cooperation objectives, assesses the effectiveness of security cooperation activities, and revises goals when required to ensure continued support for US interests abroad. Although they can shift over time, examples of typical security cooperation objectives include: creating favorable military regional balances of power; advancing mutual defense or security arrangements; building allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and preventing conflict and crisis.

a. The Department of Defense's (DOD) senior civilian and military leadership — in conjunction with CCDRs, Service Chiefs, and support agencies — focus their activities on achieving the security cooperation objectives identified by the SecDef. Security cooperation planning links these activities with security cooperation objectives by identifying, prioritizing, and integrating them to optimize their overall contribution to specified U.S. security interests. Security cooperation activities are grouped into six categories:

(1) Military contacts, including senior official visits, port visits, counterpart visits, conferences, staff talks, and personnel and unit exchange programs.

(2) Nation assistance, including foreign internal defense, security assistance programs, and planned humanitarian and civic assistance activities.

(3) Multinational training.

(4) Multinational exercises, including those in support of the Partnership for Peace Program.

(5) Multinational education for US personnel and personnel from other nations, both overseas and in the United States.

(6) Arms control and treaty monitoring activities.

b. The DOD Security Cooperation Guidance and CJCS Manual (CJCSM) 3113.01A, Responsibilities for the Management of Security Cooperation, prescribe guidelines and procedures for developing security cooperation strategies and plans. Joint Publication (JP) 3- 08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations Vol. I, discusses how to facilitate coordination and cooperation with US Government agencies, and intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and regional security organizations.

3. Force Planning

a. Force planning at the national strategic level, is associated with creating and maintaining military capabilities. It is primarily the responsibility of the Services and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and is conducted under the administrative control that runs from the SecDef to the Secretaries of the Military Departments to the Service Chiefs. The Services recruit, organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to combatant commands and administer and support these forces. In areas peculiar to special operations, USSOCOM has similar responsibility for special operations forces (SOF), with the exception of organizing Service components.

b. At the theater strategic level, force planning encompasses all those activities performed by the supported CCDR, subordinate component commanders, and support agencies to select, prepare, integrate, and deploy the forces and capabilities required to accomplish an assigned mission. Force planning also encompasses those activities performed by force providers to develop, source, and tailor those forces and capabilities with actual units. JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006, Chapter III, describes this aspect of force planning in greater detail. Force Planning is covered in greater detail in Chapter XVI of this document.

4. Joint Operation Planning

a. Joint operation planning is the overarching process that guides CCDR's and/or Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) in developing plans for the employment of military power within the context of national strategic objectives and national military strategy to shape events, meet contingencies, and respond to unforeseen crises. Planning is triggered when the continuous monitoring of global events indicates the need to prepare military options. It is a collaborative process that can be iterative and/or parallel to provide actionable direction to commanders and their staffs across multiple echelons of command.

b. Joint operation planning includes all activities that must be accomplished to plan for an anticipated operation — the mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment of forces. **Planners recommend and commanders define criteria for the termination of joint operations and link these criteria to the transition to stabilization and achievement of the end state.**

c. **Stability operations** are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

(1) Per DODD 3000.05, November 28, 2005 all military plans shall address stability operations requirements throughout all phases of an operation or plan as appropriate. Stability operations dimensions of military plans shall be:

(a) Exercised, gamed, and, when appropriate, red-teamed (i.e., tested by use of exercise opposition role playing) with other U.S. Departments and Agencies.

(b) Integrated with U.S. Government plans for stabilization and reconstruction and developed when lawful and consistent with security requirements and the Secretary of Defense's guidance, in coordination with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector.

d. Planning also addresses redeployment and demobilization of forces.

(1) Joint operation planning encompasses the full range of activities required to conduct joint operations. These activities include the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of forces.

(a) **Mobilization.** Mobilization is the process by which all or selected parts of the Armed Forces of the United States are brought to the necessary state of readiness for potential military operations. Mobilization may include activating all or part of the Reserve Components. Mobilization is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments and Services in close cooperation with the supported commanders and their Service component commanders. *JP 4-05*, Joint Mobilization Planning, *discusses joint mobilization planning in greater detail.*

(b) **Deployment.** Deployment encompasses the movement of forces and their sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific destination to conduct joint operations. It specifically includes movement of forces and their requisite sustaining resources within the United States, within theaters, and between theaters. Deployment is primarily the responsibility of the supported commanders and their Service component commanders, in close cooperation with the supporting CCDRs and US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). *JP 3-35*, Joint Deployment

and Redeployment Operations, *discusses joint deployment planning in greater detail.*

(c) **Employment.** Employment encompasses the use of military forces and capabilities within an operational area (OA). Employment planning provides the foundation for, determines the scope of, and is limited by mobilization, deployment, and sustainment planning. Employment is primarily the responsibility of the supported CCDRs and their subordinate and supporting commanders. *JP 5-0,* Joint *Operation Planning, Signature Draft, JP 3-0,* Joint Operations*, this publication, and numerous other publications in the Joint Doctrine system discuss joint employment planning in greater detail.*

(d) **Sustainment.** Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. The focus of sustainment in joint operations is to provide the CCDR with the means to enable freedom of action and endurance and extend operational reach. Effective sustainment determines the depth to which the joint force can conduct decisive operations; allowing the CCDR to seize, retain and exploit the initiative. Sustainment is primarily the responsibility of the supported CCDRs and their Service component commanders in close cooperation with the Services, combat support agencies, and supporting commands.

(e) **Redeployment.** Redeployment encompasses the movement of units, individuals, or supplies deployed in one area to another area, or to another location within the area for the purpose of further employment. Redeployment also includes the return of forces and resources to their original location and status. Redeployment is primarily the responsibility of supported commanders and their Service component commanders, in close cooperation with the supporting CCDRs and USTRANSCOM.

(f) **Demobilization.** Demobilization encompasses the transition of a mobilized military establishment and civilian economy to a normal configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. It includes the return of Reserve Component units, individuals, and materiel stocks to their former status. Demobilization is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments and Services, in close cooperation with the supported commanders and their Service component commanders. *JP 4-05,* Mobilization Planning, *discusses demobilization planning in greater detail.*

c. Operation Phasing Model. The phasing model (See Figures 4 thru 6) has six phases: shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize the environment, and enable civil authority. **Each phase must be considered during operation planning and plan assessment.** This construct is prescriptive in nature and is meant to provide planners a

consistent template while not imparting additional constraints on the flexibility of commanders. Commanders are not obligated to execute all phases, but are expected to demonstrate consideration of all phases during their planning. The six phases are described below.



Figure 4. Relationship of Global and Theater Shaping

(1) Shape. Joint and multinational operations — inclusive of normal and routine military activities — and various interagency activities are performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. They are executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined national strategic and strategic military objectives. They are designed to assure success by **shaping perceptions** and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and allies, developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access. Shape phase activities must adapt to a particular theater environment and may be executed in one theater in order to create effects and/or achieve objectives in another. Planning that supports most "shaping" requirements typically occurs in the context of day-to-day security cooperation, and combatant commands may incorporate Phase 0 activities and tasks into the SCP. Thus, these requirements are beyond the scope of this document and JP 5-0. However, contingency and Crisis Action Planning requirements also occur while global and theater shaping activities are ongoing, and these requirements are satisfied in accordance with the CJCSM 3122 series. Moreover, the JOPP steps described in Chapter VI, "The Joint

Operation Planning Process," are useful in planning security cooperation activities as well as developing OPLANs and OPORDs.

(2) Deter. The intent of this phase is to deter undesirable adversary action by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force. It differs from deterrence that occurs in the shape phase in that it is largely characterized by **preparatory actions** that specifically support or facilitate the execution of subsequent phases of the operation/campaign. Once the crisis is defined, these actions may include mobilization, tailoring of forces and other predeployment activities; initial deployment into a theater; employment of ISR assets to provide real-time and near-real-time situational awareness; setting up of transfer operations at enroute locations to support aerial ports of debarkation in post-chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives attack configurations; and development of mission-tailored C2, intelligence, force protection, transportation, and logistic requirements to support the JFC's concepts of operations. CCDRs continue to engage multinational partners, thereby providing the basis for further crisis response. Liaison teams and coordination with other agencies assist in setting conditions for execution of subsequent phases of the campaign or operation. Many actions in the deter phase build on security cooperation activities from the previous phase and are conducted as part of security cooperation plans and activities. They can also be part of stand-alone operations.



Figure 5. Phasing Model – Linear View

(3) Seize the Initiative. JFCs seek to seize the initiative in combat and noncombat situations through the **application of appropriate joint force capabilities**. In combat operations this involves executing offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the adversary to offensive culmination and setting the conditions for decisive operations. Rapid application of joint combat power may be required to delay, impede, or halt the adversary's initial aggression and to deny the initial objectives. If an adversary has achieved its initial objectives, the early and rapid application of

offensive combat power can dislodge adversary forces from their position, creating conditions for the exploitation, pursuit, and ultimate destruction of both those forces and their will to fight during the dominate phase. During this phase, operations to gain access to theater infrastructure and to expand friendly freedom of action continue while the JFC seeks to degrade adversary capabilities with the intent of resolving the crisis at the earliest opportunity. In all operations, the JFC establishes conditions for stability by providing immediate assistance to relieve conditions that precipitated the crisis.



Figure 6. The Six Phases vs. Level of Military Effort

(4) Dominate. The dominate phase focuses on **breaking the enemy's will** for organized resistance or, in noncombat situations, control of the operational environment. Success in this phase depends upon overmatching joint force capability at the critical time and place. This phase includes full employment of joint force capabilities and continues the appropriate sequencing of forces into the OA as quickly as possible. When a campaign or operation is focused on conventional enemy forces, the dominate phase normally concludes with decisive operations that drive an adversary to culmination and achieve the JFC's operational objectives. Against unconventional adversaries, decisive operations are characterized by dominating and controlling the operational environment through a combination of conventional, unconventional, information, and stability operations. Stability operations are conducted as needed to ensure a smooth transition to the next phase and relieve suffering. In noncombat situations, the joint force's activities seek to control the situation or operational environment. Dominate phase activities may establish the

conditions for an early favorable conclusion of operations or set the conditions for transition to the next phase.

(5) Stabilize the Environment. The stabilize phase is required when there is **no fully functional, legitimate civil governing authority present**. The joint force may be required to perform limited local governance, integrating the efforts of other supporting/contributing multinational, IGO, NGO, or USG agency participants until legitimate local entities are functioning. This includes providing or assisting in the provision of basic services to the population. The stabilize phase is typically characterized by a change from sustained combat operations to stability operations. Stability operations are necessary to ensure that the threat (military and/or political) is reduced to a manageable level that can be controlled by the potential civil authority or, in noncombat situations, to ensure that the situation leading to the original crisis does not reoccur and/or its effects are mitigated. Redeployment operations may begin during this phase and should be identified as early as possible. Throughout this segment, the JFC continuously assesses the impact of current operations on the ability to transfer overall regional authority to a legitimate civil entity, which marks the end of the phase.

(6) Enable Civil Authority. This phase is predominantly characterized by **joint force support to legitimate civil governance in theater**. Depending upon the level of indigenous state capacity, joint force activities during phase VI may be at the behest of that authority or they may be under its direction. The goal is for the joint force to enable the viability of the civil authority and its provision of essential services to the largest number of people in the region. This includes coordination of joint force actions with supporting or supported multinational, agency, and other organization participants; establishment of MOEs; and influencing the attitude of the population favorably regarding the US and local civil authority's objectives. DOD policy is to support indigenous persons or groups promoting freedom, rule of law, and an entrepreneurial economy and opposing extremism and the murder of civilians. The joint force will be in a supporting role to the legitimate civil authority in the region throughout the enable civil authority phase. Redeployment operations, particularly for combat units, will often begin during this phase and should be identified as early as possible. The military end state is achieved during this phase, signaling the end of the campaign or operation. Operations are concluded when redeployment is complete. Combatant command involvement with other nations and agencies, beyond the termination of the joint operation, may be required to achieve the national strategic end state. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006)

6. Organization and Responsibility

a. Joint operation planning is an inherent command responsibility established by

law and directive. This fundamental responsibility extends from the President and SecDef, with the advice of the CJCS, to the CCDRs and their subordinate JFCs. Joint force Service and functional components conduct component planning that could involve planning for the employment of other components' capabilities, such as when the joint force air component commander (JFACC) plans for the employment of all air assets made available. The CJCS transmits the orders of the President and the SecDef to the CCDRs and oversees the combatant commands' planning activities. The JCS function in the planning process as advisers to the President, NSC, and SecDef.

b. The CJCS, CCDRs, and subordinate JFCs have primary responsibility for planning the employment of joint forces. Although not responsible for directing the combatant commands' Service forces in joint operations, the Military Departments participate in joint operation planning through execution of their responsibilities to: organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to the combatant commands; administer and support those forces; and prepare plans implementing joint strategic mobility, logistic, and mobilization plans.

c. Headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in joint operation planning or committed to conduct military operations are collectively termed the **Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC)**. Although not a standing or regularly meeting entity, the JPEC consists of the CJCS and other members of the JCS, the Joint Staff, the Services and their major commands, the combatant commands and their subordinate commands, and the combat support agencies (see JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006).

d. For Contingency Plans CJCSI 3141.01C prescribes four periodic In-Progress-Reviews (IPRs) at successive steps in the planning process that stress the importance of strategic communication between the SECDEF / CJCS and the CCDR's. IPRs give the SECDEF / CJCS visibility on the contingency plan while the plan is being developed or reviewed. These IPRs constitute a disciplined dialogue naming strategic leaders to shape plans as they are developed. Further, they expedite planning by ensuring that the plan addresses the most current strategic assessments and needs. They generate valuable feedback for planning staffs and provide a forum for guidance on coordination with the interagency and multinational communities. IPRs provide the opportunity for discussion of key issues or concerns, identification and removal of planning obstacles, and resolution of planning conflicts. IPRs ensure that plans remain relevant to the situation and the SECDEF's intent throughout their development. IPRs occur during each of the four functions of the planning process; *strategic guidance, concept development, plan development and plan assessment.* Each of these steps will include as many IPRs as necessary to complete the plan (Figure 7). As you step through this document you should note an IPR review for each Planning Function.



Figure 7. Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions, and Products

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CHAPTER III

Contingency Planning

1. Contingency Planning. Contingency Planning is planning that occurs in non-crisis situations. A **contingency** is a situation that likely would involve military forces in response to natural and man-made disasters, terrorists, subversives, military operations by foreign powers, or other situations as directed by the President or SecDef. Following the guidance provided by the JSPS, Commanders prepare, submit, and continuously refine their plans. Planning guidance is provided in the CPG, JSCP, Strategic Guidance Statements (SGS) and through SecDef and combatant commander in-progress reviews (IPRs). Contingency Planning is an iterative process and is adaptive to situational changes within the operational and planning environments. The process allows for changes in plan priorities, changes to the review and approval process of either a single plan or a category of plans, and contains the flexibility to adjust the specified development time line for producing and refining plans. Contingency Planning facilitates the transition to Crisis Action Planning (CAP). Specific Contingency Planning procedures are given in JOPES Vol. I, 29 Sept 2006, Enclosure C. and other portions.

a. Contingency Planning begins when a planning requirement is identified in the CPG, JSCP, or a planning order, and continues until the requirement no longer exists. The JSCP links the JSPS to joint operation planning, identifies broad scenarios for plan development, specifies the type of joint OPLAN required, and provides additional planning guidance as necessary. A CCDR may also initiate Contingency Planning by preparing plans not specifically assigned but considered necessary to discharge command responsibilities. If a situation develops during a Contingency Planning cycle that warrants Contingency Planning but was not anticipated in the CPG/JSCP, the SecDef, through the CJCS, tasks the appropriate supported CCDR and applicable supporting CCDRs, Services, and combat support agencies out-of-cycle to begin Contingency Planning in response to the new situation. The primary mechanism for tasking contingency plans outside of the CPG/JSCP cycle will be through strategic guidance statements from the SecDef and endorsed by message from the CJCS to the CCDRs.

b. Plans are produced and updated periodically to ensure relevancy. Contingency Planning most often addresses military options requiring combat operations; however, plans must account for other types of joint operations across the range of military operations. For example, operations during Phase IV (Stabilize) of a campaign and most stability operations are very complex and require extensive planning and coordination with non-DOD organizations, with the military in support of other agencies. Contingency Planning occurs in prescribed cycles in accordance with formally established procedures that complement and support other DOD planning cycles. In coordination with the JPEC, the Joint Staff develops and issues a planning schedule that coordinates plan development activities and establishes submission dates for joint OPLANs. The CJCS can also direct out-of-cycle Contingency Planning when circumstances warrant disruption of the normal planning cycle.

c. Contingency Planning encompasses four **levels of planning detail**, with an associated planning product for each level (Figure 8).

(1) **Level 1 Planning Detail — Commander's Estimate**. This level of planning involves the least amount of detail, and focuses on producing a developed COA. The product for this level can be a COA briefing, command directive, commander's estimate, or a memorandum. The commander's estimate provides the SecDef with military COAs to meet a potential contingency. The estimate reflects the supported commander's analysis of the various COAs available to accomplish an assigned mission and contains a recommended COA.

(2) **Level 2 Planning Detail — Base Plan**. A base plan describes the CONOPS, major forces, concepts of support, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission. It normally does not include annexes or a TPFDD.

(3) **Level 3 Planning Detail — CONPLAN**. A CONPLAN is an operation plan in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. It includes a base plan with annexes required by the JFC and a supported commander's estimate of the plan's feasibility. It may also produce a TPFDD if applicable.

(4) **Level 4 Planning Detail — OPLAN**. An OPLAN is a complete and detailed joint plan containing a full description of the CONOPS, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a TPFDD. It identifies the specific forces, functional support, and resources required to execute the plan and provide closure estimates for their flow into the theater. OPLANs can be quickly developed into an OPORD. An OPLAN is normally prepared when:

(a) The contingency is critical to national security and requires detailed prior planning.

(b) The magnitude or timing of the contingency requires detailed planning.

(c) Detailed planning is required to support multinational planning.

(d) The feasibility of the plan's CONOPS cannot be determined without detailed planning.

(e) Detailed planning is necessary to determine force deployment, employment, and sustainment requirements, determine available resources to fill identified requirements, and validate shortfalls.

d. Contingency Plan Management. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviews contingency plans specified in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP),

combined military plans, military plans of international treaty organizations, and as otherwise specifically directed by the Secretary of Defense. (CJCSI 3141.01C, 12 Sept 2006, and JOPES Vol I, Enclosure D, guide the Contingency Plan review process)

(1) The Joint Staff Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (DJ-7) is responsible for the plan management processes for all contingency plans, to include plans maintained by the Joint Staff Director of Operations (DJ-3) that are not in execution. DJ-3 is responsible for managing the process of developing operations plans in a crisis action environment, overseeing the execution of operations, and maintaining subject matter experts (SME) on all J3 developed plans.

(2) The J-7/Joint Operational War Plans Division (JOWPD) serves as the office of primary responsibility (OPR) within the Joint Staff for all contingency plan matters, to include bilateral military plans and military plans of international treaty organizations not specifically designated otherwise. This consists of both the management of contingency plans and the plan review process, including but not limited to review of the TPFDD, final plan, and facilitation of contingency plan IPRs with the SECDEF.

(3) JOWPD is the primary liaison for the combatant commander with both the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Staff (OCJCS) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) for development of contingency plans and the plan review process.

(4) To achieve rapid planning with greater efficiency, this process features early and detailed planning guidance and frequent dialogue during these four steps in the form of IPRs between senior leaders and planners to promote an understanding of, and agreement on, the mission, planning assumptions, threat definitions, interagency, and allied planning cooperation, risks, courses of action, and other key factors.

e. Contingency Plan Approval Authority and Alignment:

(1) Contingency plans are categorized as follows:

(a) Top Priority Plans

1 Selected plans briefed to the SECDEF

2 Plans delegated to the VCJCS and USD (P); forwarded to the SECDEF for administrative approval.

(b) Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG)-Directed Plans Unique to Specific Commands:

1 USD(P) / VCJCS recommend plan approval or disapproval to SECDEF / CJCS.

2 SECDEF approves final plan via a paper process.

(c) Plans Common to all Commanders or in Support of Treaty Agreements.

1 Approved by the CCDR unless SECDEF assigns oversight of plan development to USD(P) / VCJCS, who then recommend plan approval to SECDEF / CJCS.

2 CCDR approves final plan

3 Not submitted for review unless SECDEF directs.



Figure 8: Joint Operation Planning Product

CHAPTER IV

Crisis Action Planning

1. Crisis Action Planning. The planning process for both contingency and crises action planning is the same, though different products are produced. A **crisis** is an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests. It typically develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that the President or SecDef considers a commitment of US military forces and resources to achieve national objectives. It may occur with little or no warning. It is fast-breaking and requires accelerated decision making. Sometimes a single crisis may spawn another crisis elsewhere. JOPES Vol. I, 1 Sept 2006, provides additional **crisis-action** planning procedures for the time-sensitive development of OPORDs for the likely use of military forces in response to a crisis.

2. Relationship to Contingency Planning. CAP provides a process for responding to crises spanning the full range of military operations. Contingency Planning supports Crisis Action Planning by anticipating potential crises and operations and developing contingency plans that facilitate execution planning during crises. Contingency Planning prepares for a hypothetical military contingency based on the best available intelligence, while using forces and resources projected to be available for the period during which the plan will be effective. It relies heavily on assumptions regarding the political and military circumstances that will exist when the plan is implemented. Even though every crisis situation cannot be anticipated, the distributed collaborative environment, detailed analysis, and coordination which occurs during Contingency Planning may facilitate effective decision-making, execution, and redeployment planning as a crisis unfolds. During CAP, assumptions and projections made in similar contingency plans are replaced with facts and actual conditions. Figure 9 compares contingency and Crisis Action Planning with time, environment, forces etc.

a. CAP encompasses the activities associated with the time-sensitive development of OPORDs for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned, attached, and allocated forces and resources in response to an actual situation that may result in actual military operations. While Contingency Planning normally is conducted in anticipation of future events, CAP is based on circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. There are always situations arising in the present that might require U.S. military response. Such situations may approximate those previously planned for in Contingency Planning, though it is unlikely they would be identical, and sometimes they will be completely unanticipated. The time available to plan responses to such real-time events is short. In as little as a few days, commanders and staffs must develop and approve a feasible COA, publish the plan or order prepare forces, ensure sufficient communications systems support, and arrange sustainment for the employment of US military forces.

Comparing Contingency and Crisis Action Planning		
	Contingency Planning	**Crisis Action Planning**
Time Available to Plan	As defined in authoritative directives (normally 6 + months)	Situation dependent. (hours, days, or up to 12 months)
Environment	Distributed, collaborative planning	Distributed, collaborative planning and execution
JPEC involvement	Full JPEC participation. Note: JPEC participation may be limited for security reasons.	Full JPEC participation. Note: JPEC participation may be limited for security reasons
Functional Processes	Situation Awareness and Planning	Situation Awareness, Planning, and Execution
Components	Strategic Guidance, Concept Development, Plan Development, Plan Maintenance & Supporting Plan Development	Strategic Guidance, Concept Development, Plan Development, Plan Maintenance & Supporting Plan Development, Execution
Document assigning planning task	Chairman issues (1) JSCP, (2) Planning Directive, or (3) Warning Order for short-suspense planning	Chairman issues WARNORD, PLANORD or SecDef approved ALERTORD
Forces for planning	Apportioned in JSCP	Allocated in WARNORD, PLANORD, or ALERTORD
Planning guidance	Chairman issues JSCP or Warning Order. Combatant commander issues planning directive and TPFDD LOI	Chairman issues WARNORD, PLANORD, or ALERTORD. Combatant commander issues WARNORD, PLANORD or ALERTORD and TPFDD LOI to subordinates, supporting commands and supporting agencies
COA selection	Combatant commander selects COA and submits strategic concept (CSC) to Chairman for review and approval	Combatant commander develops Commanders Estimate with recommended COA
CONOPS approval	Chairman approves CSC, disapproves or approves for further planning	President/Secretary of Defense approve COA
Final planning product	OPLAN or CONPLAN	OPORD
Final planning product approval	Combatant commander submits final plan to Chairman for review and approval	Combatant commander develops approved COA (CONOPS) into detailed OPORD
Execution document	N/A	Chairman issues SecDef approved EXORD Combatant Commander issues EXORD

Figure 9. Comparing Contingency and Crisis Action Planning

b. In a crisis, situational awareness is continuously fed by the latest intelligence and operations reports. An adequate and feasible military response in a crisis demands flexible procedures that consider time available, rapid and effective communications, and relevant previous planning products whenever possible.

c. In a crisis or time-sensitive situation, the CCDR uses CAP to adjust previously prepared OPLANs. The CCDR converts these plans to executable OPORDs or develops OPORDs from scratch when no useful OPLAN exists. To maintain plan viability it is imperative that all steps of the JOPP are conducted and thought through, although some may be done sequentially. Time-sensitivities are associated with CAP and the JOPP may be abbreviated for time.

d. CAP activities are similar to Contingency Planning activities, but CAP is based on dynamic, real-world conditions vice assumptions. CAP procedures provide for the rapid and effective exchange of information and analysis, the timely preparation of military COAs for consideration by the President or SecDef, and the prompt transmission of their decisions to the JPEC. CAP activities may be performed sequentially or in parallel, with supporting and subordinate plans or OPORDs being developed concurrently. The exact flow of the procedures is largely determined by the time available to complete the planning and by the significance of the crisis. Capabilities such as collaboration and decision-support tools will increase the ability of the planning process to adapt quickly to changing situations and improve the transition from Contingency Planning to CAP. The following paragraphs summarize the activities and interaction that occur during CAP. Refer to *JOPES Volume I* for detailed procedures.

(1) When the President, SecDef, or CJCS decides to develop military options, the CJCS issues a **planning directive** to the JPEC initiating the development of COAs and requesting that the supported commander submit a **commander's estimate** of the situation with a recommended COA to resolve the situation. Normally, the directive will be a WARNORD, but a PLANORD or ALERTORD may be used if the nature and timing of the crisis warrant accelerated planning. In a quickly evolving crisis, the initial WARNORD may be communicated vocally with a follow-on record copy to ensure that the JPEC is kept informed. If the directive contains force deployment preparation or deployment orders, SecDef approval is required.

(2) The WARNORD describes the situation, establishes command relationships, and identifies the mission and any planning constraints. It may identify forces and strategic mobility resources, or it may request that the supported commander develop these factors. It may establish tentative dates and times to commence mobilization, deployment or employment, or it may solicit the recommendations of the supported commander regarding these dates and times. If the President, SecDef, or CJCS directs development of a specific COA, the WARNORD will describe the COA and request the supported commander's assessment. A WARNORD sample can be found in JOPES Volume I.

(3) In response to the WARNORD, the supported commander, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting commanders and the rest of the JPEC, reviews existing joint OPLANs for applicability and develops, analyzes, and compares COAs. Based on the supported commander's guidance, supporting commanders begin their planning activities.

(4) Although an existing plan almost never completely aligns with an emerging crisis, it can be used to facilitate rapid COA development. An existing OPLAN can be modified to fit the specific situation. An existing CONPLAN can be fully developed beyond the stage of an approved CONOPS. The Time Phased Force Deployment Lists (TPFDD) related to specific OPLANs are stored in the JOPES database and available to the JPEC for review.

(5) The CJCS, in consultation with other members of the JCS and CCDRs, reviews and evaluates the supported commander's estimate and provides recommendations and advice to the President and SecDef for COA selection. The supported commander's COAs may be refined or revised, or new COAs may have to be developed to accommodate a changing situation. The President or SecDef selects a COA and directs that detailed planning be initiated.

(6) On receiving the decision of the President or SecDef, the CJCS issues an alert order (ALERTORD) to the JPEC to announce the decision. The SecDef approves the ALERTORD. The order is a record communication that the President or SecDef has approved the detailed development of a military plan to help resolve the crisis**.** The contents of an ALERTORD may vary, and sections may be deleted if the information has already been published, but it should always describe the selected COA in sufficient detail to allow the supported commander, in collaboration with other members of the JPEC, to conduct the detailed planning required to deploy, employ, and sustain forces. However, the ALERTORD does not authorize execution of the approved COA.

(7) The supported commander develops the OPORD and supporting TPFDD using an approved COA. Understandably, the speed of completion is greatly affected by the amount of prior planning and the planning time available. The supported commander and subordinate describe the CONOPS in OPORD format. They update and adjust planning accomplished during COA development for any new force and sustainment requirements and source forces and lift resources. All members of the JPEC identify and resolve shortfalls and limitations.

(8) The supported CCDR submits the completed OPORD for approval to the SecDef or President via the CJCS. After an OPORD is approved, the President or SecDef may decide to begin deployment in anticipation of

executing the operation or as a show of resolve, execute the operation, place planning on hold, or cancel planning pending resolution by some other means. Detailed planning may transition to execution as directed or become realigned with continuous situational awareness, which may prompt planning product adjustments and/or updates.

(9) In CAP, plan development continues after the President decides to execute the OPORD or to return to the pre-crisis situation. When the crisis does not lead to execution, the CJCS provides guidance regarding continued planning under either crisis- action or Contingency Planning procedures.

e. CAP provides the CJCS and CCDRs a process for getting vital decision-making information up the chain of command to the President and SecDef. CAP facilitates information sharing among the members of the JPEC and the integration of military advice from the CJCS in the analysis of military options. Additionally, CAP allows the President and SecDef to communicate their decisions rapidly and accurately through the CJCS to the CCDRs, subordinate and supporting commanders, the Services, and combat support agencies to initiate detailed military planning, change deployment posture of the identified force, and execute military options. It also outlines the mechanisms for monitoring the execution of the operation.

f. Abbreviated Procedures. The activities in the preceding discussion have been described sequentially. During a crisis, they may be conducted concurrently or even eliminated, depending on prevailing conditions. In some situations, no formal WARNORD is issued, and the first record communication that the JPEC receives is the PLANORD or ALERTORD containing the COA to be used for plan development. It is also possible that the President or SecDef may decide to commit forces shortly after an event occurs, thereby significantly compressing planning activities. No specific length of time can be associated with any particular planning activity. **Severe time constraints may require crisis participants to pass information verbally**, including the decision to commit forces.

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CHAPTER V

JOPP Planning and Functions

1. **Planning**

a. Contingency Planning and CAP share common planning activities and are interrelated. Joint operation planning embodies four subordinate functions; *strategic guidance, concept development, plan development, and plan assessment*.

b. **Planning Functions**

(1) Strategic Guidance. The President, Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman, with appropriate consultation, formulate suitable and feasible military objectives to counter threats. The CCDR may provide input through one or more Commander's Assessments. This function is used to develop planning guidance for preparation of COAs. This process begins with an analysis of existing strategic guidance (e.g., a JSCP for Contingency Planning or a CJCS Warning Order, Planning Order or Alert Order in CAP). The primary end product is a CCDR's mission statement for Contingency Planning and a commander's assessment (OPREP-3PCA) or commanders estimate in Crisis Action Planning. More details are provided in Enclosure C of JOPES Vol. I.

(2) Concept Development. During Contingency Planning, the supported commander develops the Combatant Commander's concept of operations, for SecDef approval, based on SecDef, CJCS, and Service Chief planning guidance and resource apportionment provided in the JSCP and Service documents. In Crisis Action Planning, concept development is based on situational awareness guidance, resource allocations from approved Contingency Plans, and a CJCS Planning Order, or Alert Order. Using the CCDR's mission statement combatant command planners develop preliminary COAs and staff estimates. COAs are then compared and the CCDR recommends a COA for SecDef approval in a Commander's Estimate. The CCDR also requests SecDef guidance on interagency coordination. The approved COA becomes the basis of the CONOPS containing conflict termination planning, supportability estimates, and, time permitting, an integrated time-phased database of force requirements, with estimated sustainment. (JOPES Vol. I, 29 Sept 06).

(3) Plan Development. This function is used in developing an OPLAN, CONPLAN or an OPORD with applicable supporting annexes and in refining preliminary feasibility analysis. This function fully integrates mobilization, deployment, employment, conflict termination, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities. Detailed planning begins with SecDef approval

for further planning in a non-crisis environment or a CJCS Warning Order, Alert Order or Planning Order in a Crisis Action Planning situation; it ends with a SecDef-approved Plan or OPORD.

(4) Plan Assessment. During this function, the CCDR refines the complete plan while supporting and subordinate commanders, Services and supporting Agencies complete their supporting plans for his review and approval. All commanders continue to develop and analyze branches and sequels as required or directed. The CCDR and the Joint Staff continue to evaluate the situation for any changes that would trigger plan revision or refinement.

(a) The Joint Staff, Services, combatant commands, and Agencies monitor current readiness and availability status to assess sourcing impacts and refine sourcing COAs should the plan be considered for near-term execution.

(b) The CCDR may conduct one or more IPR(s) with the Secretary of Defense during Plan assessment. These IPR(s) would likely focus on branches/options and situational or assumption changes requiring major reassessment or significant plan modification/adaptation, but might also include a variety of other pertinent topics (e.g., information operations, special access programs, nuclear escalation mitigation). See Enclosures D of JOPES Vol. I and CJCSI 31410.01C for additional details on IPRs.

2. Conflict Termination Planning. Clearly defined strategic objectives are key to defining a conflict's terminal conditions. The process of explicitly and clearly defining terminal conditions is an important one, since it requires careful dialogue between civilian and military leadership which may, in turn, offer some greater assurances that the defined end state is both politically acceptable (ending conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests, and its allies), and militarily attainable. (JOPES Vol. I, 29 Sept 2006)

CHAPTER VI

Joint Operation Planning Process

The **JOPP** is the fundamental process for all joint planning. Contingency and Crisis Action Planning are structured using the JOPP.

Campaign and operation planning blends operational design and the iterative Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP). JOPP is an orderly, analytical planning process consisting of a set of logical steps to analyze a mission, develop and compare potential courses of action (COA), select the best COA and produce a plan or order.

JOPP is a four function, seven step process that culminates with a published Operations Order (OPORD) in CAP and results in an OPLAN, Concept Plan (CONPLAN), Base Plan or Commanders Estimate during Contingency Planning.

1. The four functions of the JOPP as discussed in the last chapter are: **Strategic Guidance, Concept Development, Plan Development,** and **Plan Assessment.** Each of these functions is further broken down into steps. The Concept Development Function contains and additional 13 Key-Steps (Figure 10 and 11).



Figure 10. The Joint Operation Planning Process

a. Function I – Strategic Guidance consists of 2 steps; Planning Initiation and Mission Analysis.

b. Function II – Concept Development consists of four steps; COA Development, COA Analysis and Wargaming, COA Comparison and COA Approval.

c. Function III – Plane Development consists of Plan or Order Development.

d. Function IV – Plane Assessment.

2. JOPP underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the full range of military operations. It applies to both supported and supporting JFCs and to joint force component commands when the components participate in joint planning. This process is designed to facilitate interaction between the commander, staff, and subordinate headquarters throughout planning. JOPP helps commanders and their staffs organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander's intent, and develop effective plans and orders. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006)

Joint Operation Planning Process



Figure 11. Joint Operation Planning Process



Figure 12. Joint Planning Group

3. **Joint Planning Group**. The Joint Planning Group is typically organized within the J-5 Directorate. The JPG is responsible to the J-5 and Commander for driving the command's planning effort. Effectiveness of the JPG will be measured, in part, by the support provided to it by the principal JTF staff officers (J-1 through J-6). The composition of the JPG is a carefully balanced consideration between group management and appropriate representation from the JTF staff and components. JPG membership will vary based on the tasks to be accomplished, time available to accomplish the tasks, and the experience level of the JPG members. Representation to the JPG should be a long-term assignment to provide continuity of focus and consistency of procedure (Figure 12).

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CHAPTER VII

Strategic Guidance/Strategic Direction — Function I

Function I — Strategic Guidance/Strategic Direction is the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies. As an overarching term, strategic direction encompasses the processes and products by which the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide strategic guidance. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006)

1. Strategic Guidance will focus largely on solidifying guidance, agreeing on the framework assumptions and planning factors, establishing a common understanding of adversaries and their intentions, conducting initial interagency and/or coalition coordination (as authorized), and producing an approved combatant commander mission statement. These outcomes form the foundation for continued planning.

a. The Strategic Guidance IPR (IPR-A). IPR-A will focus largely on solidifying guidance, agreeing on the framework assumptions and planning factors, establishing a common understanding of adversaries and their intentions, conducting initial interagency and / or coalition coordination (as authorized), and producing an approved CCDR's mission statement. These outcomes form the basis for continued planning. Subsequent IPRs may revisit, refine, modify, or amend these outcomes as required.

b. The CCDR incorporates guidance from IPRs into subsequent planning. The transition into the next function of concept development is marked by a decision to have military options developed. The SecDef may include specific guidance for course of action development. (CJCSI 3141.01C, 12 Sept 2006)

2. Strategic direction and supporting national-level activities, in concert with the efforts of CCDRs, ensure the following:

-- National strategic objectives and termination criteria are clearly defined, understood, and achievable;

-- Active Component is ready for combat and Reserve Components are appropriately manned, trained, and equipped in accordance with Title 10 responsibilities and prepared to become part of the total force upon mobilization;

-- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems and efforts focus on the operational environment;

-- Strategic guidance is current and timely;

-- DOD, other intergovernmental organizations, allies, and coalition partners are fully integrated at the earliest time during planning and subsequent operations;

-- All required support assets are ready;

-- Multinational partners are available and integrated early in the planning process;

-- Forces and associated sustaining capabilities deploy ready to support the JFC's CONOPS.

CHAPTER VIII

Planning Initiation



Step 1 — Planning Initiation: JOPP begins when the President, SecDef or CJCS decides on military options and directs CCDRs through guidance contained in Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)/Global Force Management (GFM), Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), Strategic Communication Guidance, Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG), Strategic Guidance Statements (SGS), Theater Security Guidance (TSG) or CCDR's Initiative/Guidance (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006).

1. The JSCP, CPG, and related strategic guidance statements (when applicable) serve as the primary guidance to begin Contingency Planning. However, CCDRs and other commanders may initiate planning on their own authority when they identify a planning requirement not directed by higher authority. The CJCS may also issue a Warning Order in an actual crisis. Military options normally are developed in combination with other nonmilitary options so that the President can respond with all the appropriate instruments of national power.

2. During this step, peacetime Contingency Planning tasks are transmitted (primarily via the CPG and JSCP), forces and resources are apportioned, and planning guidance is issued to the supported CCDR. During Contingency Planning, CCDR's prepare plans, including campaign plans, primarily in direct response to tasking in the JSCP.

3. Strategic requirements or tasking for the planning of major contingencies may require the preparation of several alternative plans for the same requirement using different sets of forces and resources in order to preserve flexibility. For these reasons, campaign plans are based on reasonable assumptions. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006)

CHAPTER IX

Mission Analysis



Step 2 — Mission Analysis: The primary products of mission analysis are a restated mission statement, the JFC's initial intent statement, Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIR), and initial planning guidance (IPG).

1. The commander is responsible for analyzing the mission and restating the mission for subordinate commanders to begin their own estimate and planning efforts. Mission analysis is used to study the assigned mission and to identify all tasks necessary to accomplish it. Mission analysis is critical because it provides direction to the commander and the staff, enabling them to focus effectively on the problem at hand. There is perhaps no step more critical to the JOPP.

2. A primary consideration for a supported CCDR during mission analysis is the **national strategic end state** — that set of national objectives and related guidance that define strategic success from the President's perspective. This end state will reflect the broadly expressed Political, Military, Economic, Social, Informational, Infrastructure (PMESII) and other circumstances that should exist after the conclusion of a campaign or operation. The CCDR also must consider multinational objectives associated with coalition or alliance operations.

3. The supported CCDR typically will specify a **theater strategic end state**. While it will mirror many of the objectives of the national strategic end state, the theater strategic end state may contain other supporting objectives and conditions. This end state normally will represent a point in time and/or circumstance beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve remaining objectives of the national strategic end state.

4. CCDR/JFCs include a discussion of the national strategic end state in their initial planning guidance. This ensures that joint forces understand what the President wants the situation to look like at the conclusion of US involvement. The CCDR and subordinate JFCs typically include the **military end state** in their commander's intent statement. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006)

5. During mission analysis, it is essential that the tasks (specified and essential task(s)) and their purposes are clearly stated to ensure planning encompasses all requirements; limitations (restraints-can't do, or constraints – must do) on actions that the commander or subordinate forces may take are understood; and the correlation between the commanders mission and intent and those of higher and other commanders is understood.

6. The joint force's mission is the task or set of tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The JFC and staff can accomplish mission analysis through a number of logical tasks**. Of these two, the purpose is preeminent. The commander can adjust his task to ensure he accomplishes the purpose. This is a critical aspect of mission type orders and the ability of subordinate commanders to re-task themselves during rapidly changing circumstances and still fulfill the commander's intent.**

7. While all of these tasks will be addressed during the plan development process, it is critical to focus on the mission essential task(s) to ensure unity of effort and maximum use of limited resources. The mission essential task(s) defines success of the assigned mission.

8. The mission analysis step has an additional **13*** Key-Steps:

***NOTE:** JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006 on page III-20 lists 15 Mission Analysis Key-Steps. This document recognizes and addresses all **15** Key-Steps of Joint Doctrine but numerates only **13** Key-Steps in the following way: First, JP 5-0's "Review strategic communication guidance" is addressed by this document within Key-Step 1 and 2 (Determine own specified, implied, and essential tasks and Analysis of higher CDR's mission and intent). Secondly, JP 5-0's Key-Step of "Develop Assumptions" will be addressed within this documents Key-Step 3, "Determine known facts, current status, or conditions." This is done to allow a logical flow for planners to follow.

a. Key-Step — 1: Task Analysis, Determine Own Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks
b. Key-Step — 2: Analysis Higher CDR's Mission and Intent
c. Key-Step — 3: Determine Known Facts, Current Status, or Conditions (and Assumptions)
d. Key-Step — 4: Determine Operational Limitations
   - Constraints
   - Restraints
e. Key-Step — 5: Determine Own Military End State, Objectives and Initial Effects
f. Key-Step — 6: Determine Own and Enemy's Center(s) of Gravity and Critical Factors
g. Key-Step — 7: Conduct Initial Force Structure Analysis (Apportioned Forces)
h. Key-Step — 8: Conduct Initial Risk Assessment
i. Key-Step — 9: Determine CDR's CCIR
   - CFFI
   - PIR
j. Key-Step — 10: Develop Tentative Mission Statement
k. Key-Step — 11: Develop Mission Analysis Brief
l. Key-Step — 12: Prepare Initial Staff Estimates
m. Key-Step — 13: Publish Initial CDR's Planning Guidance and Intent

9. Although some Key-Step's occur before others, mission analysis typically involves substantial parallel processing (spiral development) of information by the commander and staff, particularly in a CAP situation. A primary example is the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE). JIPOE is a continuous process that includes defining the operational environment, describing the effects of the operational environment, evaluating the adversary, and determining and describing adversary potential and most dangerous COA(s). This planning process must begin at the earliest stage of a JFC's campaign or operations planning and must be an integral part of, not an addition to, the overall planning effort.

10. **Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE):**

a. Understanding JIPOE is **critical to mission success**. Intelligence must be integrated with the overall plan from beginning to end utilizing the JOPP. JIPOE is a product of the intelligence staff estimate and generally **occurs parallel to the mission analysis.** JIPOE is the analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander's decision-making process. The primary purpose of the JIPOE is to support the CCDR's decision-making and planning by identifying, assessing, and estimating the enemy's COG, critical factors, capabilities, limitations, intentions, and enemy COAs **(ECOA)** that are most likely to be encountered based on the situation. Although JIPOE support to decision-making is both dynamic and continuous, it must also

be "front loaded" in the sense that the majority of analysis must be completed early enough to be factored into the commander's decision-making effort. JIPOE supports mission analysis by enabling the commander and staff to visualize the full extent of the operational environment, to distinguish the known from the unknown, and to establish working assumptions regarding how adversary and friendly forces will interact within the operational environment. JIPOE also assists commanders in formulating their planning guidance by identifying significant adversary capabilities and by pointing out critical operational environment factors, such as the locations of key geography, attitudes of indigenous populations, and potential land, air, and sea avenues of approach. JIPOE will focus on more than just military capabilities, and include information and analysis on enemy information, diplomatic, economic and informational capabilities. The PMESII construct offers a means to capture this information. As planning continues, analysts refine their assessment of the adversary's COGs, potential COAs, and other factors. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 7 October 2004)

(1) The JIPOE process is used to *analyze the air, land, sea, space, weather, electromagnetic, and information environments as well as other dimensions of the battlespace and to determine an adversary's capabilities to operate in each*. JIPOE products are used by joint force and Service component command staffs in preparing their estimates and are also applied during the analysis and selection of friendly COAs.

(2) The JIPOE process assists CCDRs and their staffs in achieving information superiority by identifying adversary centers of gravity (COGs), focusing intelligence collection at the right time and place, and assessing the effects of the operational environment on military operations. However, JIPOE's main focus is on providing predictive intelligence designed to help the CCDR discern the adversary's probable intent, most dangerous COA, and most likely future COA. Simply stated, *JIPOE helps the CCDR to stay inside the adversary's decision loop* (i.e., to react faster and make better decisions than the adversary). (JP 2-01.3, Joint TTP for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, 24 May 2000)

b. The Staff Planners Role in JIPOE: JIPOE is a staff process – not just a J-2 process, and should be driven by the chief of staff. To ensure you're getting the commander relevant and accurate intelligence support material, and to ensure the most efficient and productive use of intelligence resources, the staff should take an active role in meeting with the J-2 and those analysts working on your production requirements. They now also know you and understand intelligence in context with the operation you are planning or executing.

(1) JIPOE is a continuous process that involves four major steps (Figure 13):

(a) Defining the operational environment

(b) Describing the effects of the operational environment

(c) Evaluating the adversary

(d) Determining adversary COAs, particularly the adversary's most likely COA and the COA most dangerous to friendly forces and mission accomplishment.



Figure 13. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

"Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered. Know the ground, know the weather; your victory will be total."
Sun Tzu, The Art of War
C. 500 B. C.



Figure 14. Define the Operational Environment

c. Step 1 — Define the Operational Environment. (Figure 14) During Step 1, the joint force staff assists the JFC and component commanders in determining the dimensions of the joint force's battlespace by identifying the significant characteristics of the operational environment and gathering information relating to the operational environment and the adversary. The joint force J-2 staff works with other joint force and component command staff elements**, including the IO planning staff**, to formulate an initial survey of adversary, environmental, and other characteristics that may impact the friendly joint mission. Additionally, the joint force staff must also recognize that **the operational environment extends beyond the geographic dimensions of land, air, sea, and space**. It also includes nonphysical dimensions such as the electromagnetic spectrum, automated information systems, and public opinion. These nonphysical dimensions may extend well beyond the joint force's designated operational areas, which will also impact determining the **Area of Interest**, or, according to the Joint Pub 1-02, *"that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission*." Understanding which characteristics are significant is done in context with the adversary, weather and terrain, neutral or benign population or elements, and most importantly with the JFC's intent and the mission, if specified. The significant characteristics, once identified, will provide focus and guide the remaining steps of JIPOE. Therefore, **it is essential to conduct effective analysis of the operational environment to ensure the "right" characteristics were identified as**

significant. Identifying the wrong significant characteristics or simply not addressing them jeopardizes the integrity of the operation plan.

The joint force J-2 staff evaluates the available intelligence data bases to determine if the necessary information is available to conduct the remainder of the JIPOE process. In nearly every situation, there will be gaps in the existing data bases. The gaps must be identified early in order for the joint force staff to initiate the appropriate intelligence collection requirements. The joint force J-2 will use the JFC's stated intent and initial PIR to establish priorities for intelligence collection, processing, production, and dissemination. The joint force J-2 staff initiates collection operations and issues RFIs to fill intelligence gaps to the level of detail required to conduct JIPOE. As additional information and intelligence is received, the J-2 staff updates all JIPOE products. **If any assumptions are repudiated by new intelligence, the commander, the J-3, and other appropriate staff elements should reexamine any evaluations and decisions that were based on those assumptions.**

Products from step one may include assessments of each significant characteristic, overlays of each, if applicable, and an understanding and graphical depiction of the operational area and possibly of the area of interests and entities therein which could affect our ability to accomplish our mission. (JFSC, Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook, Sept 2006)



Figure 15. Describe the Effects of the Operational Environment

d. Step 2 — Describe the Effects of the Operational Environment. (Figure 15) **Step 2, describing the operational environment effects, focuses on the environment.** The first action in describing operational environment effects is to analyze the military aspects of the terrain. The famous acronym that aids in addressing the various aspects of the operational environment is OCOKA - observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach. **This analysis is followed by an**

evaluation of how these aspects of the operational environment will affect operations for both friendly and adversary forces.

Products developed during this step might include overlays and matrices that depict the military effects of geography, meteorological (METOC) factors, demographics, and the electromagnetic and cyberspace environments. **The primary product from JIPOE produced in step 2 is the Modified Combined Operations Overlay (MCOO)** (Figure 16). The MCOO is "*a JIPOE product used to portray the effects of each battlespace dimension on military operations. It normally depicts militarily significant aspects of the battlespace environment, such as obstacles restricting military movement, key geography, and military objectives.*" Areas of the operational environment where the terrain predominantly favors one COA over others should be identified and graphically depicted. The most effective graphic technique is to construct a MCOO by depicting (in addition to the restricted and severely restricted areas already shown) such items as **avenues of approach and mobility corridors, counter-mobility obstacle systems, defensible terrain, engagement areas, and key terrain**. Refer to Joint Pub 2-01.3 JTTP for JIPOE for more information concerning the types of MCOOs generated during step 2 of JIPOE.



Figure 16. Combined Obstacle Overlay

A MCOO generally has standardized overlays associated with it. However, it is not a standardized product with respect to what it should portray simply because a commander's requirements are based on his mission and intent – and they differ with each operation. Therefore, the MCOO should portray the relevant information necessary to support the commander's understanding of the battlespace and decision-making process in context with his mission and intent. The results of terrain analysis should be disseminated to the joint force staff as soon as possible by way of the intelligence

estimate (included in the order), documented analysis of the operational area, and the MCOO.

e. Operational environments that you'll be analyzing are broken down into dimensions, as follows:

(1) Land dimension

(2) Maritime dimension

(3) Air dimension

(4) Space dimension

(5) Electromagnetic dimension

(6) Cyberspace dimension

(7) Human dimension

(8) Analysis of weather effects

(9) Other characteristics of the operational environment



Figure 17. Land Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay

(1) Land Dimension. Analysis of the land dimension of the operational environment concentrates on terrain features such as transportation systems (road and bridge information), surface materials, ground water, natural obstacles such as large bodies of water and mountains, the types and distribution of vegetation, and the configuration of surface drainage and weather. Observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach, and mobility corridors are examples of what is required to be evaluated to understand the terrain effects on your plan (Figure 17).



Figure 18. Maritime Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay

(2) Maritime Dimension. The maritime dimension of the operational environment is the sea and littoral environment in which all naval operations take place, including sea control, power projection, and amphibious operations. Key military aspects of the maritime environment can include maneuver space and chokepoints; natural harbors and anchorages; ports, airfields, and naval bases; sea lines of communications (SLOCs), and the hydrographic and topographic characteristics of the ocean floor and littoral land masses (Figure 18).



Figure 19. Air Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay

(3) Air Dimension. The air dimension of the operational environment is the environment in which military air and counter-air operations take place. It is the operating medium for both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, air defense systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise missiles, and some theater and anti-theater ballistic missile systems. The surface and air environments located between the target areas and air operations points of origin are susceptible to METOC conditions, surface and air borne missiles, lack of emergency airfields, restrictive air avenues of approach and operating altitude restrictions to name a few (Figure 19).



Figure 20. Space Modified Combined Overlay Obstacle

(4) Space Dimension. The space dimension of the operational environment begins at the lowest altitude at which a space object can maintain orbit around the earth (approximately 93 miles) and extends upward to approximately 22,300 miles (geosynchronous orbit). Forces that have access to this medium are afforded a wide array of options that can be used to leverage and enhance military capabilities. However, space systems are predictable in that they are placed into the orbits that maximize their mission capabilities. Once a satellite is tracked and its orbit determined, space operations and intelligence crews can usually predict its function and future position (assuming it does not maneuver). The path a satellite makes as it passes directly over portions of the earth can be predicted and displayed on a map as a satellite ground track (Figure 20).



Figure 21. Electromagnetic Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay

(5) Electromagnetic Dimension. The electromagnetic dimension of the operational environment includes all militarily significant portions of the electromagnetic spectrum, to include those frequencies associated with radio, radar, laser, electro-optic, and infrared equipment. It is a combination of the civil electromagnetic infrastructure; natural phenomena; and adversary, friendly, and neutral electromagnetic OB (Figure 21).



Figure 22. Cyberspace Vulnerability Assessment Matrix

(6) Cyberspace Dimension. The use of information systems to support military operations has significantly increased the importance of the cyberspace dimension of the operational environment. Cyberspace provides the environment in which IO such as computer network attack (CNA) and computer network defense are conducted. The ever-increasing complexity of information systems and networks places both military and civilian data bases at risk from this new type of warfare. The effects of the cyberspace environment should be evaluated by identifying and prioritizing those information systems and networks deemed most critical to the planning and conduct of military operations. The relative vulnerability of each critical system can be graphically portrayed in the form of a cyberspace vulnerability assessment matrix, which is another tool for environmental assessment (Figure 22).

(7) Human Dimension. The human dimension of the operational environment consists of various militarily significant sociological, cultural, demographic, and psychological characteristics of the friendly and adversary populace and leadership. It is the environment in which IO, such as psychological operations (PSYOP) and military deception are conducted. The analysis of the human dimension is a two step process that: (1) identifies and assesses all human characteristics that may have an impact on the behavior of the populace as a whole, the military rank and file, and senior military and civil leaders; and (2) evaluates the effects of these human characteristics on military operations. Psychological profiles on military and political leaders may facilitate understanding an adversary's behavior, evaluating an adversary's vulnerability to deception, and assessing the relative probability of an adversary adopting various COAs.



Figure 23. Weather Effects Matrix

(8) Analysis of Weather Effects. Weather affects the operational environment in two ways: it can interact with, and thereby modify, the environmental characteristics of each battlespace dimension; or it can have a direct effect on military operations regardless of operational environment dimension. The analysis of weather effects is a two-step process in which: (1) each military aspect of weather is analyzed; and (2) the effects of weather on military operations are evaluated. The joint force METOC officer is the source for weather information, and assists the joint force staff in determining the effects of METOC on adversary and friendly military operations. The overall effects of forecasted weather can be summarized in the form of a weather effects matrix (Figure 23).

(9) Others characteristics of the operational environment. Other characteristics include all those aspects of the operational environment that could affect friendly or adversary COAs that fall outside the parameters of the categories previously discussed. Because the relevant characteristics will depend upon the situation associated with each mission, there can be no definitive listing of characteristics appropriate under all circumstances. For example, the characteristics of the battlespace that may be relevant to a sustained humanitarian relief operation will be very different from those required for a joint combat operation against an adversary. Some examples to be addressed while evaluating the battlespace environment are time, political and military constraints, environmental and health hazards, infrastructure, industry, agriculture, economics, politics, and history. The country characteristics of an adversary nation should be developed through the analytic integration of all the social, economic, and political variables listed

above. Country characteristics can also provide important clues as to where a nation may use military force and to what degree.



Figure 24. Evaluate the Adversary

f. Step 3 — Evaluate the Adversary. (Figure 24) **Step three of the JIPOE process**, evaluating the adversary, **identifies and evaluates the adversary's military and relevant civil centers of gravity (COG), critical vulnerabilities (CVs), capabilities, limitations, and the doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) employed by adversary forces, absent any constraints that may be imposed by the battlespace environment described in step two.** Failure to accurately evaluate the adversary may cause the command to be surprised by an unexpected adversary capability, or result in the unnecessary expenditure of limited resources against adversary force capabilities that do not exist.

A COG can be viewed as the set of characteristics, capabilities, and sources of power from which a system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act (more on COG in Mission Analysis Key-Step 6). The COG is always linked to the objective. If the objective changes, the center of gravity also could change. At the **strategic level**, a COG could be a military force, an alliance, a political or military leader, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national will. At the **operational level** a COG often is associated with the adversary's military capabilities — such as a powerful element of the armed forces — but could include other capabilities in the operational environment. Since the adversary will protect the center of gravity, the COG invariably is found among strengths rather than among weaknesses or vulnerabilities. **Commanders consider not only the enemy** COGs, but also identify and protect their own COGs, which is a function of the J-3.

The analysis of friendly and adversary COGs is a key step within the planning process. **Joint force intelligence analysts identify adversary COGs.** The analysis is conducted after gaining an understanding of the various systems in the operational environment. The analysis addresses political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure systems of the operational environment, including the adversary's leadership, fielded forces, resources, population, transportation systems, and internal and external relationships. **The goal is to determine from which elements the adversary derives freedom of action, physical strength (means), and the will to fight.** The J-2 then attempts to determine if the tentative or candidate COGs truly are critical to the adversary's strategy. This analysis is a linchpin in the planning effort. After identifying friendly and adversary COGs, JFCs and their staffs must determine how to protect or attack them, respectively. An analysis of the identified COGs in terms of critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities is vital to this process.



Understanding the relationship among the COGs not only permits but also compels greater precision in thought and expression in operational design. Planners should analyze COGs within a framework of three **critical factors** — critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities — to aid in this understanding. **Critical capabilities** are those that are considered crucial enablers for a center of gravity to function as such, and are essential to the accomplishment of the adversary's assumed objective(s). **Critical requirements** are essential conditions, resources, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational. **Critical vulnerabilities** are those aspects or components of critical requirements that are deficient, or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack in a manner achieving decisive or significant results. Collectively, the terms above are referred to as ***critical factors***. In general, a JFC must possess sufficient operational reach and combat power to take advantage of an adversary's critical vulnerabilities. Similarly, a supported commander must protect friendly critical capabilities within the operational reach of an adversary. **As a best practice, the J-2 will act as a "red cell" in helping to identify the friendly forces COG and conduct COG analysis to support an understanding of what must be protected**.



In addition to the initial results of COG analysis, the **primary products from JIPOE** produced in JIPOE step three are doctrinal templates, descriptions of the adversary's preferred tactics and options, and the identification of high-value targets (HVTs), which are "*targets that the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the*

mission. The loss of high-value targets would be expected to seriously degrade important enemy functions throughout the friendly commander's area of interest."

Adversary models depict how an opponent's military forces prefer to conduct operations under ideal conditions. They are based on a detailed study of the adversary's normal or "doctrinal" organization, equipment, and TTP. Adversary models are normally completed prior to deployment, and are continuously updated as required during military operations. The **models consist of three major parts**: (1) graphical depictions of adversary doctrine or patterns of operations (**doctrinal templates**), (2) **descriptions of the adversary's preferred tactics and options**, and (3) the **identification of high-value targets (HVTs)**.

Doctrinal templates illustrate the employment patterns and dispositions preferred by an adversary when not constrained by the effects of the operational environment. They are usually scaled graphic depictions of adversary dispositions for specific types of military (conventional or unconventional) operations such as movements to contact, anti-surface warfare operations, insurgent attacks in urban areas, combat air patrols, and aerial ambushes. JIPOE utilizes single-service doctrinal templates that portray adversary and, sea, air, special, or space operations, and produces joint doctrinal templates that portray the relationships between all the adversary's service components when conducting joint operations.

In addition to the graphic depiction of adversary operations portrayed on the doctrinal template, an adversary model must also include a **written description of an opponent's preferred tactics**. This description should address the types of activities and supporting operations that the various adversary units portrayed on the doctrinal template are expected to perform. It also contains a listing or description of the options (branches) available to the adversary — should either the joint operation or any of the supporting operations fail — or subsequent operations (sequels) if they succeed.

The adversary model must also include a list of HVTs. HVTs are those assets that the adversary commander requires for the successful completion of the joint mission (and supporting missions) that are depicted and described on the joint doctrinal template. These targets are identified by combining operational judgment with an evaluation of the information contained in the joint doctrinal template and description. Assets are identified that are critical to the joint mission's success, that are key to each component's supporting operation, or that are crucial to the adoption of various branches or sequels to the joint operation. The joint targeting community collaborates in the identification of HVTs with the responsible producers for various intelligence product category codes.



Figure 25. Determine Adversary Courses of Action

g. Step 4 — Determine Adversary Courses of Action (COAs). (Figure 25) The first three steps of the JIPOE process help to satisfy the operational environment awareness requirements of the JFC and subordinate commanders by analyzing the effects of the battlespace environment, assessing adversary doctrine and capabilities, and identifying adversary COGs. The **fourth step of the JIPOE process seeks to go beyond operational environment awareness to help the JFC attain knowledge of the operational environment** (i.e., a detailed understanding of the adversary's probable intent and future strategy). The process for step four provides a disciplined methodology for analyzing the set of potential adversary COAs in order to identify the COA the adversary is most likely to adopt, and the COA that would be most dangerous to the friendly force or to mission accomplishment.

The first activity in JIPOE step four is to identify **the adversary's likely objectives and desired end state** by analyzing the current adversary military and political situation, strategic and operational capabilities, and the country characteristics of the adversary nation, if applicable. The JIPOE analyst should begin by identifying the adversary's overall strategic objective, which will form the basis for identifying subordinate objectives and desired end states.

During this step, a consolidated list of all potential adversary COAs is constructed. At a minimum this list will include (1) all COAs that the adversary's doctrine considers appropriate to the current situation and accomplishment of likely objectives, (2) all adversary COAs that could significantly influence the friendly mission, even if the adversary's doctrine considers them suboptimal under current conditions, and (3) all

adversary COAs indicated by recent activities or events. Each COA is generated based on what we know of the adversary and how they operate (learned from step 3 of JIPOE) to determine if the adversary can in fact accomplish the COA. If not, it is eliminated. J-2 analysts' study how an adversary operates compared to the environment it must operate within, which we analyzed during step 2 of JIPOE. Essentially, they superimpose the doctrinal adversary mode of operation on the environment. The result of this analysis is a full set of identified adversary COAs – time permitting. **Adversary COAs that meet specific criteria** are then completed. Much like friendly forces determine if their COAs meet specific criteria, J-2 personnel must also weigh the identified adversary COAs against certain criteria. The criteria generally includes: **(1) suitability, (2) feasibility, (3) acceptability, (4) uniqueness, and (5) consistency with their own doctrine**.

Each COA should be developed in the amount of detail that time allows. Subject to the amount of time available for analysis, each adversary COA is developed in sufficient detail to describe, (1) the type of military operation, (2) the earliest time military action could commence, (3) the location of the sectors, zones of attack, avenues of approach, and objectives that make up the COA, (4) the OPLAN, to include scheme of maneuver and force dispositions, and (5) the objective or desired end state. **Each COA should be developed in the order of its probability of adoption, and should consist of a situation template, a description of the COA, and a listing of HVTs.**

A full set of identified adversary COAs are evaluated and ranked according to their likely order of adoption. The purpose of the prioritized list of adversary COAs is to provide a JFC and his staff with a starting point for the development of an OPLAN that takes into consideration the most likely adversary COA as well as the adversary COA most dangerous to the friendly force or mission accomplishment.

h. For more information on JIPOE, refer to JP 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. Also, see JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006, JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 Sept 06 and JFSC, Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook, Sept 2006.

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CHAPTER X

Mission Analysis Key-Steps

1. **Key-Step — 1: Determine Own Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks (Task Analysis).** Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks, by reviewing strategic communication guidance and other documents used during Function I, Strategic Guidance and Initiation, in order to develop a concise mission statement. Specified and implied strategic tasks are derived from specific Presidential, SecDef guidance, national (or multinational) planning guidance documents such as the JSCP, the UCP, or from CCDR initiatives. The national military objectives form the basis of the campaign's mission statement.

a. Specified task — A task that is specifically assigned to an organization by its higher headquarters. Tasks *listed* in the mission received from higher headquarters are specified or stated (assigned) tasks. They are what the higher commander wants accomplished. The commander's specified tasks are normally found in paragraph 3b, (Execution-Tasks) section of the order, but could also be contained elsewhere. — for example in coordinating instructions or in annexes (though this should be avoided if possible). (NWC Primer, 30 Sept 2004)

b. Implied task — A task that must be performed to accomplish a specified task or the mission, but is not stated in the higher headquarters order. The implied tasks subsequently included in the commander's proposed mission should be limited to those considered critical to the accomplishment of the assigned mission and are not routine or a standard operating procedure.

c. Essential task — A task that must be executed to accomplish the mission. Only essential tasks should be included in the mission statement.

2. **Key-Step — 2: Analyze Higher CDR's Mission and Intent.** Assess the scope of the assigned mission, end state, objectives, and other guidance from the next higher commander (purpose, method, endstate). Determine whether the mission can be accomplished in a single operation, or will likely require a campaign due to its complexity and likely duration and intensity. At the CCDR level this would be strategic guidance issued by the President, Secretary of Defense or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The commander should not make assumptions about issues not addressed by the higher commander and if **the higher headquarters' directive is unclear, ambiguous, or confusing, the commander should seek clarification.** The higher Commander's Intent is normally found in Paragraph 3, Execution, of the higher commander's guidance. The intent statement of the higher echelon commander should then be repeated in paragraph 1, Situation, of your own Operations Plan (OPLAN) or Operations Order (OPORD) to ensure that the staff and supporting commanders understand it. Each subordinate Commander's Intent must be framed and embedded within the context of the higher Commander's Intent, and they must be nested both horizontally and vertically to achieve a common military endstate. (NWC Primer, 30 Sept 2004)

3. **Key-Step — 3: Determine Known Facts, Current Status, or Conditions (and Assumptions).** The staff assembles both facts and assumptions to support the planning process and initial planning guidance.

a. A fact is a statement of information known to be true (such as verified locations of friendly and adversary force dispositions), while an assumption provides a supposition about the current situation or future course of events, assumed to be true in the absence of facts. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006)

b. Assumptions provide a supposition about the current situation or future course of events, assumed to be true in the absence of facts. Assumptions are necessary to enable the commander to complete an estimate of the situation and select the COA. If you make an assumption, you must direct resources towards turning it into a fact. Assumptions that address gaps in knowledge are critical for the planning process to continue. The commander considers assumptions handed down from higher echelons as facts. When dealing with an assumption, changes to the plan may need to be developed should the assumption prove to be incorrect. Because of their influence on planning, the fewest possible assumptions are included in a plan. A valid assumption has three characteristics: it is *logical, realistic, and essential* for the planning to continue. Assumptions are made for both friendly and adversary situations. The planner should assume that the adversary would use every capability at his disposal (i.e., nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC), asymmetric approach, etc.) and operate in the most efficient manner possible. Planners should never assume an adversary has less capability than anticipated, nor assume that key friendly forces have more capability than has been demonstrated. (JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, 25 Jan 2002)

4. **Key-Step — 4: Determine Operational Limitations: Constraints/Restraints.** Operational limitations are actions required or prohibited by higher authority and other restrictions that limit the commander's freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, political and economic conditions in affected countries, and host nation issues.

a. A constraint is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that *dictates an action*, thus restricting freedom of action. For example, General Eisenhower was required to liberate Paris instead of bypassing it during the 1944 campaign in France.

b. A restraint is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that *prohibits an action*, thus restricting freedom of action. For example, General MacArthur was prohibited from striking Chinese targets north of the Yalu River during the Korean War.

c. Some operational limitations are commonly expressed as Rules of Engagement (ROE). Operational limitations may restrict or bind COA selection or may even impede implementation of the chosen COA. These ROE or operational limitations become more complex in multinational or coalition operations. Commanders must examine the operational limitations imposed on them, understand their impacts, and develop options that minimize these impacts in order to promote maximum freedom of

action during execution. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006)

5. **Key-Step — 5: Determine Own Military End State, Objectives and Initial Effects.** Remember that a primary consideration for a supported CCDR during mission analysis is the **national strategic end state —** that set of national objectives and related guidance that define strategic success from the President's perspective. This end state will reflect the broadly expressed political, military, economic, social, informational, and other circumstances that should exist after the conclusion of a campaign or operation. Below is an example of a national strategic end state:

"An economically viable and stable Country X, without the capability to coerce its neighbors."

The **theater strategic or military end state** is a subset of the national strategic end state discussed above, and generally describes the military conditions that must be met to satisfy the objectives of the strategic end state. Often, the military end state is achieved before the national strategic end state; it signifies when the President no longer requires the military as the primary element of national power required to achieve the remaining objectives of the national strategic end state. An example of a theater strategic or military end state:

"A defeated Country X where WMD delivery, production, and storage, as well as conventional force projection capabilities, are destroyed; and its remaining military is reorganized to adequately defend its borders."

a. In this task the supported CCDR typically will specify a theater strategic end state. While it will mirror many of the objectives of the national strategic end state, the theater strategic end state may contain other supporting objectives and conditions. This end state normally will represent a point in time and/or circumstance beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve remaining objectives of the national strategic end state.

b. JFCs include a discussion of the national strategic end state in their initial planning guidance. This ensures that joint forces understand what the President wants the situation to look like at the conclusion of US involvement. The CCDR and subordinate JFCs typically include the military end state in their commander's intent statement.

c. The President or SecDef, with the advice of the CJCS and the supported CCDR, should clearly describe the national strategic end state before committing the Armed Forces of the United States to an operation. The CJCS or the supported CCDR may recommend a military end state, but the President or SecDef should formally approve it. A clearly defined military end state complements and *supports attaining the specified termination criteria and objectives associated with other instruments of national power.* The military end state helps affected CCDRs modify their theater strategic estimates and begin mission analysis even without a pre- existing OPLAN. The CCDR must work closely with the civilian leadership to ensure a clearly defined military end state is established. The CCDR also should anticipate that military capability likely

would be required in some capacity in support of other instruments of national power, potentially before, during, and after any required large-scale combat. Commanders and their staffs must understand that many factors can affect national strategic objectives, possibly causing the end state to change even as military operations unfold. A clearly defined end state is just as necessary for situations across the range of military operations that might not require large-scale combat. While there may not be an armed adversary to confront in some situations, the JFC still must think in terms of ends, ways, and means that will lead to success and end state attainment.

> (1) The Military End State. This end state normally represents a point in time and/or circumstances beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve remaining national objectives. While it may mirror many of the conditions of the national end state, the military end state typically will be more specific and contain other supporting objectives. These conditions contribute to developing *termination criteria*, the specified standards approved by the President and/or the Secretary of Defense that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded. Aside from its obvious association with strategic or operational objectives, clearly defining the military end state promotes unity of effort, facilitates synchronization, and helps clarify (and may reduce) the risk associated with the joint campaign or operation. Commanders should include the military end state in their planning guidance and in their commander's intent statement. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006)
>
> (2) As you work through phasing in later steps you will note that each phase has an endstate prior to the transition to the follow-on phases. Phasing is accomplished using both backward and forward planning; one method develops phases from endstate to the present, the other from present to the endstate.
>
> (3) Desired End State. The thread of continuity that ties the strategic objectives to the operational and tactical levels is the desired "end state." A strategic end state simply means the required conditions that achieve the strategic objectives. Normally this constitutes crisis resolution and the disengagement of the military instrument of national power from the contingency. (JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, 25 Jan 2002)

d. Conflict Termination. Every campaign and every strategic effort is directed toward a goal, and at some point military action eventually ends. Just as the combatant commander must clearly understand the desired end state, so too must the termination criteria for the campaign be understood. Effective planning cannot occur without a clear picture of the military end state and termination criteria. Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is essential to achieving the national strategic end state. When and under what circumstances to suspend or terminate military operations is a political decision. Even so, it is essential that the CJCS and the supported JFC advise the President and SecDef during the decision-making process. The supported JFC should ensure that political leaders understand the implications, both

immediate and long term, of a suspension of hostilities at any point in the conflict. Once established, the national strategic objectives enable the supported commander to develop the military end state, recommended termination criteria, and supporting military objectives.

(1) Properly conceived termination criteria are essential to ensuring that victories achieved with military forces endure. When planning a joint operation, the supported JFC and the subordinate commanders consider the nature of the conflict and the type of military operations that will establish the conditions necessary to bring the conflict to a favorable end. The CCDR then will consult with the CJCS and the SecDef to establish the termination criteria — the specified standards approved by the President and/or the SecDef that must be met before joint operations can be concluded. To facilitate development of effective termination criteria, it must be understood that US forces must be dominant in not only the phases that involve major combat operations, but also in the "stabilize" and "enable civil authority" phases to achieve the leverage sufficient to impose a lasting solution. If the termination criteria have been properly set and met, the necessary leverage should exist to prevent the adversary from renewing hostilities and to dissuade other adversaries from interfering. When addressing conflict termination, commanders and their staffs must consider a wide variety of operational issues, to include disengagement, force protection, transition to post-conflict operations, reconstitution, and redeployment. They must also anticipate the nature of post-conflict operations (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006).

(2) Planners must plan for conflict termination from the outset of the planning process and update these plans as the campaign evolves. To maintain the proper perspective, they must know what constitutes an acceptable political-military end state; i.e., what military conditions must exist to justify a cessation of combat operations? In examining the proposed national strategic end state, the CCDR and the staff must consider whether it has reasonable assurance of ending the fundamental problem or underlying conditions that instigated the conflict in the first place.

(3) When addressing conflict termination, campaign planners must consider a wide variety of operational issues, to include disengagement, force protection, transition to post-conflict operations, and reconstitution and redeployment. Planners must also anticipate the nature of post-conflict operations, where the focus will likely shift to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR); for example, peace operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, or enforcement of exclusion zones.

(4) In formulating the theater campaign plan, the CCDR and staff should ensure the following:

(a) Conflict termination, end of the joint operation, is a key aspect of the campaign planning process.
(b) Emphasizing backward planning; decision makers should not take the first step toward hostilities or war without considering the last step.

(c) Defining the conditions of the termination phase. The military objectives must support the political aims — the campaign's conflict termination process is a part of a larger implicit bargaining process, even while hostilities continue. The military contribution can significantly affect the political leverage available to influence that process.

(d) Considering how efforts to eliminate or degrade an opponent's command and control (C2) may affect, positively or negatively, efforts to achieve the termination objectives. Will opponents be able to affect a cease-fire or otherwise control the actions of their forces?

(e) Interagency coordination plays a major role in the termination phase. View conflict termination not just as the end of a joint operation and disengagement by joint forces, but as the transition to a new post-hostilities phase characterized by both civil and military problems.

e. Objectives. *An objective is a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every military operation is directed.* Objectives and their supporting effects provide the basis for identifying tasks to be accomplished.

(1) Strategic military objectives define the role of military forces in the larger context of national strategic objectives. This focus on strategic military objectives is one of the most important considerations in operational design. The nature of the political aim, taken in balance with the sources of national strength and vulnerabilities, must be compared with the strengths and vulnerabilities of the adversary and/or other factors in the operational environment to arrive at reasonably attainable strategic military objectives. Strategic objectives must dominate the planning process at every juncture. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006)

f. Effects. **Effects help commanders and their staffs understand and measure conditions for achieving objectives**. The use of effects planning is not new, good commanders and staffs have always thought and planned this way. Effects should not be over-engineered into a list of equations, data bases and checklists. The use of effects during planning is reflected in the steps of JOPP as a way to clarify the relationship between objectives and tasks. In general, about 8-12 effects are appropriate for most campaign plans. (Insights on Joint Operations, Gen (Ret) Gary Luck, Sept 2006)

(1) An effect is a physical and/or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. A desired effect can also be thought of as a condition that supports achieving an associated objective, while an undesired effect could inhibit progress toward an objective. During

mission analysis, the CCDR considers how to achieve national and theater-strategic objectives, knowing that these likely will involve the efforts of other U.S. agencies and multinational partners.

(2) The use of effects in planning helps commanders and staff use other elements of operational design more effectively by clarifying the relationships between Centers of Gravity (COG), Lines of Operation (LOO), decisive points, and termination criteria. The JFC and planners continue to develop and refine effects throughout JOPP planning steps. Monitoring progress toward attaining desired effects and avoiding undesired effects continues throughout execution (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006).

(3) In Figure 26 on the following page, the left side of the chart depicts the broader concepts of effects-based approach to operations while the right side of the chart depicts the doctrinal operational planning process; the mechanical process thru which JTFs plan. A best practice that has been seen in the field, especially in headquarters like Multi National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) & Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF-76), is incorporating effects-based approach to operations into the existing operational planning process. Incorporating an effects-based approach to operations into the operational planning process does not represent a departure from the existing doctrinally-based process, it simply constitutes a way to broaden the types of things we think about when approaching planning problems.

(4) With a common set of desired and undesired effects, the commander can issue guidance and intent to his staff and components, and work with other stakeholders to accomplish fused, synchronized, and appropriate actions on Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information (PMESII) systems within the operational environment (beyond MIL on MIL) to attain the desired effects and achieve objectives (Effects Based Approach to Operations, JTG-JWFC, Sept 2006).

NOTE: Effects Based Approach and Effects Based Operations are currently not doctrinal terms included within JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006.

(5) Key to the effects-based approach is full participation of all of the players-military and other elements of national power – in a fully inclusive process of assessing, planning and eventually directing actions.



Figure 26. Effects-Based approach to Operations and the Operational Planning Process

7. **Key-Step — 6: Determine Own and Enemy's Center(s) of Gravity (COG) and Critical Factors.**

a. A COG is the source of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance — what Clausewitz called "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends "the point at which all our energies should be directed." A **COG comprises the source of power that provides freedom of action, physical strength, and will to fight**. COGs exist in an adversarial context involving a clash of moral wills and/or physical strengths. They are formed out of the relationships between the two adversaries and they do not exist in a strategic or operational vacuum. At the strategic level, a COG might be a military force, an alliance, a political or military leader, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national will. At the operational level a COG often is associated with the adversary's military capabilities — such as a powerful element of the armed forces — but could include other capabilities in the operational environment associated with the adversary's political, economic, social, information, and infrastructure systems. Commanders consider not only the enemy COGs, but also identify and protect their own COGs (e.g., During the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War the coalition itself was identified as a friendly strategic COG, and the CCDR took measures to protect it, to include deployment of theater missile defense systems).

b. **The essence of operational art lies in being able to produce the right combination of effects in time, space, and purpose relative to a COG to neutralize, weaken, destroy** (consistent with desired end state/CDRs intent), or otherwise exploit it

in a manner that best helps achieve military objectives and attain the military end state. In theory, this is the most direct path to mission accomplishment. However, COG analysis is continuous and a COG can change during the course of an operation for a variety of reasons. For example, a COG might concern the mass of adversary units, which has not yet formed. Likewise, the CCDR must plan for protecting friendly potential COGs such as agreements with neutral and friendly nations for transit of forces, information and networks, coalition relationships, and US and international public opinion.

c. The COG construct is useful as an analytical tool to help CCDRs and staffs analyze friendly and adversary sources of strength as well as weaknesses and vulnerabilities. *COGs are not vulnerabilities*. However, within every COG lies inherent vulnerabilities, that when attacked, can render those COGs weaker and even more susceptible to direct attack and eventual destruction. **This process cannot be taken lightly, since a faulty conclusion resulting from a poor or hasty analysis can have very serious consequences, such as the inability to achieve strategic and operational objectives at an acceptable cost.** Friendly and enemy COGs can change over time and are based on the end state, mission, and objectives as well as the adversary's strategy. Planners must continually analyze and refine COGs. Selection of COGs is not solely a static process by the J-2 during JIPOE. Figure 27 shows a number of characteristics that can be associated with a COG. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006)

d. The adversarial context pertinent to COG analysis takes place within the broader operational environment context. A systems perspective of the operational environment assists in understanding the adversary's COGs. In combat operations, this involves knowledge of how an adversary organizes, fights, and makes decisions, and of their physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, the CCDR and staff must understand other operational environment systems and their interaction with the military system (see Figure 28). **This holistic understanding helps commanders and their staffs identify COGs, <u>critical factors</u>, and <u>decisive points</u> to formulate lines of operations (LOO)** (LOO discussed in detail in CHAPTER XIII) **and visualize the CONOPS.** (JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 September 2006)



Figure 27. Characteristics of Center Gravity

(1) All COGs have inherent "**critical capabilities**" — those means that are considered crucial enablers for the adversary's COG to function and essential to the accomplishment of the adversary's assumed objective(s). These critical capabilities permit an adversary's COG to resist the military end state. In turn, all critical capabilities have essential "**critical requirements**" — those essential conditions, resources, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational. **Critical vulnerabilities** are those aspects or components of the adversary's critical requirements which are deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects disproportionate to the military resources applied. Collectively, these are referred to as "**critical factors**."

(a) Direct versus Indirect**.** In theory, direct attacks against enemy COGs resulting in their neutralization or destruction is the most direct path to victory — if it can be done in a prudent manner (as defined by the military and political dynamics of the moment). Where direct attacks against enemy COGs mean attacking into an opponent's strength, CCDRs should seek an indirect approach until conditions are established that permit successful direct attacks. In this manner, the enemy's critical vulnerabilities can offer indirect pathways to gain leverage over its COGs. For example, if the operational COG is a large enemy force, the joint force may attack it indirectly by isolating it from its C2, severing its LOCs, and defeating or degrading its protection capabilities. In this way, CCDRs employ a synchronized and integrated combination of operations to weaken enemy COGs indirectly by attacking critical requirements, which are sufficiently vulnerable.

(2) Decisive Points. In determining where and how to apply friendly capabilities to exploit enemy vulnerabilities, commanders and their staffs will have to identify decisive points. A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows a commander to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contributes materially to achieving success. Decisive points can be physical in nature, such as a constricted sea lane, a hill, a town, WMD capabilities, or an air base; but they could include other elements such as command posts, critical boundaries, airspace, or communications or intelligence nodes. In some cases, specific key events also may be decisive points; such as attainment of diplomatic permission for overflight of foreign nations, air or maritime superiority, commitment of the enemy's reserve, repairing damaged infrastructure, or providing clean water. In still other cases, decisive points may be systemic, such as political, economic, social, information, and infrastructure**. Although decisive points are not COGs, they are the keys to attacking protected COGs or defending them. Decisive points can be thought of as a way to relate what is "critical" to what is "vulnerable."** (Decisive points are always oriented on the key vulnerabilities that can only be identified through the COG or another method of systems analysis. Generally, CCDRs attack adversary vulnerabilities at decisive points so that the results they achieve are disproportional to the military and other resources applied). Consequently, commanders and their staffs must analyze the operational environment and determine which systems' nodes or links or key events offer the best opportunity to affect the enemy's COGs or to gain or maintain the initiative. The commander then designates them as decisive points, incorporates them in the LOOs, and allocates sufficient resources to produce the desired effects against them.

(a) JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006 describes Lines of Operations as the linkage of several decisive points associated with the COG and the objectives of the campaign. Lines of operations may be physical or logical, or both. Physical lines of operations *connect a series of decisive points over time to lead to defeat of the enemy or control of a geographic area.* Logical lines of operation link multiple *decisive points, in logic or purpose, to defeat the enemy or achieve an objective*. Logical lines are most useful to describe CCDR operations when positional or geographic reference to an enemy has less relevance. Determining lines of operation to shape friendly operations oriented on decisive points begins with COG analysis, continues through COA development and analysis, and is refined continuously as the strategic concept of the campaign is developed. More on LOO's in Chapter XIII, COA Development.

e. No COG discussion is complete until we look at the whole operational environment and take a comprehensive look at all the systems in this environment relevant to the mission and operation at hand. A system is a functionally related group of elements forming a complex whole. A systems view to understanding the operational environment considers more than just an adversary's military capabilities, order of battle,

and tactics. Instead, it strives to provide a perspective of interrelated systems **political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure** (PMESII), and others, that comprise the operational environment relevant to a specific operation (Figure 28). A systems perspective facilitates the planning and operational design of all joint operations. It supports unified action by providing the CCDR and staff with a common frame of reference for collaborative planning with other government agencies (OGA) counterparts to determine and coordinate necessary actions that are beyond the CCDR's command authority.



Figure 28. Identifying Centers of Gravity

f. The traditional military-centric single center of gravity focus that worked so well in the cold war doesn't allow us to accurately analyze, describe, and visualize today's emerging networked, adaptable, asymmetric adversary. This adversary has no single identifiable 'source of all power.' Rather, because of globalization, the information revolution, and, in some cases, the non-state characteristic of our adversary, this form of adversary can only be described (and holistically attacked) as a system of systems. (Insights on Joint Operations: The Art and Science, Gen (Ret) Gary Luck, September 2005)

8. **Key-Step — 7: Conduct Initial Force Structure Analysis (Apportioned Forces).**

<u>Availability of Forces for Joint Operations</u>

a. Joint operation planning uses four terms — **assigned**, **attached**, **<u>apportioned</u>**, and **allocated** — to define the availability of forces and resources for planning and conducting joint operations.

(1) **Assigned.** Combatant commanders exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces. Forces are assigned or reassigned when the transfer of forces will be permanent or for an unknown

period of time, or when the broadest level of command authority is required or desired. Assigned forces are listed in the *Forces for Unified Command Memorandum* or as the SecDef designates. A force assigned to a combatant command may be transferred from that command only as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

(2) **Attached.** In joint operations, attached forces and resources are placed under the operational control or tactical control of a CCDR or other JFCs for a relatively temporary situation. A force attached to a combatant command may be transferred from that command only as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

(3) **Apportioned.** In the general sense, **apportionment** is the **distribution for planning** of limited resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionments (such as air sorties and forces for planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning, and so forth. The Global Force Management (GFM) guidance apportions major combat forces for Contingency Planning. They may include those assigned and those expected through mobilization. They may be more or less than the forces actually allocated for CAP. During force planning, CCDRs assume that apportioned forces will be made available for execution.

(4) **Allocated.** In the general sense, **allocation** is the **distribution at execution** of limited resources among competing requirements for employment. Specific allocations (such as air sorties, nuclear weapons, forces and transportation) are described as allocation of air sorties, nuclear weapons, and so forth. Allocated forces and resources are those provided by the President or SecDef for CAP. The allocation of forces and resources is accomplished in JOPES OPORD. Allocated augmenting forces become assigned or attached forces when they are transferred to the receiving CCDR. GFM supports allocation in support of specific requests for capabilities and forces as well as allocation in support of combatant command rotational force needs.

b. Global Force Management (GFM) Guidance. The GFM guidance integrates complementary assignment, apportionment, and allocation processes into a single management process in support of the National Defense Strategy and joint force availability requirements. GFM provides comprehensive insights into the global availability of U.S. military forces and supports senior decision makers with a process to assess quickly and accurately the impact and risk of proposed changes in forces or capability assignment, apportionment, and allocation.

c. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. **The JSCP provides military strategic and operational guidance** and direction to CCDRs and Service Chiefs for preparation of OPLANs and security cooperation plans **based on current military capabilities.** It is the primary vehicle through which the CJCS exercises responsibility to provide for the preparation of joint operation plans. Based on policy guidance and tasks in the CPG, **the JSCP is the link between strategic guidance and the joint operation planning**

activities and products that accomplish that guidance. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006)

9. **Key-Step — 8: Conduct Initial Risk Assessment.**

a. Risk is inherent in military operations. Risk management is a function of command and is based on the amount of risk a higher authority is willing to accept. Risk management assists commanders in conserving lives and resources and avoiding or mitigating unnecessary risk, making an informed decision to execute a mission, identifying feasible and effective control measures where specific standards do not exist, and providing reasonable alternatives for mission accomplishment.

b. Risk management does not inhibit commanders' flexibility and initiative, remove risk altogether (or support a zero defects mindset), require a GO/NO-GO decision, sanction or justify violating the law, or remove the necessity for development of standing operating procedures (SOPs). Risk management should be applied to all levels of war, across the range of military operations, and all phases of an operation to include any branches and sequels of an operation. To alleviate or reduce risk, commanders may change the CONOPS or concept of fire support, execute a branch plan, or take other measures to reduce or bypass enemy capabilities.

(1) **Safety** is crucial to successful training and operations and the preservation of military power. High-tempo operations may increase the risk of injury and death due to mishaps. Command interest, discipline, risk mitigation measures, and training lessen those risks. The JFC reduces the chance of mishap by conducting risk assessments, assigning a safety officer and staff, implementing a safety program, and seeking advice from local personnel. Safety planning factors could include the geospatial and weather data, local road conditions and driving habits, uncharted or uncleared mine fields, and special equipment hazards.

(2) To assist in risk management, commanders and their staffs may develop or institute a risk management process tailored to their particular mission or operational area. Figure 29 is a generic model that contains the likely elements of a risk management process. (JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 September 2006)

Figure 29. Risk Management Process

c. When you conduct a preliminary risk assessment you must determining what *obstacles* or *actions* may preclude mission accomplishment. The first two steps of the three step risk management process are the *identification of risk* and the *assessment of its hazard*.

(1) Identify risk: Assess the probability and severity of loss linked to known or assumed hazards.

(2) Assessment of the risk(s) hazard: The condition with the potential to cause injury, illness or death of personnel; damage to, or loss of, equipment or property; or mission degradation.

(3) The third element of risk assessment is *risk management*, the process by which decision makers reduce or offset risk. (JP 5-00.2, JTF Planning Guidance and Procedures, 13 January 1999)

d. Operational risk is the commander's conceptual balance between danger and opportunity; it considers the resources available, the component's mission and the operational environment. The rewards of meeting the desired objectives or effects must outweigh the potential costs associated with mission accomplishment. While the commander must ultimately make the decisions what risks the strategy and forces will assume, the staff's role it to identify critical decision and risk points, provide supporting information and ensure the commander's risk decisions are considered throughout operational planning and execution.

e. The commander expresses guidance regarding risk in several ways. The commander's risk estimate is based on the mission, his or her experience, higher headquarters' guidance and staff estimates. With these considerations, the commander formulates initial staff guidance, followed by an intent statement during the mission analysis step. The commander expresses an estimate of risk every time he or she provides guidance. Some risk factors permit quantitative analysis while others will be wholly qualitative. Probability and statistics support risk analysis, but the commander will have to address operational risk subjectively when supporting information is unavailable. (Service School Planning Primers, JAWS, January 2006)

f. Risk vs. Gamble. The difference between a risk and a gamble is that you can recover from a risk, you can't from a gamble. Ensure that when conducting your Risk Analysis that if you risk mitigation fails, you still will not.

> ***"If you can recover from the loss, it's a risk. If not, it's a gamble"***
> **Field Marshal Erwin Rommel**

10. **Key-Step — 9: Determine CDR's CCIR: Commander's Critical Information Requirements. CCIRs are elements of information required by the commander that directly affect decision-making.** CCIRs are a key information management tool for the commander and help the commander assess the operational environment and identify decision points throughout the conduct of operations. **CCIRs are established by the commander**, should be developed and recommended by staffs as part of the planning process.

a. Characteristics. CCIRs result from the analysis of information requirements in the context of a mission, commander's intent, and the concept of operation. Commanders designate CCIRs to let their staffs and subordinates know what information they deem necessary for decision-making. In all cases, the fewer the CCIRs, the better the staff can focus its efforts and allocate scarce resources. Staffs may recommend CCIRs; however, they keep the number of recommended CCIRs to a minimum. **CCIRs are not static**. Commanders add, delete, adjust, and update them throughout an operation based on the information they need for decision-making.

b. Key Elements. **CCIRs include priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs).** Not all proposed PIRs and FFIRs are selected as CCIRs. Those PIRs not selected are downgraded to Information Requirements (IRs). PIRs focus on the adversary and the environment and drive intelligence collection and production requirements. FFIRs focus on the friendly force and supporting capabilities and drive reporting and requests for information (see Figure 30). Although CCIRs generate PIRs and FFIRs for management, the staff focuses on answering the CCIRs to support the commander's decision-making.



Figure 30. Information Requirements Categories



Figure 31. Commander's Critical Information Requirements Process

c. Process. To assist in managing CCIRs, commanders should adopt a process to guide the staff. This process should include specific responsibilities for development, validation, dissemination, monitoring, reporting, and maintenance (i.e., modifying/deleting). Figure 31 is a generic process for developing CCIRs. This process

may be tailored for a specific mission or operational area. (JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 September 2006)

d. Decision Support. CCIR support the commander's future decision requirements and are often related to Measures of Effectiveness and Measures of Performance. PIR are often expressed in terms of the elements of PMESII while FFIR are often expressed in terms of DIME. All are developed to support specific decisions the commander must make. (JP 2-01, Joint and National Support to Military Operations, 7 Oct 2004)

11. **Key-Step — 10: Develop Mission Statement.**

a. Mission Statement. **Develop Tentative Mission Statement:** The product of the mission analysis is the tentative mission. It must be a clear, concise statement of the essential tasks to be accomplished by the command and the purpose of those tasks. Multiple tasks are normally listed in the sequence to be accomplished. Although several tasks may have been identified during the mission analysis, the proposed mission includes only those that are essential to the overall success of the mission. The tasks that are routine or inherent responsibilities of a commander are not included in the proposed mission. The proposed mission becomes the focus of the commander's staff's estimates. It should be continually reviewed during the planning process to ensure planning is not straying from this critical focus (or that the mission requires adjustment). It is contained in paragraph 1 of the commander's estimate and paragraph 2 of the basic OPLAN or OPORD. (NWC Primer, January 2006)

b. The mission statement should be a short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization's essential task (or tasks) and purpose — a clear (**brevity and clarity)** statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The mission statement contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why; but seldom specifies how. Clarity of the joint force mission statement and its understanding by subordinates, before and during the joint operation, is vital to success. (JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 September 2006)

c. No mission statement should be written and not revised thereafter; it's important to revisit it during the entire plan development process to ensure that it meets the needs of the commander and the national leadership. A sample combatant commander's mission statement could look like this:

> *"On order, JTF Blue Sword conducts operations to seize lodgments in Redlands and defeat the Redland forces in order to eliminate terrorist safe havens in the region."*

12. **Key-Step — 11: Develop and Conduct Mission Analysis Brief.** Upon conclusion of the Mission Analysis and JIPOE, the staff will present a Mission Analysis Brief to the commander. The purpose of the Mission Analysis Brief is to provide the commander with the results of the preliminary staff analysis, offer a forum to surface issues that have been identified, and an opportunity for the commander to give his

guidance to the staff and to approve or disapprove of the staff's analysis. However, modifications to this brief may be necessary based on the commanders availability of relevant information. See Figure 32 for an *example* of a Mission Analysis Briefing format from CJCSM 3500.05A JTFHQMTG, 1 September 2003.

MISSION ANALYSIS BRIEFING

Briefer	Subject
COS or J5/J3	- Purpose and agenda - Area of operations (Joint Operations Area)
J2	- Initial intelligence situation brief (could also include elements of the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace)
J5/J3 -	- Combatant Commander's mission, intent and concept of operations - Forces currently available (US and multinational) - Assumptions - Limitations -- Must do and cannot do - Centers of gravity/decisive points -- Enemy and friendly - Tasks to be performed -- Specified -- Implied -- Essential - *Initial* JTF force structure analysis - Risk assessment - End state - Proposed mission statement - Time analysis -- Including projected planning milestones
J1*	- Facts, assumptions, conclusions - Personnel actions - Personnel services - Other personnel related support
J4*	- Facts, assumptions, conclusions - Supply - Services - Health services - Transportation - Others
J6*	- Facts, assumptions, conclusions
Others*	- Others as appropriate to the mission

*Should only be amplifications that each of these staff sections believe necessary for the CJTF to hear.

Figure 32. Mission Analysis Brief

13. **Key-Step — 12: Prepare Initial Staff Estimates.** The development of an effective commander's estimate must be supported by mission analysis, planning guidance, and *staff estimates*.

a. Early staff estimates are frequently given as oral briefings to the rest of the staff. They are continually ongoing and updating based on changes in the situation. In the beginning, they tend to emphasize information collection more than analysis. The

CJCSM 3122 (JOPES VOL I) contains sample formats for staff estimates. (JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, 25 Jan 2002)

b. **The role of the staff is to support the commander in achieving situational understanding, making decisions, disseminating directives, and following directives through execution**. The staff's effort during planning focuses on developing effective plans and orders and helping the commander make related decisions. The staff does this by integrating situation-specific information with sound doctrine and technical competence. The staff's planning activities initially focus on **mission analysis**, which develops information to help the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders understand the situation and mission. Later, during COA development and comparison, the staff provides recommendations to support the commander's selection of a COA. Once the commander approves a COA, the staff coordinates all necessary details and prepares the plan or order.

c. Throughout planning, staff officers prepare recommendations within their functional areas, such as component limitations, capabilities, and employment considerations; risk identification and mitigation; resource allocation and synchronization of supporting assets; and multinational and interagency considerations. Staff sections prepare and continuously update staff estimates that address these and other areas. The staff maintains these estimates throughout the operation, not just during pre-execution planning.

d. Not every situation will require or permit a lengthy and formal staff estimate process. During CAP, the commander may review the assigned mission, receive oral staff briefings, develop and select a COA informally, and direct that plan development commence. However, Contingency Planning will demand a more formal and thorough process. Staff estimates should be shared collaboratively with subordinate and supporting commanders to help them prepare their supporting estimates, plans, and orders. This will improve parallel planning and collaboration efforts of subordinate and supporting elements and help reduce the planning times for the entire process. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006).

14. **Key-Step — 13: Publish initial CDR's Planning Guidance and Intent.**

a. Initial Planning Guidance: The commander provides planning guidance to the staff to focus their effort during course of action development. As a minimum, the initial planning guidance should include the mission statement; assumptions; operational limitations; a discussion of the national strategic end state; termination criteria; military end state military objectives; and the JFC's initial thoughts on desired and undesired effects. The planning guidance should also address the role of agencies and multinational partners in the pending operation and any related special considerations as required. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006)

b. The commander approves the derived mission and gives the staff (and normally subordinate commanders) initial *planning guidance*. This guidance is essential for timely and effective COA development and analysis. The guidance should precede the staff's preparation for conducting their respective staff estimates. The commander's

responsibility is to *implant a desired vision* of the forthcoming combat action into the minds of the staff. Enough guidance (preliminary decisions) must be provided to allow the subordinates to plan the action necessary to accomplish the mission consistent with his and the SECDEF's intent. The commander's guidance must focus on the *essential tasks* and associated objectives that support the accomplishment of the assigned national objectives.

c. The commander may provide the planning guidance to the entire staff and/or subordinate commanders or meet each staff officer or subordinate unit commander individually as the situation and information dictates. The guidance can be given in a written form or orally. No format for the planning guidance is prescribed. However, the guidance should be sufficiently detailed to provide a clear direction and to avoid unnecessary efforts by the staff or subordinate commanders.

d. The content of planning guidance varies from commander to commander and is dependent on the situation and time available. Planning guidance may include:

— Situation

— The derived mission – including essential task(s) and associated objectives

— Purpose of the forthcoming military action

— Information available (or unavailable) at the time

— Forces available for planning

— Limiting factors (constraints and restraints) – including time constraints for planning

— Pertinent assumptions

— Tentative Courses of Action (COAs) under consideration; friendly strengths to be emphasized or enemy weaknesses the COAs should attack; or specific planning tasks

— Preliminary guidance for use (or non-use) of nuclear weapons

— Coordinating instructions

— Acceptable level of risk to own and friendly forces

— Information Operations guidance.

e. Planning guidance can be very explicit and detailed, or it can be very broad, allowing the staff and/or subordinate commander's wide latitude in developing subsequent COAs. However, no matter its scope, the content of planning guidance must be arranged in a logical sequence to reduce the chances of misunderstanding and to enhance clarity. Moreover, one must recognize that all the elements of planning guidance are *tentative only*. The commander may issue successive planning guidance during the decision-making process. Yet, the focus of his staff should remain upon the framework provided in the initial planning guidance. The commander should provide subsequent planning guidance during the rest of the plan development process. (JAWS Service School primers, January 2006)

f. Initial planning guidance includes Termination Criteria and Mission Success Criteria. These criteria become the basis for assessment and include measures of performance and measures of effectiveness.

(1) Termination**.** Effective planning cannot occur without a clear picture of the military end state and termination criteria. Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is essential to achieving the national strategic end state. As discussed earlier, when and under what circumstances to suspend or terminate military operations is a political decision. Even so, it is essential that the CJCS and the supported JFC advise the President and SecDef during the decision-making process. The supported JFC should ensure that political leaders understand the implications, both immediate and long term, of a suspension of hostilities at any point in the conflict. Once established, the national strategic objectives enable the supported commander to develop the military end state, recommended termination criteria, and supporting military objectives. Termination criteria typically apply to the **end of a joint operation and disengagement by joint forces**. This often signals the end of the use of the military instrument of national power.

(2) Mission success criteria describe the standards for determining mission accomplishment. The JFC includes these criteria in the initial planning guidance so that the joint force staff and components better understand what constitutes mission success. Mission success criteria can apply to any joint operation, phase, and joint force component operation. These criteria help the JFC determine if and when to move to the next major operation or phase.

(a) The initial set of criteria determined during mission analysis becomes the basis for **assessment** (see Function IV, Plan Assessment, within this document for more details). Assessment uses **measures of performance (MOPs)** and **measures of effectiveness (MOEs)** to indicate progress toward achieving objectives.

1 Measure of performance – A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called **MOP** (JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 01 Sep 2006)

2 Measure of effectiveness – A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called **MOE.** (JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 01 Sep 2006)

(b) If the mission is unambiguous and limited in time and scope, mission success criteria could be readily identifiable and linked directly to the mission statement. For example, if the JFC's mission is to *evacuate all U.S. personnel from the U.S. embassy in Grayland*, then mission analysis could identify two primary success criteria: (1) all U.S. personnel are evacuated and (2) established ROE are not violated.

(c) However, more complex operations will require MOEs and MOPs for each task, effect, and phase of the operation. For example, if the JFC's specified tasks are to *ensure friendly transit through the Straits of Gray, eject Redland forces from Grayland, and restore stability along the Grayland-Redland border*, then mission analysis should indicate many potential success criteria — measured by MOEs and MOPs — some for each desired effect and task.

(d) Measuring the status of tasks, effects, and objectives becomes the basis for reports to senior commanders and civilian leaders on the progress of the operation. The CCDR can then advise the President and SecDef accordingly and adjust operations as required. Whether in a supported or supporting role, JFCs at all levels must develop their mission success criteria with a clear understanding of termination criteria established by the CJCS and SecDef. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006)

g. Commanders Intent: The intent statement is the commanders' personal vision of how the campaign will unfold. Generally, the commander will write his own intent statement, frequently the staff will provide substantial input(s). The commander's intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the military end state. It provides focus to the staff and helps subordinate and supporting commanders take actions to achieve the military end state without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned. It also includes where the commander will accept risk during the operation. The intent must remain at the operational level and allow for decentralized execution.

(1) The initial intent statement normally contains the purpose and military end state as the initial impetus for the planning process; it could be stated verbally when time is short. The commander refines the intent statement as planning progresses. The commander's approved intent is written in the "Execution" paragraph as part of the operation plan or order.

(2) A well-devised intent statement enables subordinates to decide how to act when facing unforeseen opportunities and threats, and in situations where the concept of operations no longer applies. This statement deals primarily with the military conditions that lead to mission accomplishment, so the commander may highlight selected objectives and effects. The statement also can discuss other instruments of national power as they relate to the JFC's mission and the potential impact of military operations on these instruments. The commander's intent may include the commander's assessment of the adversary commander's intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006)

h. Restated Mission Statement: The mission statement may change due to commanders guidance and/or updated direction from the President or SecDef.

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CHAPTER XI

Concept Development – Function II

Function II — Concept Development

1. At the concept development step, combatant commanders develop, analyze, and compare viable COAs and develop staff estimates that are coordinated with the Military Departments when applicable. Analysis includes wargaming, operational modeling, and initial feasibility assessments.

2. In this step, a Concept Development IPR (IPR-C) will focus largely on the concept of operation, the enemy situation, interagency coordination, multinational involvement (if applicable) and capability requirements. For IPR-C, the combatant commander's estimate broadly outlines how forces will conduct integrated, joint operations to accomplish the mission. Among other elements and as appropriate, it communicates:

— Recommended COAs and supporting rationale

— Descriptions and assessments of alternate COAs and the friendly COAs

— Feasible enemy COAs and comparison of enemy and friendly COAs

— Commanders intent and desired end state

— Assessed strategic and operational centers of gravity (COG)

— Estimated level and duration of the operation

— Nature, purpose, time-phasing and interrelationship of operations, including specific relationships to strategic communication

— Branches, sequels, or other options, including warning and response times, that involve scenarios likely to confront the commend

— Gross transportation feasibility

— Potential interagency and / or multinational involvement

— The concept for sequencing the operation

3. As you work through the Concept Development Function you will be visualizing and thinking through the entire operation or campaign from end to start, start to end. It's important to emphasize here, as discussed in Chapter II, operations and campaigns are broken into phases which are a way to view and conduct a complex joint operation in manageable parts. You will determine requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space and purpose. Doctrine now standardizes phasing in OPLANs within all combatant commands. The main purpose of phasing is to integrate and synchronize related activities, thereby enhancing flexibility and unity of effort during execution. Reaching the end state often requires arranging a major operation or campaign in several phases. Phasing assists CCDRs and staffs by helping them to visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources,

time, space, and purpose. Phases are designed to be conducted sequentially, but activities from a phase may continue into subsequent phases.

4. The staff writes (or graphically portrays) the CONOPS in sufficient detail so that subordinate and supporting commanders understand their mission, tasks, and other requirements and can develop their supporting plans accordingly. During CONOPS development, the commander determined the best arrangement of simultaneous and sequential actions and activities to accomplish the assigned mission consistent with the approved COA. This arrangement of actions dictates the sequencing of forces into the OA, providing the link between the CONOPS and force planning. The link between the CONOPS and force planning is preserved and perpetuated through the TPFDD structure. This structure must ensure unit integrity, force mobility, and force visibility as well as the ability to rapidly transition to branches or sequels as operational conditions dictate. Planners ensure that the CONOPS, force plan, deployment plans, and supporting plans provide the flexibility to adapt to changing conditions, and are consistent with the CCDR's intent.

5. If the scope, complexity, and duration of the military action you contemplate to accomplish the assigned mission warrant a campaign, then the staff outlines the series of military operations and associated objectives and develops the CONOPS for the preliminary part of the campaign in sufficient detail to impart a clear understanding of the commander's concept of how the assigned mission will be accomplished.

6. During CONOPS development, the CCDR must assimilate many variables under conditions of uncertainty to determine the essential military conditions, sequence of actions, and application of capabilities and associated forces to create effects and achieve objectives. **CCDRs and their staffs must be continually aware of the higher-level objectives and associated effects that influence planning at every juncture.** If operational objectives are not linked to strategic objectives, the inherent linkage or "nesting" is broken and eventually tactical considerations can begin to drive the overall strategy at cross-purposes.

CHAPTER XII

Stability Planning and Considerations

Major operations and campaigns are the most **complex** and require the greatest diligence in planning and execution due to the time, effort, and national resources committed. They normally will include some level of **offense and defense** (e.g., interdiction, maneuver, forcible entry, fire support, counter-air, computer network defense, and base defense). To reach the national strategic end state and conclude the operation/campaign successfully, **JFCs must integrate and synchronize stability operations —** missions, tasks, and activities to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitarian relief — **with offensive and defensive operations** within each major operation or campaign phase. **Planning for stability operations should begin when joint operation planning is initiated.**

1. **Military Considerations.** In its strategic context, military victory is measured in the attainment of the national strategic end state and associated termination criteria. Termination criteria for a negotiated settlement will differ significantly than those of an imposed settlement. Military strategic advice to political authorities regarding termination criteria should be reviewed for military feasibility, adequacy, and acceptability as well as estimates of the time, costs, and military forces required to reach the criteria. Implementing military commanders should request clarification of the national strategic end state and termination criteria from higher authority when required. An essential consideration is ensuring that the longer-term stabilization and enabling of civil authority needed to achieve national strategic objectives is supported following the conclusion of sustained combat. These stability and other operations primarily support OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs to restore civil authority, rebuild the infrastructure, and reestablish commerce, education, and public utilities. Planning for these operations should begin when the JOPP is initiated. Among many considerations outlined in JP 3-0, Chapter IV, "Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment," the JFC and staff should consider conducting early collaborative planning with interagency and multinational members, harmonizing the civil and military effort, and establishing the appropriate organization to conduct operations during the "stabilize" and "enable civil authority" phases.

2. **Interagency Coordination and Coordination with Intergovernmental and Nongovernmental Organizations.**

a. **General.** CCDRs and subordinate JFCs are likely to operate with other government agencies (OGA), foreign governments, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and intergovernmental organizations (IGO) in a variety of circumstances. The nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and joint force planners consider all instruments of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective. Other agencies may be the lead effort during some operations with DOD providing support; however, U.S. military forces will remain under the DOD command structure while supporting other agencies. In

some cases, a federal agency with lead responsibility is prescribed by law or regulation, or by agreement between the agencies involved.

b. **Civil-Military Integration.** All operations will require some civil-military integration. The degree of integration depends on the complexity of the operation and mission (e.g., large-scale Peace Operation (PO)). Presidential directives guide participation by all US civilian and military agencies in such operations. Military leaders must work with the other members of the national security team in the most skilled, tactful, and persistent ways to promote unified action; which is made more difficult by the agencies' different and sometimes conflicting policies, procedures, and decision-making processes. **Integration and coordination among the military force and OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs should not be equated to the C2 of a military operation.** Military operations depend upon a command structure that is often very different from that of civilian organizations. These differences may present significant challenges to coordination. Still more difficult, some NGOs and IGOs may have policies that are explicitly antithetical to those of the United States Government (USG), and particularly the U.S. military. In the absence of a formal command structure, JFCs may be required to build consensus to achieve unified action. Robust liaison facilitates understanding, coordination, and mission accomplishment.

c. **Formal Agreements.** Formal agreements such as memoranda of understanding or terms of reference are more common among military organizations and OGAs or host nations (HN) than between military organizations and NGOs. Although formal agreements may be established, commanders should not expect that formal agreements with NGOs exist. Heads of agencies or organizations and authorized military commanders negotiate and co-sign these agreements.

d. **Information Sharing.** Unified action requires effective information sharing among DOD, OGAs, and state and local agencies, with the Director of National Intelligence playing a key role. Accordingly, JFCs should develop habitual relationships, procedures, and agreements with the individual agencies. For example, DOD support to homeland security (HS) requires detailed coordination and information sharing with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

e. **Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG).** The JIACG, an element of a Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) staff is an interagency staff group that establishes or enhances regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between OGA (e.g., Central Intelligence Agency, DOS, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Treasury Department) representatives and military operational planners at the combatant commands. There is currently no standardized structure for the JIACG. Its size and composition depends on the specific operational and staff requirements at each combatant command. The JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the national level through DOD and the National Security Council System. JIACG members participate in contingency, crisis action, security cooperation, and other operational planning. They provide a conduit back to their parent organizations to help synchronize joint operations with the efforts of OGAs.

f. **Joint Task Force Staff.** There are several means available at the JTF level to conduct interagency coordination. This coordination can occur in the various boards, centers, cells, and/or working groups established within the JTF. The commander, JTF (CJTF), and OGAs also may agree to form an executive steering group to coordinate actions.

g. **Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC).** One method to facilitate unified action and conduct on-site interagency coordination for civil-military operations (CMO) is to establish a CMOC. There is no established structure for a CMOC; its size and composition depend on the situation. Members of a CMOC may include representatives of US military forces, OGAs, multinational partners, HN organizations (if outside the United States), IGOs, and NGOs. Civil affairs (CA) units may be used to establish the CMOC core. Through a structure such as a CMOC, the JFC can gain a greater understanding of the roles of IGOs and NGOs and how they influence mission accomplishment.

For additional guidance on interagency coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations.

3. **Stability Operations.** These missions, tasks, and activities seek to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitarian relief. Many of these missions and tasks are the essence of CMO. **To reach the national strategic end state and conclude the operation/campaign successfully, JFCs must integrate and synchronize stability operations with other operations (offense and defense) within each major operation or campaign phase.** Stability operations support USG plans for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations are likely will be conducted in coordination with and in support of HN authorities, OGAs, IGOs, and/or NGOs.

For further guidance on the SSTR, refer to DODD 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations.

a. **Balance and Simultaneity.** JFCs strive to apply the many dimensions of military power simultaneously across the depth, breadth, and height of the operational area. Consequently, JFCs normally achieve concentration in some areas or in specific functions and require economy of force in others. However, major operation and campaign plans must feature an **appropriate balance between offensive and defensive operations and stability operations in all phases**. Most importantly, **planning for stability operations should begin when joint operation planning is initiated**. Planning for the transition from sustained combat operations to the termination of joint operations and then a complete handover to civil authority and redeployment must commence during plan development and be ongoing during all phases of a campaign or major operation. An uneven focus on planning offensive and defensive operations in the "dominate" phase may threaten full development of basic and supporting plans for the "stabilize" and "enable civil authority" phases and ultimately joint operation momentum. Even while sustained combat operations are ongoing, there will be a need to establish or restore security and control and provide humanitarian relief as succeeding areas are

occupied or bypassed. Figure 33 illustrates the notional balance between offensive, defensive, and stability operations throughout a major operation or campaign.



Figure 33. Key Considerations by Phase

` 4. **Considerations for Shaping**

a. **General.** JFCs are able to take actions before committing forces to assist in determining the shape and character of potential future operations. In many cases, these actions enhance bonds between future coalition partners, increase understanding of the region, help ensure access when required, strengthen future multinational operations, and prevent crises from developing.

b. **Stability Operations.** Activities in the "shaping" phase primarily will focus on continued planning and preparation for anticipated stability operations in the subsequent phases. These activities should include conducting collaborative interagency planning to synchronize the civil-military effort, confirming the feasibility of pertinent military objectives and the military end state, and providing for adequate intelligence, an appropriate force mix, and other capabilities. Stability operations in this phase may be required to quickly restore security and infrastructure or provide humanitarian relief in select portions of the operational area to dissuade further adversary actions or to help ensure access and future success.

5. **Considerations for Deterrence (Preparing the Operational Area)**

a. **General.** Before the initiation of hostilities, the JFC must gain a clear

understanding of the national and military strategic objectives; desired and undesired effects; COGs and decisive points; actions likely to create those desired effects; and required joint, multinational, and nonmilitary capabilities matched to available forces. The JFC must visualize how these operations can be integrated into a campaign with missions that are communicated via commanders intent throughout the force. An early analysis and assessment of the adversary's decision-making process must be performed to know what actions will be an effective deterrent. Emphasis should be placed on setting the conditions for successful joint operations in the "dominate" and follow-on phases.

b. **Stability Operations.** Joint force planning and operations conducted prior to commencement of hostilities should establish a sound foundation for operations in the "stabilize" and "enable civil authority" phases. JFCs should anticipate and address how to fill the power vacuum created when sustained combat operations wind down. Accomplishing this task should ease the transition to operations in the "stabilize" phase and shorten the path to the national strategic end state and handover to another authority. Considerations include:

(1) Limiting the damage to key infrastructure and services.

(2) Establishing the intended disposition of captured leadership and demobilized military and paramilitary forces.

(3) Providing for the availability of cash.

(4) Identifying and managing potential "stabilize" phase enemies.

(5) Determining the proper force mix (e.g., combat, military police, CA, engineer, medical, multinational).

(6) Availability of HN law enforcement and Health Service Support (HSS) resources.

(7) Securing key infrastructure nodes and facilitating HN law enforcement and first responder services.

(8) Developing and disseminating strategic communication (SC) themes to suppress potential new enemies and promote new governmental authority.

c. **Civil Affairs (CA)** units contain a variety of specialty skills that may support the joint operation being planned. CA units can assess the civil infrastructure, assist in the operation of temporary shelters, and serve as liaisons between the military and civil organizations. Establishing and maintaining military-to civil relations may include interaction among U.S., allied or coalition, HN forces, as well as OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. CA forces can provide expertise on factors that directly affect military operations to include culture, social structure, economic systems, language, and HNS capabilities. CA may be able to perform functions that normally are the responsibility of local or indigenous governments. Employment of CA forces should be based upon a clear concept of CA mission requirements for the type operation being planned.

6. **Considerations for Seizing the Initiative**

a. **General.** As operations commence, the JFC needs to exploit friendly advantages and capabilities to shock, demoralize, and disrupt the enemy immediately. The JFC seeks decisive advantage through the use of all available elements of combat power to seize and maintain the initiative, deny the enemy the opportunity to achieve its objectives, and generate in the enemy a sense of inevitable failure and defeat. Additionally, the JFC coordinates with OGAs to facilitate coherent use of all instruments of national power in achieving national strategic objectives.

b. **Stability Operations.** The onset of combat provides an opportunity to set into motion actions that will achieve military strategic and operational objectives and establish the conditions for operations at the conclusion of sustained combat. Operations to neutralize or eliminate potential "stabilize" phase enemies may be initiated. National and local HN authorities may be contacted and offered support. Key infrastructure may be seized or otherwise protected. Intelligence collection on the status of enemy infrastructure, government organizations, and humanitarian needs should be increased. PSYOP used to influence the behavior of approved foreign target audiences in support of military strategic and operational objectives can ease the situation encountered when sustained combat is concluded.

7. **Considerations for Dominance**

a. **General.** JFCs conduct sustained combat operations when a "coup de main" is not possible. During sustained combat operations, JFCs simultaneously employ conventional and special operations forces and capabilities throughout the breadth and depth of the operational area.

b. Operations to neutralize or eliminate potential "stabilize" phase enemies continues.

8. **Considerations for Stabilization**

a. **General.** Operations in this phase ensure the national strategic end state continues to be pursued at the conclusion of sustained combat operations. These operations typically begin with significant military involvement to include some combat, then move increasingly toward enabling civil authority as the threat wanes and civil infrastructures are reestablished. As progress is made, military forces will increase their focus on supporting the efforts of HN authorities, OGAs, IGOs, and/or NGOs. National Security Presidential Directive – 44 assigns U.S. State Department the responsibility to plan and coordinate U.S. government efforts in stabilization and reconstruction. SecState is responsible to coordinate with SecDef to ensure harmonization with planned and ongoing operations. Military support to SSTR operations within the JOA are the responsibility of the JFC.

b. **Several LOOs may be initiated immediately** (e.g., providing humanitarian relief, establishing security). In some cases the scope of the problem set may dictate using other nonmilitary entities which are uniquely suited to address the problems. The

goal of these military and civil efforts should be to eliminate root causes or deficiencies that create the problems (e.g., strengthen legitimate civil authority, rebuild government institutions, foster a sense of confidence and well-being, and support the conditions for economic reconstruction). With this in mind, the JFC may need to address how to harmonize CMO with the efforts of participating OGAs, IGOs, and/or NGOs.

For further guidance on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.

c. **Forces and Capabilities Mix.** The JFC may need to realign forces and capabilities or adjust force structure to begin stability operations in some portions of the operational area even while sustained combat operations still are ongoing in other areas. For example, CA forces and human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities are critical to supporting "stabilize" phase operations and often involve a mix of forces and capabilities far different than those that supported the previous phases. Planning and continuous assessment will reveal the nature and scope of forces and capabilities required. These forces and capabilities may be available within the joint force or may be required from another theater or from the Reserve Component (RC). The JFC should anticipate and request these forces and capabilities in a timely manner to facilitate their opportune employment.

d. **Stability Operations**

(1) As sustained combat operations conclude, military forces will shift their focus to stability operations, which likely will involve combat operations. Of particular importance will be CMO; initially conducted to secure and safeguard the populace, reestablishing civil law and order, protect or rebuild key infrastructure, and restore public services. U.S. military forces should be prepared to lead the activities necessary to accomplish these tasks when indigenous civil, USG, multinational or international capacity does not exist or is incapable of assuming responsibility. Once legitimate civil authority is prepared to conduct such tasks, U.S. military forces may support such activities as required/necessary. SC will play an important role in providing public information to foreign populations during this period.

(2) The military's predominant presence and its ability to command and control forces and logistics under extreme conditions may give it the de facto lead in stability operations normally governed by other agencies that lack such capacities. However, some stability operations likely will be in support of, or transition to support of, U.S. diplomatic, UN, or HN efforts. Integrated civilian and military efforts are key to success and military forces need to work competently in this environment while properly supporting the agency in charge. To be effective, planning and conducting stability operations require a variety of perspectives and expertise and the cooperation and assistance of OGAs, other Services, and alliance or coalition partners. Military forces should be prepared to work in integrated civilian military teams that could include representatives from other U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, IGOs, NGOs, and members of the private

sector with relevant skills and expertise. Typical military support includes, but is not limited to, the following.

(a) Work as part of an integrated civilian-military team ensuring security, developing local governance structures, promoting bottom-up economic activity, rebuilding infrastructure, and building indigenous capacity for such tasks.

For further guidance, refer to DODD 3000.05, Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations.

(b) CA forces are organized and trained to perform CA operations and activities that support CMO conducted in conjunction with stability operations. PSYOP forces will develop, produce, and disseminate products to gain and reinforce popular support for the JFC's objectives. Complementing conventional forces, other SOF will conduct FID to train, advise, and support indigenous military and paramilitary forces as they develop the capacity to secure their own lands and populations.

For further guidance on SOF, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

(c) **Counterintelligence (CI) activities** to safeguard essential elements of friendly information. This is particularly pertinent in countering adversary HUMINT efforts. HN authorities, IGOs, and NGOs working closely with U.S. forces may pass information (knowingly or unknowingly) to adversary elements that enable them to interfere with stability operations. Members of the local populace often gain access to U.S. military personnel and their bases by providing services such as laundry and cooking and provide information gleaned from that interaction to seek favor with a belligerent element, or they may actually be belligerents. The JFC must consider these and similar possibilities and take appropriate actions to counter potential compromise. CI personnel develop an estimate of the threat and recommend appropriate actions.

(d) **Public Affairs (PA) operations** to provide command information programs, communication with internal audiences, media and community relations support, and international information programs.

(e) Reconstruction, engineering, logistics, law enforcement, HSS, etc. needed to restore essential services.

(3) During stability operations in the "stabilize" phase, **protection** from virtually any person, element, or group hostile to U.S. interests must be considered. These could include activists, a group opposed to the operation, looters, and terrorists. Forces will have to be even more alert to force protection and security matters after a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high yield explosive (CBRNE) incident. JFCs also should be constantly ready to counter activity that could bring significant harm to units or jeopardize mission accomplishment.

Protection may involve the security of HN authorities and OGA, IGO, and NGO members if authorized by higher authority. For contractors, the GCC must evaluate the need for force protection support following the guidelines of DOD Instruction 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces*.

(4) Personnel should stay alert even in an operation with little or no perceived risk. **JFCs must take measures to prevent complacency and be ready to counter activity that could bring harm to units or jeopardize the operation.** However, security requirements should be balanced with the military operation's nature and objectives. In some stability operations, the use of certain security measures, such as carrying arms, wearing helmets and protective vests, or using secure communications may cause military forces to appear more threatening than intended, which may degrade the force's legitimacy and hurt relations with the local population.

(5) **Restraint.** During stability operations, military capability must be applied even more prudently since the support of the local population is essential for success. The actions of military personnel and units are framed by the disciplined application of force, including **specific ROE**. These ROE often will be more restrictive and detailed when compared to those for sustained combat operations due to national policy concerns. Moreover, these rules may change frequently during operations. Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence characterize the environment. The use of excessive force could adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short- and long-term goals. The use of nonlethal capabilities should be considered to fill the gap between verbal warnings and deadly force when dealing with unarmed hostile elements and to avoid raising the level of conflict unnecessarily. The JFC must determine early in the planning stage what nonlethal technology is available, how well the force is trained to use it, and how the established ROE authorize its employment. This concept does not preclude the application of overwhelming force, when appropriate, to display U.S. resolve and commitment. The reasons for the restraint often need to be understood by the individual Service member, because a single act could cause adverse political consequences.

(6) **Perseverance.** Some "stabilize" phases may be short, others may require years to transition to the "enable civil authority" phase. Therefore, the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national strategic end state conditions for as long as necessary to achieve them often is the requirement for success.

(7) **Legitimacy.** Joint stability operations need to sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the emerging or host government. During operations where a government does not exist, extreme caution should be used when dealing with individuals and organizations to avoid inadvertently legitimizing them. Effective SC can enhance perceptions of the legitimacy of stability operations.

(8) **OPSEC.** Although there may be no clearly defined threat, the essential elements of U.S. military operations should be safeguarded. The uncertain nature

of the situation, coupled with the potential for rapid change, require that OPSEC be an integral part of stability operations. OPSEC planners must consider the effect of media coverage and the possibility coverage may compromise essential security or disclose critical information.

(9) The PO fundamentals of consent, impartiality, transparency, credibility, freedom of movement, flexibility and adaptability, civil-military harmonization, and mutual respect discussed in JP 3- 07.3, *Peace Operations*, likely will apply to stability operations in the "stabilize" phase.

9. **Considerations for Enabling Civil Authority**

a. **General.** In this phase the joint operation normally is terminated when the stated military strategic and/or operational objectives have been met and redeployment of the joint force is accomplished. This should mean that a legitimate civil authority has been enabled to manage the situation without further outside military assistance. In some cases, it may become apparent that the stated objectives fall short of properly enabling civil authority. This situation may require a redesign of the joint operation as a result of an extension of the required stability operations in support of U.S. diplomatic, HN, IGO, and/or NGO efforts.

b. **Peace Building.** The transition from military operations to full civilian control may involve stability operations that initially resemble peace enforcement operations (PEO) to include counterinsurgency operations, antiterrorism, and counterterrorism; and eventually evolve to a peace building (PB) mission. PB provides the reconstruction and societal rehabilitation that offers hope to the HN populace. Stability operations establish the conditions that enable PB to succeed. PB promotes reconciliation, strengthens and rebuilds civil infrastructures and institutions, builds confidence, and supports economic reconstruction to prevent a return to conflict. The ultimate measure of success in PB is political, not military. Therefore, JFCs seek a clear understanding of the national/coalition strategic end state and how military operations support that end state.

c. **Transfer to Civil Authority.** In many cases, the United States will transfer responsibility for the political and military affairs of the HN to another authority. JFCs may be required to transfer responsibility of operations to another authority (e.g., UN observers, multinational peacekeeping force, or North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) as the termination criteria. This probably will occur after an extended period of conducting joint or multinational stability operations and PB missions as described above. Overall, transfer likely will occur in stages (e.g., HN sovereignty, PO under UN mandate, termination of all U.S. military participation). Joint force support to this effort may include the following:

(1) **Support to Truce Negotiations.** This support may include providing intelligence, security, transportation and other logistic support, and linguists for all participants.

(2) **Transition to Civil Authority.** This transfer could be to local or HN federal governments, to a UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) after PEO, or

through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to a NGO in support of refugees.

d. **Redeployment**

(1) **Conduct.** Redeployment normally is conducted in stages — the entire joint force likely will not redeploy in one relatively short period. It may include waste disposal, port operations, closing of contracts and other financial obligations, disposition of contracting records and files, clearing and marking of minefields and other explosive ordnance disposal activities, and ensuring that appropriate units remain in place until their missions are complete. Redeployment must be planned and executed in a manner that facilitates the use of redeploying forces and supplies to meet new missions or crises. Upon redeployment, units or individuals may require refresher training prior to reassuming more traditional roles and missions.

(2) **Redeployment to Other Contingencies.** Forces deployed may be called upon to rapidly redeploy to another theater. Commanders and their staffs should consider how they would extricate forces and ensure that they are prepared for the new contingency. This might include such things as a prioritized redeployment schedule, identification of aerial ports for linking intra- and inter-theater airlift, the most recent intelligence assessments and supporting geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) products for the new contingency, and some consideration to achieving the national strategic objectives of the original contingency through other means.

For further guidance on considerations for termination of operations, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006 and JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

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CHAPTER XIII

COA Development



Step 3 — COA Development:

1. COA Development. A COA is any force employment option open to a commander that, if adopted, would result in the accomplishment of the mission of the campaign. For each COA, the commander must envision the employment of own/friendly forces and assets as a whole, taking into account externally imposed limitations, the area of operations, and the conclusions previously drawn during the mission analysis and the commander's guidance.

2. A COA consists of the following information: what type of military action will occur; why the action is required (purpose); who will take the action; when the action will begin; where the action will occur; and how the action will occur (method of employment of forces). The staff converts the approved COA into a concept of operations. COA determination consists of four primary activities: *COA development, analysis and wargaming, comparison, and approval.*

Task: Dissuade (ME: JFMCC)
Purpose: Stabilize the region by encouraging Algeria/Libya to accept political solution

Phase 1: Deter
Task: Dissuade (ME: JFACC)
Purpose: Discourage Algerian/ Libyan attack into Tunisia

Phase 2: Seize the Initiative
Task: Disrupt (ME: JFACC)
Purpose: Prevent seizure of Tunis and Bizerte and attacks

Task: Destroy (ME: JFLCC)
Purpose: Remove all foreign adversaries from Tunisia and ensure they no longer pose as regional threats. Re-establish Tunisian borders and control of EBOF

Phase 4: Stabilize
Task: Secure (ME: JFLCC)
Purpose: Maintain recognized borders and rebuild Tunisian defense capability

Phase 5: Enable Civil Authorities
Task: Secure
Purpose: Transition defense of Tunisia to host nation
Reserve Phases 3 – 4: MEB

Figure 34. Course of Action Example

3. The output of COA development are tentative COAs (with sketch if possible, Figure 34) in which the commander describes for each COA, in broad but clear terms, what is to be done, the size of forces deemed necessary, and time in which force needs to be brought to bear. A *tentative COA* should be simple, brief, yet complete. It should answer the following questions:

a. How much force is required to accomplish the mission?

b. Generally, in what order should coalition forces be deployed?

c. Where and how should coalition aerospace, naval, ground and SO forces be employed in theater?

d. What major tasks must be performed and in what sequence?

e. How is the coalition to be sustained for the duration of the campaign?

f. What are the command relationships?

4. Planners may utilize the backwards planning technique during COA development. (reverse planning technique). Here's a step by step approach to developing a first rate COA:

Step 1. Determine how much force will be needed in the theater at the end of the campaign, what those forces will be doing, and how those forces will be postured geographically. Use troop to task analysis. Draw a sketch to help you visualize the forces and their location.

Step 2. Looking at your sketch and working backwards, determine the best way to get the forces you just postured in step 1 from their ultimate locations at the end of the campaign to a base in friendly territory. This will help you formulate your desired basing plan.

Step 3. Using your mission statement as a guide, determine the tasks the force must accomplish enroute to their ultimate positions at the end of the campaign. Draw a sketch of the maneuver plan. Make sure your force does everything the SECDEF has directed the CCDR to do (refer to specified tasks from the mission analysis steps).

Step 4. Determine the basing required to posture the force in friendly territory, and the tasks the force must accomplish to get to these bases. Sketch this as part of a deployment plan.

Step 5. Determine if the force you just considered is enough to accomplish all the tasks the SECDEF has given you. Adjust the force strength to fit the tasks. You should now be able to answer the first question.

Step 6. Given the tasks to be performed, determine in what order you want the force to be deployed into theater. Consider force categories such as *combat, C4ISR, protection, sustainment, theater enablers, and theater opening*. You can now answer the second question.

Step 7. You now have all the information necessary to answer the rest of the questions regarding force employment, major tasks and their sequencing, sustainment and command relationships. (AWC, Primer)

5. Time available, the Commander, and the nature of the mission will dictate the number of COAs to be considered. Staff sections continually inform course of action development by an ongoing staff estimate process to ensure suitability, feasibility, acceptability, and compliance with Joint Doctrine (deviations from Joint Doctrine should be conscious decisions and not the result of a lack of knowledge of doctrinal procedures). Additionally, staffs ensure completeness (answers Who, What, When, Where, How).

6. To develop COAs, the staff must focus on key information necessary to make decisions and assimilate the data in mission analysis (Figure 35). Usually, the staff develops no more than three COAs to focus their efforts and concentrate valuable resources on the most likely scenarios. All COAs selected for analysis must be **valid**. A valid COA is one that is **adequate, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable,** and **complete.**

a. Adequate- Can accomplish the mission within the commander's guidance.

b. Feasible- Can accomplish the mission within the established time, space, and resource limitations.

c. Acceptable- Must balance cost and risk with the advantage gained.

d. Distinguishable- Must be sufficiently different from the other courses of action.

e. Complete- Must incorporate:

(1) Objectives (including desired effects) and tasks to be performed

(2) Major forces required

(3) Concepts for deployment, employment, and sustainment

(4) Time estimates for achieving objectives

(5) Military end state and mission success criteria

7. The staff should reject potential COAs that do not meet all five criteria. A good COA accomplishes the mission within the commander's guidance and positions the joint force for future operations and provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution. It also gives components the maximum latitude for initiative. Embedded within COA development is the application of operational art. Planners can develop different COAs for using joint force capabilities (operational fires and maneuver, deception, joint force organization, etc.) by varying the elements of operational design (such as phasing, line of operations, and so forth).



Figure 35. Course of Action Development

8. During COA development, the commander and staff continue risk assessment, focusing on identifying and assessing hazards to mission accomplishment. The staff also continues to revise intelligence products. Generally, at the theater level, each COA will constitute a theater strategic or operational concept and should outline the following per JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006.

a. Major strategic and operational tasks to be accomplished in the order in which they are to be accomplished.

b. Capabilities required.

c. Task organization and related communications systems support concept.

d. Sustainment concept.

e. Deployment concept.

f. Estimate of time required to reach mission success criteria or termination criteria.

g. Concept for maintaining a theater reserve.

9. Political Considerations. Planning for the use of military forces includes a discussion of the political implications of their transportation, staging, and employment. The combatant commander's political advisor is a valuable asset in advising the combatant commander and staff on issues crucial to the planning process, such as overflight and transit rights for deploying forces, basing, and support agreements. Multinational and coalition force concerns and sensitivities must also be considered. (JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, 25 Jan 2002)

a. **Political objectives drive the operation at every level from strategic to tactical.** There are many degrees to which political objectives influence operations; ROE restrictions, basing access and overflight rights are examples. Two important factors about political primacy stand out. *First*, all military personnel should understand the political objectives and the potential impact of inappropriate actions**.** Having an understanding of the political objective helps avoid actions which may have adverse political effects. It is not uncommon today in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) for junior leaders to make decisions which have significant political implications. *Secondly*, commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also to changes in political objectives that may warrant a change in military operations. These changes may not always be obvious.

b. The integration of U.S. political and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into action have always been essential to success at all levels of operation. The global environment that is characterized by regional instability, failed states, increased weapons proliferation, global terrorism, and unconventional threats to U.S. citizens, interests, and territories, requires even greater cooperation.

c. Today's adversary is a dynamic, adaptive foe who operates within a complex, interconnected operational environment. Attaining our national objectives requires the efficient and effective use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) instruments of national power and a systems taxonomy of the multi-dimensional political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure (PMESII). This situational understanding supported by and coordinated with that of our allies and various intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and regional security organizations is critical to success.

d. Military operations must be strategically integrated and operational and tactically coordinated with the activities of other agencies of the USG, IGOs, NGOs, regional organizations, the operations of foreign forces, and activities of various host nation (HN) agencies. Sometimes the joint force commander (JFC) draws on the capabilities of other organizations; sometimes the JFC provides capabilities to other organizations; and sometimes the JFC merely deconflicts his activities with those of others. These same organizations may be involved in pre-hostilities operations, activities during combat, and in the transition to post-hostilities activities. Roles and relationships among agencies and organizations, combatant commands, U.S. state and local governments, and overseas with the U.S. chief of mission (COM), and country team in a U.S. embassy, must be clearly understood. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military and the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power. Successful interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination helps enable the USG to build international support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared goals.

10. Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs). Flexible deterrent options are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions carefully tailored to send the right signal and influence an adversary's actions. They can be established to dissuade actions before a crisis arises or to deter further aggression during a crisis. FDOs are developed for each instrument of national power — diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and others — but they are most effective when used in combination with across instruments of national power.

a. FDOs facilitate early strategic decision-making, rapid de-escalation and crisis resolution by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths. Examples of FDOs for each instrument of national power are listed in Figures 36 through 39. Key goals of FDOs are:

(1) Deter aggression through communicating the strength of U.S. commitments to treaty obligations and peaceful development.

(2) Confront the adversary with unacceptable costs for its possible aggression.

(3) Isolate the adversary from regional neighbors and attempt to split the adversary coalition.

(4) Rapidly improve the military balance of power in the OA.

b. FDOs Implementation. The use of FDOs must be consistent with U.S. national security strategy (i.e., the instruments of national power are normally used in combination with one another), therefore, continuous coordination with interagency partners is imperative. All operation plans have FDOs, and CCDRs are tasked by the JSCP to plan requests for appropriate options using all instruments of national power. (JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 01 Sep 2006)

c. Military FDOs. Military FDOs underscore the importance of early response to a crisis. Deployment timelines, combined with the requirement for a rapid, early response, generally requires military FDO force packages to be light; however, military FDOs are not intended to place U.S. forces in jeopardy if deterrence fails (risk analysis should be an inherent step in determining which FDOs to use, and how and when to use

them). Military FDOs are carefully tailored to avoid the classic "too much, too soon" or "too little, too late" responses. They rapidly improve the military balance of power in the operational area (OA), especially in terms of early warning, intelligence gathering, logistic infrastructure, air and maritime forces, information operations, and force protection assets, without precipitating armed response from the adversary. Military FDOs are most effective when used in concert with the other instruments of power. They can be initiated before or after, and with or without unambiguous warning (Figure 36). (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006)



Figure 36 Examples of Requested Military Flexible Deterrent Options



Figure 37. Examples of Requested Economic Flexible Deterrent Options



Figure 38. Examples of Requested Informational Flexible Deterrent Options



Figure 39. Example of Requested Diplomatic Flexible Deterrent Options

11. Lines of Operation (LOO). It is important to conduct LOO analysis prior to COA development to ensure COAs achieve military objectives. As JFCs visualize the design of the operation, they may use several **lines of operations** (LOOs) to help visualize the intended progress of the joint force toward achieving operational and strategic objectives. Lines of operations define the orientation of the force in time and space or purpose in relation to an adversary or objective. Commanders may describe the operation along LOOs that are **physical**, **logical**, or **both**. Logical and physical LOOs are not mutually exclusive and JFCs often combine them (Figure 40 and 41). Normally, joint operations require commanders to synchronize activities along multiple and complementary LOOs working through a series of military strategic and operational objectives to attain the military end state. There are many possible ways to graphically depict LOOs, which can assist planners to visualize/conceptualize the joint operation from beginning to end and prepare the OPLAN or OPORD accordingly.

a. From the perspective of unified action, there are many diplomatic, economic, and informational activities that can affect the sequencing and conduct of military operations along both physical and logical LOOs. Planners should consider depicting relevant actions or events of the other instruments of national power on their LOOs diagrams.

(1) A **physical line of operations** connects a series of decisive points over time that lead to control of a geographic objective or defeat of an enemy force. *Commanders use physical LOOs to connect the force with its base of operations and objectives when positional reference to the enemy is a factor.* Physical LOOs may be either *interior* or *exterior*.



Figure 40. Sample Physical Line of Operation

(a) A force operates on **interior lines** when its operations diverge from a central point and when it is therefore closer to separate adversary forces than the latter are to one another. Interior lines benefit a weaker force by allowing it to shift the main effort laterally more rapidly than the adversary, and provide increased security to logistical support operations.

(b) A force operates on **exterior lines** when its operations converge on the adversary. Successful operations on exterior lines require a stronger or more mobile force, but offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker or less mobile opponent. Assuring strategic mobility enhances exterior LOOs by providing the JFC greater freedom of maneuver. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006)

1 The relevance of interior and exterior physical lines depends on the relationship of time and distance between the opposing forces. Although an adversary force may have interior lines with respect to the friendly force, this advantage disappears if the friendly force is more agile and operates at a higher operational tempo. Conversely, if a smaller force maneuvers to a position between larger but less agile adversary forces, the friendly force may be able to defeat them in detail before they can react effectively. A joint operation may have ***single*** or ***multiple*** physical LOOs.

a A **single LOOs** has the advantage of concentrating forces and simplifying planning.

b **Multiple LOOs**, on the other hand, increase flexibility and create opportunities for success. Multiple LOOs also make it difficult for an adversary to determine the objectives of the campaign or major operation, forcing the adversary to disperse resources to defend against multiple threats. The decision to operate on multiple lines will depend to a great extent on the availability of resources.

(2) **Logical LOOs** are used by the JFC to visualize and describe the operation when *positional reference to an enemy or adversary has less relevance*. In contrast to physical LOOs, a **logical** line of operations focuses more on depicting a logical arrangement of tasks, effects, and/or objectives. Logical LOOs typically can link multiple decisive points with the logic of purpose to defeat an enemy or achieve an objective. This situation is common in many joint operations, particularly from the theater-strategic perspective. In a linkage between objectives and forces, only the logical linkage of LOOs may be evident. Logical LOOs are particularly useful when working with interagency and multinational partners in either a supporting or supported capacity. For example, a JFC can reflect the tasks and objectives of agencies along separate LOOs and relate these to tasks and objectives along the military LOOs. Logical LOOs also help commanders visualize how military means can support nonmilitary instruments of national power and vice versa. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006)



Figure 41. Example Lines of Operations

12. Tentative Courses of Action**.** Tentative COAs allow for initial conceptualization and broad descriptions of potential approaches to the conduct of operations that will accomplish the desired end state. The combatant commander gives the staff their preliminary thoughts on possible and acceptable military actions early in the planning process to provide focus to their efforts, allowing them to concentrate on developing COAs that are the most appropriate. Below is listed a logical flow of TTP's that will help focus you while conceptualizing Tentative COA's:

a. Review information contained in the mission analysis and commanders guidance.

b. Determine the COA development technique. A critical first decision in COA development is whether to conduct simultaneous or sequential development of the COAs. Each approach has distinct advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of simultaneous development of COAs is potential time savings. Separate groups are simultaneously working on different COAs. The disadvantage of this approach is that the synergy of the JPG may be disrupted by breaking up the team, the approach is manpower intensive and requires component and directorate representation in each COA group, and there is an increased likelihood that the COAs will not be distinctive. While there is potential time to be saved, experience has demonstrated that it is not an automatic result. The simultaneous COA development approach can work, but its inherent disadvantages must be addressed and some risk accepted up front.

c. Planning cells with land, maritime, air, space and special operations planners as well as Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) reps (and others as necessary) should initially develop ways to accomplish the essential tasks. They should then consider ways to accomplish the other tasks. A technique is for these planners to "think

two levels down" from the Joint Force level (e.g., how could the MARFOR's component commands, MEF, regiment or appropriate subordinate, accomplish the assigned tasks).

d. Planners should then integrate and synchronize these ideas (which will essentially be Service perspectives) by using the joint architecture of maneuver, firepower, protection, support, and command and control (see the taxonomy used in the Universal Joint Task List). See the questions below:

(1) Land Operations. What are ways land forces can integrate/synchronize maneuver, firepower, protection, support and command and control with other forces to accomplish their assigned tasks? Compare friendly against enemy forces to see if there are sufficient land forces to accomplish the tasks.

(2) Air Operations. What are ways air forces can integrate/synchronize maneuver, firepower, protection, support, and command and control with other forces to accomplish their assigned tasks? Compare friendly against enemy forces to see if there are sufficient air forces to accomplish the tasks.

(3) Maritime. What are ways maritime forces can integrate/synchronize maneuver, firepower, protection, support, and command and control with other forces to accomplish their assigned tasks? Compare friendly against enemy forces to see if there are sufficient maritime forces to accomplish the tasks.

(4) Special Operations. What are ways special operations forces can integrate/synchronize maneuver, firepower, protection, support, and command and control with other forces to accomplish their assigned tasks? Compare friendly against enemy forces to see if there are sufficient special operations forces to accomplish the tasks.

(5) Space Operations. What are the major ways that space operations can support maneuver, firepower, protection, support and establishment of command and control?

(6) Information Operations (IO). What are the ways joint forces can integrate the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.

e. The COAs should focus on where Center(s) of Gravity (COGs) and decisive points (or vulnerabilities, e.g., "keys to achieving desired effect on centers of gravity") may occur.

f. Identify phases of the operation. Phasing of broad COA statements is not required during this step, but should be accomplished eventually. For combat operations, JP 3-0 delineates typical phases, however, these may be modified or adjusted by the commander.

g. Identify the sequencing (simultaneous/sequential/or combination) of the operation for each COA. This is not required for each COA, but may be included.

h. Identify main and supporting efforts, by phase, the purposes of these efforts, and key supporting/supported relationships within phases.

i. Identify component level mission/tasks (who, what and where) that will accomplish the stated purposes of main and supporting efforts. Think of component tasks from the perspective of movement and maneuver, firepower, protection, support and C2. Display them with graphic control measures as much as possible.

j. Develop the IO/IW support items. Since the results of deception operations may influence the positioning of units, planners should conceive major elements of the story before developing any COAs.

k. Develop initial COA sketches and statements. Answer the questions:

(1) WHO (type of forces) will execute the tasks?

(2) WHAT is the task?

(3) WHERE will the tasks occur? (start adding graphic control measures, e.g., areas of` operation, amphibious objective areas)

(4) WHEN will the tasks begin?

(5) Some HOW (but do not usurp the components' prerogatives). The CCDR should provide "operational direction," so the components can accomplish "tactical actions."

(6) WHY (for what purpose) will each force conduct its part of the operation?

l. Test the validity of each COA

(1) Tests for suitability

(a) Does it accomplish the mission?

(b) Does it meet the CCDRs intent?

(c) Does it accomplish all the essential tasks?

(d) Does meet the conditions for the end state?

(e) Does it take into consideration the enemy and friendly centers of gravity?

(2) Preliminary test for feasibility.

(a) Does the CCDR have the force structure and lift assets (means) to carry it out? The COA is feasible if it can be carried out with the forces, support, and technology available, within the constraints of the physical environment and against expected enemy opposition.

(b) Although this process occurs during COA analysis and the test at this time is preliminary, it may be possible to declare a COA infeasible (for

example, resources are obviously insufficient). However, it may be possible to fill shortfalls by requesting support from the CCDR or other means.

(3) Preliminary test for acceptability.

(a) Does it contain unacceptable risks? (Is it worth the possible cost?) A COA is considered acceptable if the estimated results justify the risks. The basis of this test consists of an estimation of friendly losses in forces, time, position, and opportunity.

(b) Does it take into account the limitations placed on the CCDR (must do, cannot do, other physical limitations)?

(c) Acceptability is considered from the perspective of the CCDR by reviewing the strategic objectives.

(d) COAs are reconciled with external constraints, particularly ROE.

(e) Requires visualization of execution of the COA against each enemy capability. Although this process occurs during COA analysis and the test at this time is preliminary, it may be possible to declare a COA unacceptable if it violates the CCDRs definition of acceptable risk.

(4) Test for variety. Is it fundamentally different from other COAs? They can be different when considering:

(a) The focus or direction of main effort.

(b) The scheme of maneuver (land, air, maritime, and special operation).

(c) Sequential vs. simultaneous maneuvers.

(d) The primary mechanism for mission accomplishment.

(e) Task organization.

(f) The use of reserves.

(5) Test for completeness. Does it answer the all of the questions WHO, WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, HOW and WHY?

m. Determine command relationships and organizational options

(1) Joint Force Organization and Command relationships. Organizations and relationships are based on the campaign design, complexity of the campaign, and degree of control required. Establishing command relationships includes determining the types of subordinate commands and the degree of authority to be delegated to each. Clear definition of command relationships further clarifies the intent of the combatant commander and contributes to decentralized execution and unity of effort. The combatant commander has the authority to determine the types of subordinate commands from several doctrinal options, including Service components, functional components, and subordinate joint commands. The options for delegating authority emanate from COCOM and range from command to support relationships. **Regardless**

of the Command or Support relationships selected, it is the Combatant (or JFC) Commander's responsibility to ensure that these relationships are understood and clear to all subordinate, adjacent and supporting HQs. The following are considerations for establishing Joint Force Organizations:

(a) CCDRs will normally designate JFACCs and organize special operations forces into a functional component.

(b) Joint Forces will normally be organized with a combination of Service and functional components with operational responsibilities.

(c) Functional component staffs should be joint with Service representation in approximate proportion to the mix of subordinate forces. These staffs will be required to be organized and trained prior to employment in order to be efficient and effective, which will require advanced planning.

(d) Combatant commanders may establish supporting/supported relationships between components to facilitate operations.

(e) Combatant commanders define the authority and responsibilities of functional component commanders based on the strategic concept of operations and may alter their authority and responsibility during the course of an operation.

(f) Combatant commanders must balance the need for centralized direction with decentralized execution.

(g) Major changes in the Joint Force organization is normally conducted at phase changes (AWC Campaign Planning Primer, AY 07).

(2) Operational Objectives and Subordinate Tasks

(a) The theater and supporting operational objectives assigned to subordinates are critical elements of the theater-strategic design of the campaign. They establish the conditions necessary to reach the desired end state and achieve the national strategic objectives. The combatant commander carefully defines the objectives to ensure clarity of theater and operational intent, and identify specific tasks required to achieve those objectives. Tasks are shaped by the concept of operations—intended sequencing and integration of air, land, sea, special operations, and space forces. Tasks are prioritized in order of criticality while considering the enemy's objectives and the need to gain advantage.

(b) One of the fundamental purposes of a campaign plan is to synchronize employment of all available military (land, sea, air, and special operations, as well as space, information and protection) forces and capabilities. This overwhelming application of military capabilities can be achieved by assigning the appropriate tasks to components for each phase, though supporting commanders will also contribute with their own capabilities. These tasks can be derived from an understanding of how component and supporting forces interrelate, not only among themselves, but also with respect to the enemy. (AWC Campaign Planning Primer, AY 07)

n. Refine the theater design/operational area and initial battlespace architecture (e.g., control measures). The Theater Design is normally a legally /politically binding document which will initiate planning and negotiations throughout the COCOM, interagency and internationally. It will provide flexibility/options and/or limitations to the CCDR. The theater design must be precise. Specifics are required to negotiate basing and overflight, DOS will normally be the lead agency here. Theater design is also resource sensitive. Limited infrastructure resources must be optimized, i.e. APOE/DS/SPOE/DS, and when utilizing a host nations resources negotiations for sharing those resources is common.

(1) Operational area is an overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as AOR, theater of war, theater of operations, JOA, amphibious objective area (AOA), joint special operations area (JSOA), and area of operations (AO). Except for AOR, which is normally assigned in the *UCP*, the geographic combatant commander (GCC) and other JFCs designate smaller operational areas on a temporary basis. Operational areas have physical dimensions comprised of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains. JFCs define these areas with geographical boundaries, which facilitate the coordination, integration, and deconfliction of joint operations among joint force components and supporting commands. The size of these operational areas and the types of forces employed within them depend on the scope and nature of the crisis and the projected duration of operations.

(2) Combatant Command-Level Areas. GCCs conduct operations in their assigned AORs across the range of military operations. When warranted, the President, SecDef, or GCCs may designate a theater of war and/or theater of operations for each operation. GCCs can elect to control operations directly in these operational areas, or may establish subordinate joint forces for that purpose, allowing themselves to remain focused on the broader AOR. (JP 3-0, Joint Operation Planning, 17 Sept 2006)

(a) Area of Responsibility. An AOR is an area established by the President and SecDef on an enduring basis that defines geographic responsibilities for a GCC. A GCC has authority to plan for operations within the AOR and conduct those operations approved by the President or SecDef.

(b) Theater of War. A theater of war is a geographical area comprised of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains established for the conduct of major operations and campaigns involving combat. A theater of war is established primarily when there is a formal declaration of war or it is necessary to encompass more than one theater of operations (or a JOA and a separate theater of operations) within a single boundary for the purposes of C2, logistics, protection, or mutual support. A theater of war does not normally encompass a GCC's entire AOR, but may cross the boundaries of two or more AORs.

(c) Theater of Operations. A theater of operations is a geographical area comprised of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains established for the conduct of joint operations. A theater of operations is established primarily when the scope of the operation in time, space, purpose, and/or employed forces exceeds what can normally be accommodated by a JOA. One or more theaters of operations may be designated. Different theaters of operations will normally be geographically separate and focused on different missions. A theater of operations typically is smaller than a theater of war, but is large enough to allow for operations in depth and over extended periods of time. Theaters of operations are normally associated with major operations and campaigns.

(d) Combat Zones and Communications Zones (COMMZs). Geographic CCDRs also may establish combat zones and COMMZs. The combat zone is an area required by forces to conduct combat operations. It normally extends forward from the land force rear boundary. The COMMZ contains those theater organizations, LOCs, and other agencies required to support and sustain combat forces. The COMMZ usually includes the rear portions of the theaters of operations and theater of war (if designated) and reaches back to the CONUS base or perhaps to a supporting CCDR's AOR. The COMMZ includes airports and seaports that support the flow of forces and logistics into the operational area. It usually is contiguous to the combat zone but may be separate — connected only by thin LOCs — in very fluid, dynamic situations. (JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operation, 17 Sept 2006)

o. Prepare the COA concept of operations statement (or tasks), sketch, and task organization.

(1) COA concept of operations statements (or tasks) answer WHO, WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, HOW, and WHY.

(2) Finalize COA sketches.

(3) Finalize the task organization.

p. Conduct COA Brief to CCDR. Figure 42 is a suggested sequence:

RECOMMENDED BRIEFING SEQUENCE

Briefer	Subject

J2
- Update JIPB
- Enemy COAs - As a minimum - most likely and most dangerous

JPG
- Updated facts and assumptions
- Review Combatant Commander's and JTF's mission statements
- Review Combatant Commander's and CJTF's intent statements
- COA statements (tasks) and sketches. Also include:
  - -- Command and control recommendations
  - -- Summary of each COA:
    - --- COA statement/phases/sketches
  - -- Rationale for each COA
  - -- Risks associated with each COA
  - -- Summarize/emphasize distinctions among COAs
- Recommended COA(s) for wargaming (by priority)

Others
- Recommendations or comments as appropriate

Figure 42. Recommended Briefing Sequence

q. CCDR provides guidance on COAs

(1) Review and approve COAs for further analysis.

(2) Direct revisions to COAs, combinations of COAs, or development of additional COA(s).

(3) Directs priority for which enemy COA will be used during wargaming of friendly COA(s).

r. Continue the staff estimate process. The staff must continue to conduct their staff estimates of supportability for each COA.

s. Conduct vertical and horizontal parallel planning.

(1) Discuss the planning status of staff counterparts with both CCDR's and JFC components' staffs.

(2) Coordinate planning with staff counterparts from other functional areas.

(3) Permit adjustments in planning as additional details are learned from higher and adjacent echelons, and permit lower echelons to begin planning

efforts and generate questions (e.g., Requests for Information/Intelligence). (CJCSM 3500.05A, JTFHQ Master Training Guide, 1 September 2003)

13. Planning Directive Published. The combatant commander normally communicates initial planning guidance to the staff, subordinate commanders, and supporting commanders by publishing a planning directive to ensure that everyone understands the commander's intent and to achieve unity of effort. Generally, the J-5 coordinates staff action for deliberate planning. The J-5 staff receives the combatant commander's initial guidance and combines it with the information gained from the initial staff assessments. The combatant commander, through the J-5, may convene a preliminary planning conference for members of the JPEC who will be involved with the plan. This is the opportunity for representatives to meet face-to-face. At the conference, the combatant commander and selected members of the staff brief the attendees on important aspects of the plan and may solicit their initial reactions. Many potential conflicts can be avoided by this early exchange of information. (CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: Planning, Policies, and Procedures, Enclosure T, Appendix A, contains sample formats for the Planning Directive)

14. Staff Estimates. Staff estimates are the foundation for the combatant commander's selection of a COA. In this step, the staff divisions analyze and refine each COA to determine its supportability. Not every situation will require an extensive and lengthy planning effort. It is conceivable that a commander could review the assigned task, receive oral briefings, make a quick decision, and direct writing of the plan commence. This would complete the process and might be suitable if the task were simple and straightforward.

a. Most combatant commanders, however, are more likely to demand a thorough, well-coordinated plan that requires a complex staff estimate process. Written staff estimates are carefully prepared, coordinated, and fully documented.

b. **The purpose of the staff estimates is to determine whether the mission can be accomplished and to determine which COA can best be supported**. This, together with the supporting discussion, gives the CCDR the best possible information to select a COA. Each staff division:

— Reviews the mission and situation from its own staff functional perspective;

— Examines the factors and assumptions for which it is the responsible staff;

— Analyzes each COA from its staff functional perspective; and

— Concludes whether the mission can be supported and which COA can be best supported from its particular staff functional perspective.

c. Because of the unique talents of each joint staff division, involvement of all is vital. Each staff estimate takes on a different focus that identifies certain assumptions, detailed aspects of the COAs, and potential deficiencies that are simply not known at any other level, but nevertheless must be considered. Such a detailed study of the COAs involves the corresponding staffs of subordinate and supporting commands.

d. The form and the number of COAs under consideration change during this step. These changes result in refined COAs.

e. The product of this step is the sum total of the individual efforts of the staff divisions. Complete, fully documented staff estimates are extremely useful to the J-5 staff, which extracts information from them for the commander's estimate. The estimates are also valuable to planners in subordinate and supporting commands as they prepare supporting plans. Although documenting the staff estimates can be delayed until after the preparation of the commander's estimate, they should be sent to subordinate and supporting commanders in time to help them prepare annexes for their supporting plans.

f. The principal elements of the staff estimates normally include **mission**, **situation** and **considerations**, **analysis of opposing COAs, comparison of friendly COAs**, and **conclusions**. The details in each basic category vary with the staff performing the analysis. The principal staff divisions have a similar perspective — they focus on friendly COAs and their supportability. However, the Intelligence Directorate (J-2) estimates on intelligence (provided at the beginning of the process) concentrate on the adversary: adversary situation, including strengths and weaknesses, adversary capabilities and an analysis of those capabilities, and conclusions drawn from that analysis. The analysis of adversary capabilities includes an analysis of the various COAs available to the adversary according to its capabilities, which include attacking, withdrawing, defending, delaying, etc. The J-2's conclusion will indicate the adversary's most likely COA and identify adversary COGs. (CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol. I: Planning, Policies, and Procedures), Enclosure S, contains sample formats for staff estimates).

g. In many cases the steps in the concept development phase are not separate and distinct, as the evolution of the refined COA illustrates. During planning guidance and early in the staff estimates, the initial COAs may have been developed from initial impressions and based on limited staff support. But as concept development progresses, COAs are refined and evolve to include many of the following considerations.

— What military operations are considered?

— Where they will be performed?

— Who will conduct the operation?

— When is the operation planned to occur?

— How will the operation be conducted?

h. *An iterative process of modifying, adding to, and deleting from the original tentative list is used to develop these refined COAs.* The staff continually evaluates the situation as the planning process continues. Early staff estimates are frequently given as oral briefings to the rest of the staff. In the beginning, they tend to emphasize information collection more than analysis. It is only in the later stages of the process that the staff estimates are expected to indicate which COAs can be best supported. (JP 5.00-1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, 25 January 2002)

CHAPTER XIV

COA Analysis and Wargaming



Step 4 — COA Analysis and Wargaming. Course of action analysis or wargaming is a process whereby each COA is tested against the enemy's course of action in an action-reaction-counter reaction methodology. The COA Analysis process is the staff's visualization of the flow of an operation and is an important step in building decision support tools for the Commander. While time consuming, this procedure reveals strengths and weaknesses of each friendly course of action, anticipates battlefield events, determines task organization for combat, identifies decision points, informs potential branches and sequels, and identifies cross-service or component support requirements. (JAWS Senior Service School Planning Primers, January 2006)

1. COA Analysis. The commander and staff analyze each tentative COA separately.

   a. Analysis of the proposed COAs should reveal a number of factors including:

      (1) Potential decision points

      (2) Task organization adjustment

      (3) For use in a synchronization matrix or other decision-making tool

(4) Identification of plan branches and sequels

(5) Identification of high-value targets

(6) Risk assessment

(7) COA advantages and disadvantages

(8) Recommended CCIR

b. COA analysis identifies advantages and disadvantages of each proposed friendly COA. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006).

c. COA Analysis Considerations

(1) There are two key decisions to make before COA analysis begins. The *first* decision is to decide what type of wargame will be used. This decision should be based on Commander's guidance, time and resources available, staff expertise, and availability of simulation models.

(2) Information Review: Mission Analysis, Commander's intent, planning guidance, combatant commander's orders.

(3) Gather tools, materials, personnel and data:

— Friendly courses of action to be analyzed

— Enemy courses of action against which you will evaluate the friendly COAs

— Representations of the operational area such as maps, overlays, etc.

— Representations of friendly and enemy force dispositions and capabilities

— Subject matter experts (INTEL, SJA, POLAD, Log, IW, C4, PAO, etc.)

— Red cell

— Scribe/recorder

(4) Keep discussions elevated to the theater level.

(5) Balance between stifling creativity and making progress.

(6) Ensure the deception plan is woven into the analysis.

d. Note that at this point in the planning process, there are no phases developed for the COA; only Pre-hostilities, Hostilities, and Post-hostilities. Phasing comes later when the planner begins to flesh out the selected COA into a strategic concept.

2. Wargaming. The *second* decision is to prioritize the enemy COAs the wargame is to be analyzed against. In time constrained situations it may not be possible to wargame against all courses of action. Wargaming provides a means for the commander and participants to analyze a tentative COA and obtain insights that otherwise might not have occurred. An objective, comprehensive analysis of tentative COAs is difficult even without time constraints. Based upon time available, the commander should wargame each tentative COA against the most probable and the most dangerous adversary COAs

(or most difficult objectives in non-combat operations) identified through the JIPOE process. (JAWS Senior Service School Planning Primers, January 2006)

a. Refine wargaming methodology

-- Pre-conditions or start points and endstate for each phase

-- Advantages/disadvantages of the COA

-- Unresolved issues

-- COA modifications or refinements

-- Estimated duration of critical events/phases

-- Major tasks for components

-- Identify critical events & decision points

-- Identify branches and sequels

-- Identify risks

-- Recommended EEIs and supporting collections plan priorities

-- Highlight ROE requirements

b. Wargaming is a conscious attempt to visualize the flow of the operation, given joint force strengths and dispositions, adversary capabilities and possible COAs, the operational area (OA), and other aspects of the operational environment. Each critical event within a proposed COA should be wargamed based upon time available using the action, reaction, counteraction method of friendly and/or opposition force interaction (Figure 43). Here, the friendly force will make two moves because this activity is intended to validate and refine the friendly forces COA, not the enemies. The basic wargaming method (modified to fit the specific mission and environment) can apply to noncombat as well as combat operations.

Record of Wargame COA #

	Pre-hostilities		Hostilities				Post-hostilities	
	Act	Ctr-react	Act	Ctr-react	Ctr-react	Ctr-react	Act	Ctr-react
Enemy								
	React	Ctr-react	React	Ctr-react	Ctr-react	Ctr-react	React	Ctr-react
Friendly								

Branches:

Sequels:

Figure 43. Sample Format for Recording Wargaming Results

c. Wargaming stimulates thought about the operation so the staff will obtain ideas and insights that otherwise might not have occurred. This process highlights tasks that appear to be particularly important to the operation and provides a degree of familiarity with operational-level possibilities that might otherwise be difficult to achieve.



Figure 44. Course of Action Analysis and Wargaming

d. The wargaming process can be as simple as a detailed narrative effort which describes the action, probable reaction, counteraction, assets, and time used. A more comprehensive version is the "sketch-note" technique, which adds operational sketches and notes to the narrative process in order to gain a clearer picture. The most sophisticated form of wargaming is modern, computer-aided modeling and simulation. Figure 44 provides a list of key inputs and outputs for wargaming.

e. However, the most important element of wargaming is not the tool used, but the people who participate. Staff members who participate in wargaming should be the individuals who were deeply involved in the development of COAs. **A robust cell that can aggressively pursue the adversary's point of view when considering adversary counteraction is essential.** This **"red cell"** role-plays the adversary commander and staff. If formed, the cell would work for the joint force headquarters J-2 and typically would reside in either the joint intelligence support element (JISE) or the joint planning group (JPG). The red cell develops critical decision points relative to the friendly COAs, projects adversary reactions to friendly actions, and estimates adversary losses for each friendly COA. By trying to accurately portray the capabilities of the enemy, the red cell helps the staff fully address friendly responses for each adversary COA. If subordinate functional and Service components establish similar cells that mirror their adversary counterparts, this Red Cell network can collaborate to effectively wargame the adversary's full range of capabilities against the joint force. In addition to supporting the wargaming effort during planning, the Red Cell can continue to view friendly joint operations from the adversary's perspective during execution. The red cell process can be applied to noncombat operations to help determine unforeseen or most likely obstacles to as well as the potential results of planned operations.

f. A **synchronization matrix** is a decision-making tool and a method of recording the results of wargaming. Key results that should be recorded include decision points, potential governing factors, CCIR, COA adjustments, branches, and sequels. Using a synchronization matrix helps the staff visually synchronize the COA across time and space in relation to the adversary's possible COAs. The wargame and synchronization matrix efforts will be particularly useful in identifying cross-component support resource requirements. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006) Figures 45-49 are examples of synchronization matrix frameworks.

	CRITICAL EVENT/PHASE/TIME:								
Sequence Number	Action	Reaction	Counter-action	Assets	Time	Decision Point	PIR	Procedural & Positive Controls	Remarks

Figure 45. Example of Synchronization matrix framework

These synchronization matrices might be combined into one that, for example, reflects the contributions that each component would provide, within each joint functional area, over time. The staff can adapt the synchronization matrix to fit the needs of the analysis. It should incorporate other operations, functions, and units that it wants to highlight.

Friendly COA # _____ Short Name

Enemy COA - (Most Likely / Most Dangerous)

Time / Phase / Critical Event _____

COA

Overall Situation:

	Areas	*Action*	*Reaction*	*Counteraction*
COMPONENTS	ARFOR / Land Component			
	MARFOR / Land Component			
	NAVFOR / Maritime Component			
	AFFOR			
	JFACC			
	JSOTF			
	Others (e.g. USCG & Interagency)			
JOINT FUNCTIONAL AREAS	Movement & Maneuver			
	Intelligence			
	Firepower			
	Support			
	Command & Control			
	Protection			
OTHERS	Decision Pts			
	CCIR			
	Branches			
	Risks			
	Issues			

Figure 46. Example of Synchronization matrix framework

Friendly COA # 1 Short Name Simultaneous NEO

Enemy COA (Most Likely) (Most Dangerous)

Time / Phase Critical Event Evacuations

Situation:

The host country government cannot guarantee the safety of Americans & third country nationals (TCN). The environment for a NEO is "uncertain." Rebel factions are becoming more violent.

Start: JTF 780 positioned for NEO
End: Successful NEO and forces return to safe havens



	Areas	Action	Enemy Reaction	Counteraction
COMPONENTS	ARFOR / Land Component	- Preparing to secure evac. site at # 3 - Located with NAVFOR (afloat)	Rebel forces declare all AMCITs "enemies of the revolution" & US military presence as evidence of plans to invade their country. Several TCNs killed in grenade atk near Site 2.	· Launches & secures evac. site # 2 · Evac AMCITs/TCN onto C-130 for evac
	MARFOR / Land Component	- Preparing to secure evac. site at # 3 - Located with NAVFOR (afloat)		· Launches & secures evac. site # 3 · Evac AMCITs/TCN onto NAVFOR ships
	NAVFOR / Maritime Component	- Spting MARFOR - Spting JFACC - Spting ARFOR (ISB TR)		· Spting MARFOR · Spting JFACC · Spting ARFOR (ISB TR)
	AFFOR	- Spting JFACC - Preparing evac. control center at site A		· Spting JFACC · Operates evac. control center at site A
	JFACC	- Preparing to gain air superiority - Preparing to provide CAS - Coord airspace		· Gains/maintains air superiority · Provides CAS - Coordinates airspace
	JSOTF	- Preparing to secure evac. site at # 1 - Located at ISB B		· Launches & secures evac. site # 1 · Evac AMCITs/TCN to ISB B
	Others (e.g., USCG & Interagency)	DOS - Preparing to implement emergency evacuation plan President/SECDEF - Prepares EXORD		DOS -Implements emergency evac plan President/SECDEF - Releases EXORD
JOINT FUNCTIONAL AREAS	Movement & Maneuver	- JTF must be in position NLT ____ - JTF must be prepared to execute EXORD +4 hr		- NAVFOR & JFACC insures freedom of sea & air movements
	Intelligence	- NAIs - Sites 1,2 & 3 - PIR - Threat against AMCITs; rebels troop mov; rebels attacks; etc.		- Collects info at NAIs - Collects & processes PIR
	Firepower	- Targeting efforts continue		- AC-130 spt ARFOR/MARFOR/JSOTF (OPCON to JSOTF, TACON others)
	Support	- HN spt being provided from Countries Y & Z		- HN spt being provided from Cty Y & Z
	Command & Control	- IO/TW -PSYOP spt to each ARFOR, MARFOR & JSOTF - JTF HQ located on USS MTW		- NAVFOR provides direct spt to MARFOR & ARFOR - ROE changes
	Protection	- Weapons status ____ - Deception theme _____		- Weapons status ____ - Deception theme ____
OTHERS	Decision Pts	- Recommendation for evacuation EXORD		- When to declare "end state" and mission accomplishment
	CCIR	- Taking of any AMCIT as a hostage - Violence directed at AMCITs or TCN		- #'s of AMCITs & TCNs evacuated - Any interference with the evacuation
	Branches	- Site # 1 is unusable - Site # 3 is unusable - Site # 2 is unusable - Hostages are taken		- Implement branch plans
	Risks	- Military presence will provoke rebels		- Significant casualties - Unable to locate all AMCITs
	Issues	- Army helicopter on carriers - Approval for use of evac site/ISB in Cty Y & Z		- Policy for evacuation of unidentified personnel requesting help

Figure 47. Example of Synchronization matrix framework

Friendly COA # 1 Short Name Simultaneous NEO

Enemy COA - (Most Likely / Most Dangerous)

Time / Phase / Critical Event Evacuations

Situation:

The host country government cannot guarantee the safety of Americans & third country nationals (TCN). The environment for a NEO is "uncertain." Rebel factions are becoming more violent.

Start: JTF 780 positioned for NEO
End: Successful NEO and forces return to safe havens



	Areas	Day D-2	D-Day
COMPONENTS	ARFOR/Land Component	- Preparing to secure evac. site at # 3 - Located with NAVFOR (afloat)	- Launches & secures evac. site # 2 - Evac AMCITs/TCN onto C-130 for evac
	MARFOR/Land Component	- Preparing to secure evac. site at # 3 - Located with NAVFOR (afloat)	- Launches & secures evac. site # 3 - Evac AMCITs/TCN onto NAVFOR ships
	NAVFOR/Maritime Component	- Spting MARFOR - Spting JFACC - Spting ARFOR (ISB TR)	- Spting MARFOR - Spting JFACC - Spting ARFOR (ISB TR)
	AFFOR	- Spting JFACC - Preparing evac. control center at site A	- Spting JFACC - Operates evac. control center at site A
	JFACC	- Preparing to gain air superiority - Preparing to provide CAS - Coordinates airspace	- Gains/maintains air superiority - Provides CAS - Coordinates airspace
	JSOTF	- Preparing to secure evac. site at # 1 - Located at ISB B	- Launches & secures evac. site # 1 - Evac AMCITs/TCN to ISB B
	Others (e.g., USCG & Interagency)	DOS - Preparing to implement emergency evacuation plan Pres/SECDEF - Prepares EXORD	DOS - Implements emergency evac plan Pres/SECDEF - Releases EXORD
JOINT FUNCTIONAL AREAS	Movement & Maneuver	- JTF must be in position NLT ____ - JTF must be prepared to execute EXORD +4 hr	- NAVFOR & JFACC insures freedom of sea & air movements
	Intelligence	- NAIs - Sites 1,2 & 3 - PIR - Threat against AMCITs; rebels troop mov; rebels attacks; etc.	- Collects info at NAIs - Collects & processes PIR
	Firepower	- Targeting efforts continue	- AC-130 spt ARFOR/MARFOR/JSOTF (OPCON to JSOTF, TACON others)
	Support	- HN spt being provided from Countries Y & Z	- HN spt being provided from Cty Y & Z
	Command & Control	- IO/IW - PSYOP spt to each ARFOR, MARFOR & JSOTF - JTF HQ located on USS MTW	- NAVFOR provides direct spt to MARFOR & ARFOR - Continue IW/C2W spt - ROE changes
	Protection	- Weapons status ____ - Deception theme _____	- Weapons status ____ - Deception theme ____
OTHERS	Decision Pts	- Recommendation for evacuation EXORD	- When to declare "end state" and mission accomplishment
	CCIR	- Taking of any AMCIT as a hostage - Violence directed at AMCITs or TCNs	- #'s of AMCITs & TCNs evacuated - Any interference with the evacuation
	Branches	- Site # 1 is unusable - Site # 3 is unusable - Site # 2 is unusable - Hostages are taken	- Implement branch plans
	Risks	- Military presence will provoke rebels	- Significant casualties - Unable to locate all AMCITs
	Issues	- Army helicopter on carriers - Approval for use of evac site/ISB in Cty Y & Z	- Policy for evacuation of unidentified personnel requesting help

Figure 48. Sample Time Line Matrix for a JTF Operation

Figure 49. Sample Matrix by Phase



Figure 50. Results of Analysis and Wargaming

3. Interpret the results of analysis and wargaming. Comparisons of advantages and disadvantages of each COA will be conducted during the next step of the commanders estimate. However, if the *suitability, feasibility,* or *acceptability* of any COA becomes questionable during the analysis, the commander should *modify or discard* it and concentrate on other COAs. The need to create additional combinations of COAs may also be required (Figure 50). (JAWS Senior Service School Planning Primers, January 2006)

4. Branches and Sequels. During the wargaming sequence operational branches and sequels will be identified**.** Many operation plans require adjustment beyond the initial stages of the operation. Consequently, CCDRs build flexibility into their plans by developing branches and sequels to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing conditions. Branches and sequels directly relate to the concept of phasing. It is critical to record branches and sequels to focus future planning efforts and ensure they are complete.

a. **Branches are options built into the basic plan.** Such branches may include shifting priorities, changing unit organization and command relationships, or changing the very nature of the joint operation itself. Branches add flexibility to plans by anticipating situations that could alter the basic plan. Such situations could be a result of enemy action, availability of friendly capabilities or resources, or even a change in the weather or season within the operational area.

b. **Sequels are subsequent operations** based on the possible outcomes of the current operation — victory, defeat, or stalemate. In joint operations, phases can be viewed as the sequels to the basic plan. (JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 September 2006)

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CHAPTER XV

COA Comparison



Step 5 — COA Comparison: COA comparison facilitates the Commander's decision making process by balancing the **ends, means, ways and risk** of each COA. (JAWS Senior Service School Planning Primers, January 2006)

1. Course of action comparison is an objective process whereby COAs are considered independently of each other and evaluated/compared against a set of criteria that are established by the staff and commander. The goal is to identify and recommend the course of action that has the highest probability of success against the enemy course of action that is of the most concern to the commander. The commander and staff develop and evaluate a list of important criteria, or governing factors, consider each COA's advantages and disadvantages, identify actions to overcome disadvantages, make final tests for feasibility and acceptability and weigh the relative merits of each. Figure 51 depicts inputs and outputs for course-of-action comparison. **Governing factors** are those aspects of the situation (or externally imposed factors) that the commander deems critical to the accomplishment of the mission. Potential governing factors include elements of the commander's intent and planning guidance; wargaming results; selected principles of war; external constraints or any criteria the commander desires. Using the governing factors, the staff then outlines each COA, highlighting advantages and

disadvantages. Comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the COAs identifies their advantages and disadvantages relative to each other. The staff may use any technique that facilitates reaching consensus on the best recommendation, so that the commander can make a decision in choosing the best COA. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006)



Figure 51. Course of Action Comparison

2. **Prepare for course of action comparison**

a. Determine/define comparison criteria (e.g., "governing factors"). Criteria are based on the particular circumstances and should be relative to the situation. There is no standard list of criteria, although the commander may prescribe several core criteria that all staff directors will use. Individual staff sections based on their estimate process selects the remainder of the criteria. The following menu provides a good starting point for developing a COA comparison criteria list.

(1) Some possible sources for determining criteria are:

(a) CCDRs intent statement/guidance.

(b) Implicit significant factors relating to the operation (e.g., need for speed, security).

(c) Each staff member may identify factors relating to that staff function.



Figure 52. Operational Art and Design

(d) **Other factors, Principles of Joint Operations, Elements of Operational Art** (Figure 52), **political constraints, risk, financial costs, flexibility.** (CJCSM 3500.05A, 1 September 2003 and JP 3-0, Joint Operation Planning, 17 Sept 2006)

b. The staff evaluates feasible COAs using governing factors to identify the one with the highest probability of success. The selected COA should also:

(1) Mitigate risk to the force and mission to an acceptable level.

(2) Place the force in the best posture for future operations.

(3) Provide maximum latitude for initiative by subordinates.

(4) Provide the most flexibility to meet unexpected threats and opportunities.

3. Determine the comparison method and record. There are a number of techniques for comparing COAs. The most common technique is the decision matrix. Four types of decision matrices are:

a. Weighted Numerical Comparison Technique. The example below provides a numerical aid for differentiating COAs. Values reflect the relative advantages or disadvantages of each COA for each of the criterion selected. Certain criteria have been weighted to reflect greater value. (Figure 53)

(1) Criteria are those selected through the process described earlier.

(2) The criteria can be rated (or weighted). The most important criteria are rated with the highest numbers. Lesser criteria are weighted with progressively lower numbers.

(3) The highest number is best. The best criterion and the most advantageous COA ratings are with the highest number. Values reflect the relative strengths and weaknesses of each COA.



		Courses of Action					
		COA 1		COA 2		COA 3	
Criteria	Weight	Rating	Product	Rating	Product	Rating	Product
Exploits Maneuver	2	3	6	2	4	1	2
Attacks COGs	3	2	6	3	9	1	3
Integrates Maneuver and Interdiction	2	2	4	3	6	1	2
Exploits Deception	2	1	2	2	4	3	6
Provide flexibility	2	1	2	3	6	2	4
CSS (best use of transportation)	1	3	3	2	2	1	1
etc.							
Total		12		15		9	
Weighted total			23		31		18

Figure 207-1
Example Numerical Comparison

- The CJTF's intent explained that the most important criteria was "attacking the enemy's centers of gravity."
***therefore*-----> Assign a value of 3 for that criteria and lower numbers for other criteria that the staff devises (this is weighting the criteria).**
- For "attacking enemy COGs," COA 2 was rated the best (with a number of "3")
***therefore*----> COA 2 = 9, COA 1 = 6, and COA 3 = 3**
- After multiplying the relative COA rating by the weight given to each criteria, and adding the product columns, COA 2 (with a score of 31) is rated the most appropriate according to the criteria used to evaluate it.

Figure 53. Example Numerical Comparison

(4) Each staff section does this separately, perhaps using different criteria on which to base the COA comparison. Then the staff assembles and arrives at a consensus for the criterion and weights. The Chief of Staff/DCJTF should approve the staff's recommendations concerning the criteria and weights to ensure completeness and consistency throughout the staff sections.

b. Non-Weighted Numerical Comparison Technique. The same as the previous method except the criteria are not weighted. Again, the highest number is best for each of the criteria.

c. Narrative or bulletized descriptive comparison of strengths and weaknesses. Review criteria and describe each COA's strengths and weaknesses. See the example below, Figure 54.

Course of Action	Strengths	Weaknesses
COA 1	Narrative or bulletized discussion of strengths using the criteria	Narrative or bulletized discussion of weaknesses using the criteria
COA 2	Same	Same
COA 3	Same	Same

Figure 54. Criteria for Strengths and Weaknesses

d. Plus/Minus/Neutral comparison. Base this comparison on the broad degree to which selected criteria support or are reflected in the COA. This is typically organized as a table showing (+) for a positive influence, (0) for a neutral influence, and (-) for a negative influence. Figure 55 is an example:

Criteria	COA 1	COA 2
Casualty estimate	+	-
Casualty evacuation routes	-	+
Suitable medical facilities	0	0
Flexibility	+	-

Figure 55. Plus/Minus/Neutral Comparison

COA comparison remains a subjective process and should not be turned into a mathematical equation. Using +,-,0 or 1,2,3 are as appropriate as any other methods. The key element in this process is the ability to articulate to the Commander why one COA is preferred over another. (CJCSM 3500.5A, 1 September 2003)

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Chapter XVI

COA Selection and Approval



Step 6 — COA Approval

COA Recommendation

1. Throughout the COA development process, the CCDR conducts an independent analysis of the mission, possible courses of action, and relative merits and risks associated with each COA. The Commander, upon receiving the staff's recommendation, combines his analysis with the staff recommendation resulting in a selected COA. The forum for presenting the results of COA comparison is the *Commander's Decision Brief*. Typically this briefing provides the combatant commander with an update of the current situation, an overview of the COAs considered, and a discussion of the results of COA comparison.

2. Once the CCDR has made a decision on a selected COA, provides guidance, and updates his intent, the staff completes the Commander's Estimate. The Commander's Estimate provides a concise statement of how the combatant commander intends to accomplish the mission, and provides the necessary focus for campaign planning and OPLAN/OPORD development. Further, it responds to the establishing authority's

requirement to develop a plan for execution. Annex D of JOPES Volume I (CJCSI 3122.01) provides the format for the Commander's Estimate. (JAWS Senior Service School Planning Primers, January 2006)

3. **Prepare the COA decision briefing**. The JPG should prepare a briefing to provide the following to the CCDR/JFC:

a. The purpose of the briefing.

b. Enemy situation.

(1) Strength. A review of enemy forces, both committed/available for reinforcement.

(2) Composition. Order of battle, major weapons systems, and operational characteristics.

(3) Location and disposition. Ground combat and fire support forces, air, naval, missile forces, logistic forces and nodes, command and control (C2) facilities, and other combat power.

(4) Reinforcements. Land; air; naval; missile; nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC), other advanced weapons systems; capacity for movement of these forces.

(5) Logistics. A summary of the enemy's ability to support combat operations.

(6) Time and space factors. The capability to move to and reinforce initial positions.

(7) Combat efficiency. The state of training, readiness, battle experience, physical condition, morale, leadership, motivation, tactical doctrine, discipline, and significant strengths and weaknesses.

c. Friendly situation.

d. Mission statements.

(1) CCDR's.

(2) JFC's.

e. Commander's intent statement.

(1) CCDR's.

(2) JFC's.

f. Operational concepts and COAs developed.

(1) Any changes from the mission analysis briefing in the following areas:

(a) Assumptions.

(b) Limitations.

(c) Enemy and friendly centers of gravity.

(d) Phasing of the operation (if phased).

(2) Present courses of action. As a minimum, discuss:

(a) COA # ___. (Short name, e.g., "Simultaneous Assault")

1 COA statement (brief concept of operations).

2 COA sketch.

3 COA architecture:

a JFC task organization.

b Command relationships.

c Organization of the operational area.

(b) Major differences between each COA.

(c) Summaries of COAs.

g. COA analysis.

(1) Review of JPG's wargaming efforts.

(2) Add considerations from own experience.

h. COA comparisons.

(1) Description of comparison criteria (e.g., governing factors) and comparison methodology.

(2) Weigh strengths/weaknesses with respect to comparison criteria.

i. COA recommendations:

(1) Staff.

(2) JFC components. (CJCSM 3500.05A, 1 Sept 2003)

4. **Present the COA decision briefing.** All principal staff directors and the component commanders should attend this briefing (physically present or linked by VTC).

5. **CDR selects/modified COA**.

a. Review staff recommendations.

b. Apply results of own COA analysis and comparison.

c. Consider any separate recommendations from supporting and subordinate commanders.

d. Review guidance from the CDR.

e. The CDR may:

(1) Concur with staff/component recommendations, as presented.

(2) Concur with staff/component recommended COAs, but with modifications.

(3) Select a different COA from the staff/component recommendations.

(4) Direct the use of a COA not formally considered.

(5) Defer the decision and consult with selected staff/commanders prior to making a final decision. (CJCSM 3500.5A, 1 September 2003)

6. **COA Approval.** Figure 56 depicts the COA approval inputs and outputs. The staff briefs the commander on the COA comparison and the analysis and wargaming results, including a review of important supporting information. This briefing often takes the form of a Commander's Estimate. This information could include; the current status of the joint force; the current JIPOE; and assumptions used in COA development. The commander selects a COA based upon the staff recommendations and the commander's personal estimate, experience, and judgment.

a. The nature of a potential contingency could make it difficult to determine a specific end state until the crisis actually occurs. In these cases, the CCDR may choose to present two or more valid COAs for approval by higher authority. A single COA can then be approved when the crisis occurs and specific circumstances become clear.



Figure 56. Course of Action Approval

7. **Prepare the Commander's Estimate**. The Commander's Estimate provides a continuously updated source of information from the perspective of the CCDR. Commanders at various levels use estimates during JOPP to support all aspects of COA determination and plan or order development. Outside of formal JOPES requirements, a commander may or may not use a Commander's Estimate as the situation dictates. The commander's initial intent statement and planning guidance to the staff can provide sufficient information to guide the planning process. Although the CCDR will tailor the content of the Commander's Estimate based on the situation, a typical format for an estimate that a CCDR submits per JOPES VOL I procedures is shown at Figure 57. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006)



Figure 57. Commander's Estimate

a. Precise contents may vary widely, depending on the nature of the crisis, time available to respond, and the applicability of prior planning. In a rapidly developing situation, the formal Commander's Estimate may be initially impractical, and the entire estimate process may be reduced to a commanders' conference.

b. In practice, with appropriate horizontal and vertical coordination, along with IPR's the CCDR's COA selection could already have been briefed to and approved by the CJCS and SecDef. In the current global environment, where major military operations are both politically and strategically significant, even a CCDR's selected COA is normally briefed to and approved by the President or SECDEF. The Commander's Estimate then becomes a matter of formal record keeping and guidance for component and supporting forces.

c. Annex J of JOPES Volume I (CJCSI 3122.01) provides the format for a Commander's Estimate. (CJCSM 3500.5A, 1 September 2003). See also Appendix C of this document.

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CHAPTER XVII

Plan Development – Function III



Function III — Plan Development

Step 7 — Plan or Order Development:

1. After completing Steps 1-6 we now have a document that's been well staffed which will aid us in developing our plan.

a. During Plan or Order development, the CDR and staff, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting components and organizations, expand the approved COA into a detailed OPLAN or OPORD utilizing the CONPLAN, which is the centerpiece of the operation plan or order.

2. Plan or Order Development

a. For plans and orders developed per CJCSM 3122.01 (*JOPES*), the CJCS, in coordination with the supported and supporting commanders and other members of the JCS, monitors planning activities, resolves shortfalls when required, and reviews the supported commander's OPLAN for *adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, completeness, and compliance with Joint Doctrine.* The supported commander will conduct Final Plan

Approval -in-progress reviews (IPR-F) with the SecDef to confirm the plan's strategic guidance and receive approval of assumptions, the mission statement, the concept, the plan, and any further guidance required for plan refinement. At IPR-F, the CJCS and USD(P) will include issues arising from, or resolved during, plan review (e.g. key risks, decision points). The intended result of IPR-F is SECDEF approval of the basic plan and required annexes, the resolution of any remaining key issues, and approval to proceed with plan assessment (as applicable) with any amplifying guidance or direction.

If the President or SecDef decides to execute the plan, all three joint operation planning elements — *situational awareness, planning, and execution* — continue in a complementary and iterative process.

b. The CCDR guides plan development by issuing a PLANORD or similar planning directive to coordinate the activities of the commands and agencies involved. A number of activities are associated with plan development, as Figure 58 shows.

Figure 58. Plan Development Activities

These planning activities typically will be accomplished in a parallel, collaborative, and iterative fashion rather than sequentially, depending largely on the planning time available. The same flexibility displayed in COA development is seen here again, as planners discover and eliminate shortfalls.

c. The CJCSI 3122 series (JOPES) provides specific guidance on these activities for organizations required to prepare a plan per JOPES procedures. However, these are typical types of activities that other organizations also will accomplish as they plan for joint operations. For example, a combatant command which is preparing a crisis-related OPLAN at the President's direction will follow specific procedures and milestones in force planning, TPFDD development, and shortfall identification. If required, a joint task

force (JTF) subordinate to the CCDR will support this effort even as the CCDR commander and staff are planning for their specific mission and tasks.

(1) Application of Forces and Capabilities

(a) When planning the application of forces and capabilities, **the CCDR should not be completely constrained by the strategic plan's force apportionment** if additional resources are justifiable and no other course of action within the allocation reasonably exists. The additional capability requirements will be coordinated with the joint staff through the development process. Risk assessments will include results using both allocated capabilities and additional capabilities. Operation planning is inherently an iterative process, with forces being requested and approved for certain early phases, while other forces may be needed or withdrawn for the later phases. This process is particularly complex when planning a campaign because of the potential magnitude of committed forces and length of the commitment. Finally, when making this determination the CCDR should also consider withholding some capability as an **operational reserve**.

(b) When developing an OPLAN, the supported CCDR should designate the main effort and supporting efforts as soon as possible. This action is necessary for economy of effort and for allocating disparate forces, to include multinational forces. The main effort is based on the supported CCDR's prioritized objectives. It identifies where the supported CCDR will concentrate capabilities to achieve specific objectives. Designation of the main effort can be addressed in geographical (area) or functional terms. Area tasks and responsibilities focus on a specific area to control or conduct operations. Functional tasks and responsibilities focus on the performance of continuing efforts that involve the forces of two or more Military Departments operating in the same domain — air, land, sea, or space — or where there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. In either case, designating the main effort will establish where or how a major portion of available friendly forces and assets are employed, often to attain the primary objective of a major operation or campaign.

(c) Designating a main effort facilitates the synchronized and integrated employment of the joint force while preserving the initiative of subordinate commanders. After the main effort is identified, joint force and component planners determine those tasks essential to accomplishing objectives. The supported CCDR assigns these tasks to subordinate commanders along with the capabilities and support necessary to achieve them. As such, the CONOPS must clearly specify the nature of the main effort.

(d) The main effort can change during the course of the operation based on numerous factors, including changes in the operational environment

and how the adversary reacts to friendly operations. When the main effort changes, support priorities must change to ensure success. Both horizontal and vertical coordination within the joint force and with multinational and interagency partners is essential when shifting the main effort. Secondary efforts are important, but are ancillary to the main effort. They normally are designed to complement or enhance the success of the main effort (for example, by diverting enemy resources). Only necessary secondary efforts, whose potential value offsets or exceeds the resources required, should be undertaken, because these efforts divert resources from the main effort. Secondary efforts normally lack the operational depth of the main effort and have fewer forces and capabilities, smaller reserves, and more limited objectives (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006).

(2) **Force Planning**

(a) The primary purposes of force planning are to (1) influence COA development and selection based on force allocations, availability, and readiness (2) identify all forces needed to accomplish the supported component commanders' CONOPS with some rigor and (3) effectively phase the forces into the OA. Force planning consists of determining the force requirements by operation phase, mission, mission priority, mission sequence, and operating area. It includes force allocation review, major force phasing; integration planning; force list structure development (TPFDD); followed by force list development. Force planning is the responsibility of the CCDR, supported by component commanders in coordination with global force management (GFM) and USJFCOM force providers. Force planning begins early during CONOPS development and focuses on adaptability. The commander determines force requirements; develops a letter of instruction or time phasing and force planning; and designs force modules to align and time-phase the forces in accordance with the CONOPS. Major forces and elements are selected from those apportioned or allocated for planning and included in the supported commander's CONOPS by operation phase, mission and mission priority. Service components then collaboratively make tentative assessments of the specific sustainment capabilities required in accordance with the CONOPS. After the actual forces are identified (sourced), the CCDR refines the force plan to ensure it supports the CONOPS, provides force visibility, and enables flexibility. The commander identifies and resolves or reports shortfalls with a risk assessment.

(b) In CAP, force planning focuses on the actual units designated to participate in the planned operation and their readiness for deployment. The supported commander identifies force requirements as operational capabilities in the form of force packages to facilitate sourcing by the Services USJFCOM, USSOCOM, and other force providers' supporting commands. A force package is a list (group of force capabilities) of the various forces (force requirements) that the supported commander requires

to conduct the operation described in the CONOPS. The supported commander typically describes required force requirements in the form of broad capability descriptions or unit type codes, depending on the circumstances. The supported commander submits the required force packages through the Joint Staff to the force providers for sourcing. Force providers review the readiness and deployability posture of their available units before deciding which units to allocate to the supported commander's force requirements. Services and their component commands also determine mobilization requirements and plan for the provision of non-unit sustainment. The supported commander will review the sourcing recommendations through the GFM process to ensure compatibility with capability requirements and concept of operations. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006)

(3) **Support Planning.** The purpose of support planning is to determine the sequence of the personnel, logistic, and other support required to provide distribution; maintenance; civil engineering, medical, and sustainment in accordance with the concept of operation. Support planning is conducted in parallel with other planning, and encompasses such essential factors as executive agent identification; assignment of responsibility for base operating support; airfield operations; management of non-unit replacements; health service support; personnel management; financial management; handling of prisoners of war and detainees; theater civil engineering policy; logistic-related environmental considerations; support of noncombatant evacuation operations and other retrograde operations; and nation assistance. Support planning is primarily the responsibility of the Service component commanders and begins during CONOPS development. Service component commanders identify and update support requirements in coordination with the Services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and USTRANSCOM. They initiate the procurement of critical and low-density inventory items; determine host nation support (HNS) availability; develop plans for total asset visibility; and establish phased delivery plans for sustainment in line with the phases and priorities of the CONOPS. They develop and train for battle damage repair; develop reparable retrograde plans; develop container management plans; develop force and line of communications protection plans; develop supporting phased transportation and support plans aligned to the CONOPS and report movement support requirements. Service component commanders continue to refine their sustainment and transportation requirements as the force providers identify and source force requirements. During distribution planning, the supported CCDR and USTRANSCOM resolve gross distribution feasibility questions impacting inter-theater and intra-theater movement and sustainment delivery. USTRANSCOM and other transportation providers identify air, land, and sea transportation resources to support the approved CONOPS. These resources may include apportioned inter-theater transportation, GCC-controlled theater transportation, and transportation organic to the subordinate commands. USTRANSCOM and other transportation providers develop transportation schedules for movement requirements identified by the supported commander. A transportation

schedule does not necessarily mean that the supported commander's CONOPS is transportation feasible; rather, the schedules provide the most effective and realistic use of available transportation resources in relation to the phased CONOPS. (JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operation, 17 Sept 2006)

(a) **Support refinement** is conducted to confirm the sourcing of logistic requirements in accordance with strategic guidance and to assess the adequacy of resources provided through support planning. This refinement ensures support is phased in accordance with the CONOPS; refines support C2 planning; and integrates support plans across the supporting commands, Service components, and agencies. It ensures an effective but minimum logistics foot-print for each phase of the CONOPS.

(b) **Transportation refinement** simulates the planned movement of resources that require lift support to ensure that the plan is transportation feasible. The supported commander evaluates and adjusts the concept of operation to achieve end-to-end transportation feasibility if possible, or requests additional resources if the level of risk is unacceptable. Transportation plans must be consistent and deconflicted with plans and timelines required by providers of Service-unique combat and support aircraft to the supported CCDR. Planning also must consider requirements of international law; commonly understood customs and practices; and agreements or arrangements with foreign nations with which the U.S. requires permission for overflight, access, and diplomatic clearance. If significant changes are made to the CONOPS, it should be assessed for feasibility and refined to ensure it is acceptable.

(4) **Nuclear strike.** Commanders must assess the military as well as political impact a nuclear strike would have on their operations. Nuclear planning guidance issued at the combatant commander level is based on national-level political considerations and is influenced by the military mission. Although USSTRATCOM conducts nuclear planning in coordination with the supported GCC and certain allied commanders, the supported commander does not effectively control the decision to use nuclear weapons.

(5) **Deployment Planning.** Deployment planning is conducted on a continuous basis for all approved contingency plans and as required for specific crisis-action plans. In all cases, mission requirements of a specific operation define the scope, duration, and scale of both deployment and redeployment operation planning. Unity of effort is paramount, since both deployment and redeployment operations involve numerous commands, agencies, and functional processes. Because the ability to adapt to unforeseen conditions is essential, supported CCDRs must ensure their deployment plans for each contingency or crisis-action plan support global force visibility requirements.

(a) **Operational Environment**. For a given plan, deployment planning decisions are based on the anticipated operational environment, which

may be permissive, uncertain, or hostile. The anticipated operational environment dictates the type of entry operations, deployment concept, mobility options, predeployment training, and force integration requirements. Normally, supported CCDRs, their subordinate commanders, and their Service components are responsible for providing detailed situation information; mission statements by operation phase; theater support parameters; strategic and operational lift allocations by phase (for both force movements and sustainment); HNS information and environmental standards; and prepositioned equipment planning guidance.

(b) **Deployment Concept**. Supported CCDRs must develop a deployment concept and identify specific predeployment standards necessary to meet mission requirements. Supporting CCDRs provide trained and mission-ready forces to the supported combatant command deployment concept and predeployment standard. Services recruit, organize, train, and equip interoperable forces. The Services' predeployment planning and coordination with the supporting combatant command must ensure that predeployment standards specified by the supported CCDR are achieved, supporting personnel and forces arrive in the supported theater fully prepared to perform their mission, and deployment delays caused by duplication of predeployment efforts are eliminated. The Services and supporting CCDRs must ensure unit OPLANs are prepared; forces are tailored and echeloned; personnel and equipment movement plans are complete and accurate; command relationship and integration requirements are identified; mission-essential tasks are rehearsed; mission-specific training is conducted; force protection is planned and resourced; and sustainment requirements are identified. Careful and detailed planning ensures that only required personnel, equipment, and materiel deploy; unit training is exacting; missions are fully understood; deployment changes are minimized during execution; and the flow of personnel, equipment; and movement of materiel into theater aligns with the concept of operation.

(c) **Movement Planning**. Movement planning integrates the activities and requirements of units with partial or complete self-deployment capability, activities of units that require lift support, and the transportation of sustainment and retrogrades. Movement planning is highly collaborative and is enhanced by coordinated use of simulation and analysis tools.

1 The supported command is responsible for movement control, including sequence of arrival, and exercises this authority through the TPFDD and the JOPES validation process. The supported commander will use the organic lift and non-organic, common-user, strategic lift resources made available for planning by the CJCS. Competing requirements for limited strategic lift resources, support facilities, and intra-theater transportation assets will be assessed in terms of impact on mission accomplishment. If additional resources are required, the supported command will identify the requirements and provide

rationale for those requirements. The supported commander's operational priorities and any movement constraints (e.g., assumptions concerning the potential use of WMD) are used to prepare a movement plan. The plan will consider enroute staging locations to support the scheduled activity. This information, together with an estimate of required site augmentation, will be communicated to appropriate supporting commanders. The global force manager and USTRANSCOM use the Joint Flow Analysis and Sustainment for Transportation model to assess transportation feasibility and develop recommendations on final port of embarkation selections for those units without organic lift capability. Movement feasibility requires current analysis and assessment of movement C2 structures and systems; available organic, strategic and theater lift assets; transportation infrastructure; and competing demands and restrictions.

2 After coordinated review of the movement analysis by USTRANSCOM, the supported command, and the global force provider may adjust the concept of operation to improve movement feasibility where operational requirements remain satisfied. Commander USTRANSCOM should adjust or reprioritize transportation assets to meet the supported commander's operational requirements (fort to foxhole). If this is not an option due to requirements from other commanders, then the supported commander adjusts TPFDD requirements or is provided additional strategic and theater lift capabilities using (but not limited to) Civil Reserve Air Fleet and/or Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement capabilities as necessary to achieve end-to-end transportation feasibility.

3 Operational requirements may cause the supported commander and/or subordinate commanders to alter their plans, potentially impacting the deployment priorities or TPFDD requirements. Planners must understand and anticipate the impact of change. There is a high potential for a sequential pattern of disruption when changes are made to the TPFDD. A unit displaced by a change might not simply move on the next available lift, but may require reprogramming for movement at a later time. This may not only disrupt the flow, but may also interrupt the operation. Time is also a factor in TPFDD changes. Airlift can respond to short-notice changes, but at a cost in efficiency. Sealift, on the other hand, requires longer lead times, and cannot respond to change in a short period. These plan changes and the resulting modifications to the TPFDDs must be handled during the planning cycles.

(d) **Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration Planning**. JRSOI planning is conducted to ensure an integrated joint force arrives and becomes operational in the OA as scheduled. Effective integration of the force into the joint operation is the primary objective of the deployment phase.

(e) **TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI).** The supported commander publishes supplemental instructions for time phasing force deployment data development in the TPFDD LOI. The LOI provides operation specific guidance for utilizing the JOPES processes and systems to provide force visibility and tracking; force mobility; and operational agility through the TPFDD and the validation process. It provides procedures for the deployment, redeployment, and rotations of the operation's forces. The LOI provides instructions on force planning sourcing, reporting, and validation. It defines planning and execution milestones and details movement control procedures and lift allocations to the commander's components, supporting commanders, and other members of the JPEC. A TPFDD must ensure force visibility, be tailored to the phases of the concept of operation, and be execution feasible.

(f) **Deployment and JRSOI Refinement**. Deployment and JRSOI refinement is conducted by the supported command in coordination with Joint Staff, USJFCOM, USTRANSCOM, the Services, and supporting commands. The purpose of the deployment and JRSOI refinement is to ensure the force deployment plan maintains force mobility throughout any movements, provides for force visibility and tracking at all times, provides for effective force preparation, and fully integrates forces into a joint operation while enabling unity of effort. This refinement conference examines planned missions, the priority of the missions within the operation phases and the forces assigned to those missions. By mission, the refinement conference examines force capabilities, force size, support requirements, mission preparation, force positioning/basing, weapon systems, major equipment, force protection and sustainment requirements. It should assess the feasibility of force closure by the commander's required delivery date and the feasibility of successful mission execution within the time frame established by the commander under the deployment concept. This refinement conference should assess potential success of all force integration requirements. Transition criteria for all phases should be evaluated for force redeployment or rotation requirements.

(g) For lesser-priority plans that may be executed simultaneously with higher-priority plans or on-going operations, combatant command and USTRANSCOM planners may develop several different deployment scenarios to provide the CCDR a range of possible transportation conditions under which the plan may have to be executed based on risk to this plan and the other ongoing operations. This will help both the supported and supporting CCDRs identify risk associated with having to execute multiple operations in a transportation-constrained environment.

(6) **Shortfall Identification.** Along with hazard and threat analysis, shortfall identification is performed throughout the plan development process. The supported commander continuously identifies limiting factors and capabilities shortfalls and associated risks as plan development progresses. Where possible, the supported commander resolves the shortfalls and required

controls and countermeasures through planning adjustments and coordination with supporting and subordinate commanders. If the shortfalls and necessary controls and countermeasures cannot be reconciled or the resources provided are inadequate to perform the assigned task, the supported commander reports these limiting factors and assessment of the associated risk to the CJCS. The CJCS and the Service Chiefs consider shortfalls and limiting factors reported by the supported commander and coordinate resolution. However, the completion of assigned plans is not delayed pending the resolution of shortfalls. If shortfalls cannot be resolved within the JSCP time frame, the completed plan will include a consolidated summary and impact assessment of unresolved shortfalls and associated risks.

(7) **Feasibility Analysis.** This step in plan or order development is similar to determining the feasibility of a course of action, except that it typically does not involve simulation-based wargaming. The focus in this step is on ensuring the assigned mission can be accomplished using available resources within the time contemplated by the plan. The results of force planning, support planning, deployment planning, and shortfall identification will affect OPLAN or OPORD feasibility. The primary factors considered are whether the apportioned or allocated resources can be deployed to the joint operations area (JOA) when required, sustained throughout the operation, and employed effectively, or whether the scope of the plan exceeds the apportioned resources and supporting capabilities. Measures to enhance feasibility include adjusting the CONOPS, ensuring sufficiency of resources and capabilities, and maintaining options and reserves.

(8) **Refinement.** During Contingency Planning, plan refinement typically is an orderly process that follows plan development and is associated with plan assessment (see Figure 59). Refinement then continues on a regular basis as circumstances related to the potential contingency change. In CAP, refinement is almost continuous throughout OPLAN or OPORD development. Planners frequently adjust the plan or order based on results of force planning, support planning, deployment planning, shortfall identification, revised JIPOE, and changes to strategic guidance. Refinement continues even after execution begins, with changes typically transmitted in the form of FRAGORDs rather than revised copies of the plan or order. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006)



Figure 59. Joint Operations Planning Activities, Functions, and Products

(9) **Documentation.** When the TPFDD is complete and end-to-to end transportation feasibility has been achieved and is acceptable to the commander, the supported commander completes the documentation of the final, transportation-feasible OPLAN or OPORD and coordinates distribution of the TPFDD within the JOPES network as appropriate.

(10) **Plan Review and Approval.** When the final OPLAN or OPORD is complete, the supported commander then submits it with the associated TPFDD file to the CJCS and SecDef for review, approval, or modification. The JPEC reviews the supported commander's OPLAN or OPORD and provides the results of the review to the CJCS. The CJCS reviews and recommends approval or disapproval of the OPLAN or OPORD to the SecDef. After the CJCS's review, the SecDef or President will review, approve, or modify the plan. The SecDef may delegate the approval of contingency plans to the CJCS. The President is the final approval authority for OPORDs. Plan review criteria are common to Contingency Planning and CAP, as shown in Figure 60.

Figure 60. Plan Review Criteria

(11) **Supporting Plan Development**

(a) Supporting commanders prepare plans that encompass their role in the joint operation. Employment planning is normally accomplished by the JFC (CCDR or subordinate JFC) who will direct the forces if the plan is executed. Detailed employment planning may be delayed when the politico-military situation cannot be clearly forecast, or it may be excluded from supporting plans if employment is to be planned and executed within a multinational framework.

(b) The supported commander normally reviews and approves supporting plans. However, the CJCS may be asked to resolve critical issues that arise during the review of supporting plans, and the Joint Staff may coordinate the review of any supporting plans should circumstances so warrant. Contingency Planning does not conclude when the supported commander approves the supporting plans.

Planning refinement and maintenance continues until the operation terminates or the planning requirement is cancelled or superseded.

d. Transition is critical to the overall planning process. It is an orderly turnover of a plan or order as it is passed to those tasked with execution of the operation. It provides information, direction and guidance relative to the plan or order that will help to facilitate situational awareness. Additionally, it provides an understanding of the rationale for key decisions necessary to ensure there is a coherent shift from planning to execution. These factors coupled together are intended to maintain the intent of the concept of operations, promote unity of effort and generate tempo. Successful transition ensures that those charged with executing an order have a full understanding of the plan. Regardless of the level of command, such a transition ensures that those who execute the order understand the commander's intent and concept of operations. Transition may be internal or external in the form of briefs or drills. Internally, transition occurs between future plans and future/current operations. Externally, transition occurs between the commander and subordinate commands.

(1) **Transition Brief**. At higher levels of command, transition may include a formal transition brief to subordinate or adjacent commanders and to the staff supervising execution of the order. At lower levels, it might be less formal. The transition brief provides an overview of the mission, commander's intent, task organization, and enemy and friendly situation. It is given to ensure all actions necessary to implement the order are known and understood by those executing the order. The brief should include items from the order or plan such as: higher headquarters mission (tasks and intent), mission, commander's intent, CCIRs, task organization, situation (enemy and friendly), concept of operations, execution (including branches and sequels), and planning support tools (synchronization matrix, JIPOE products, etc.).

(2) **Confirmation Brief**. A confirmation brief is given by a subordinate commander after receiving the order or plan. Subordinate commanders brief the higher commander on their understanding of commander's intent, their specific tasks and purpose, and the relationship between their unit's missions and the other units in the operation. The confirmation brief allows the higher commander to identify potential gaps in the plan, as well as discrepancies with subordinate plans. It also gives the commander insights into how subordinate commanders intend to accomplish their missions.

(3) **Transition Drills**. Transition drills increase the situational awareness of subordinate commanders and the staff and instill confidence and familiarity with the plan. Sand tables, map exercises, rehearsals of concept (ROC) and rehearsals are examples of transition drills. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006).

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CHAPTER XVIII

Plan Assessment – Function IV

Function IV – Plan Assessment

1. **Plan Assessment**. During plan assessment the combatant commander extends and refines planning while supporting and subordinate commanders complete their plans for review and approval. The combatant commander continues to develop branch plans and other options for the SECDEF and the President as required or directed. When required by the supported combatant commander, supporting commands and agencies submit supporting plans within 60 days after SECDEF approval of the base plan.

a. Under a fully mature JOPP process, "triggers" will alert the planning community to reassess and revise, if necessary, contingency plans, thereby keeping them in a "living" state. These triggers include, but are not limited to, changes associated with:

(1) Implied or stated plan assumptions

(2) Force or enemy military structure and/or capabilities

(3) Readiness levels and availability of forces

(4) COA timelines/concept/phases

(5) Strategic guidance

(6) Intentions (U.S. and enemy)

(7) Alliances

(8) Key planning factors

b. Plan assessment encompasses four distinct evaluations of a plan; refinement (R), adaptation (A), termination (T), or execution (E). Depending on the nature or significance of such triggers, plans may only require refinement. Refining a plan to keep it in a living state does not require an additional IPR. An IPR is required, however, if the plan requires a more complex adaptation, is recommended for termination, or is required for execution. During assessment the combatant commander will conduct as many IPRs as required with the SECDEF to maintain plans in a living state. Top-priority plans and CPG-directed plans unique to specific commanders are required to be reviewed every six months at a minimum. Further, these plans require a review if there are significant changes in the following; strategy, risk and/or tolerance of risk, assumptions, US capabilities, enemy and/or adversary intent or capabilities, resources, or alliances.

2**. Execution**

a. **Execution begins when the President decides to use a military option to resolve a crisis**. Only the President or SecDef can authorize the CJCS to issue an EXORD. The EXORD directs the supported commander to initiate military operations,

defines the time to initiate operations, and conveys guidance not provided earlier. The CJCS monitors the deployment and employment of forces, acts to resolve shortfalls, and directs action needed to ensure successful completion of military operations. Execution continues until the operation is terminated or the mission is accomplished or revised. The CAP process may be repeated continuously as circumstances and missions change.

b. During execution, changes to the original plan may be necessary because of tactical, intelligence, and environmental considerations, force and non-unit cargo availability, availability of strategic lift assets, and port capabilities. Therefore, ongoing refinement and adjustment of deployment requirements and schedules and close coordination and monitoring of deployment activities are required. The JOPES deployment database contains the following information, at a minimum, at the time of OPORD execution:

(1) Sourced combat and sustainment capability requirements for assigned forces.

(2) Integrated critical resupply requirements identified by supply category, port of debarkation, and latest arrival date (LAD) at port of debarkation.

(3) Integrated non-unit personnel filler and casualty replacements by numbers and day.

c. The CJCS publishes the EXORD that defines D-day and H-hour and directs execution of the OPORD. The **CJCS's EXORD** is a record communication that authorizes execution of the COA approved by the President and SecDef and detailed in the supported commander's OPORD. It may include further guidance, instructions, or amplifying orders. In a fast- developing crisis the EXORD may be the first record communication generated by the CJCS. The record communication may be preceded by a voice announcement. **The issuance of the EXORD is time-sensitive**. The format may differ depending on the amount of previous record correspondence and applicability of prior guidance. CJCSM 3122.01 (*JOPES Vol I*) contains the format for the EXORD. Information already communicated in previous orders should not be repeated unless previous orders were not made available to all concerned. The EXORD need only contain the authority to execute the operation and any additional essential guidance, such as D-day and H-hour.

d. Throughout execution, the Joint Staff monitors movements, assesses achievement of tasks, and resolves shortfalls as necessary. The CJCS should monitor the situation for potential changes in the applicability of current termination criteria and communicate them to all concerned parties.

e. The supported commander issues an EXORD to subordinate and supporting commanders upon receipt of the CJCS's EXORD. It may give the detailed planning guidance resulting from updated or amplifying orders, instructions, or guidance that the CJCS's EXORD does not cover. The supported commander also monitors, assesses, and reports achievement of objectives; ensures that data are updated in the JOPES database; and re-plans, re-deploys, or terminates operations as necessary, in compliance with termination criteria directed by the President or SecDef.

f. Subordinate and supporting commanders execute their OPORDs, revalidate the sourcing and scheduling of units, report movement of organic lift, and report deployment movements on the JOPES database. These commanders conduct the operation as directed and fulfill their responsibilities to sustain their Service forces in the OA.

g. USTRANSCOM components validate transportation movement planned for the first increment, adjust deployment flow and reschedule as required, and continue to develop transportation schedules for subsequent increments. Both statuses of movements and future movement schedules are entered in the JOPES database.

h. **Planning during Execution.** Planning continues during execution, with an initial emphasis on refining the existing plan and producing the OPORD. As the operation progresses, planning generally occurs in three distinct but overlapping timeframes: *future plans, future operations,* and *current operations* as Figure 61 depicts.

(1) The joint force J-5's effort focuses on ***future plans***. The timeframe of focus for this effort varies according to the level of command, type of operation, JFC's desires, and other factors. Typically the emphasis of the *future plans* effort is on planning the next phase of operations or **sequels** to the current operation. In a campaign, this could be planning the next major operation (the next phase of the campaign).

(2) Planning also occurs for **branches** to current operations (***future operations* planning**). The timeframe of focus for *future operations* planning varies according to the factors listed for *future plans*, but the period typically is more near-term than the *future plans* timeframe. *Future planning* could occur in the J-5 or JPG, while *future operations* planning could occur in the joint operations center or J-3.

(3) Finally, ***current operations*** planning addresses the immediate or very near-term planning issues associated with ongoing operations. This occurs in the JOC or J-3.



Figure 61. Planning During Execution

3. **Assessment**

a. General. Assessment is a process that measures progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. Commanders continuously assess the operational environment and the progress of operations, and compare them to their initial vision and intent. Commanders adjust operations based on their assessment to ensure objectives are met and the military end state is achieved.

(1) **The assessment process is continuous and directly tied to the commander's decisions** throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations. Staffs help the commander by monitoring the numerous aspects that can influence the outcome of operations and provide the commander timely information needed for decisions. The CCIR process is linked to the assessment process by the commander's need for timely information and recommendations to make decisions. The assessment process helps staffs by identifying key aspects of the operation that the commander is interested in closely monitoring and where the commander wants to make decisions. Examples of commander's critical decisions include when to transition to another phase of a campaign, what the priority of effort should be, or how to adjust command relationships between component commanders.

(2) The assessment process begins during mission analysis when the commander and staff consider what to measure and how to measure it to determine progress toward accomplishing a **task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective**. During planning and preparation for an operation, for example, the staff assesses the joint force's ability to execute the plan based on available resources and changing conditions in the operational environment. However, the discussion in this chapter focuses on assessment for the purpose of determining the progress of

the joint force toward mission accomplishment; see Figure 62 on the following page.



Figure 62. Assessment Process -- An Overview

(3) Commanders and their staffs **determine relevant assessment actions and measures during planning.** They consider assessment measures as early as mission analysis, and include assessment measures and related guidance in commander and staff estimates. They use assessment considerations to help guide operational design because these considerations can affect the sequence

and type of actions along LOOs. During execution, they continually monitor progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating effects, and achieving objectives. Assessment actions and measures help commanders adjust operations and resources as required, determine when to execute branches and sequels, and make other critical decisions to ensure current and future operations remain aligned with the mission and end state. Normally, the joint force J-3, assisted by the J-2, is responsible for coordinating assessment activities. For subordinate commanders' staffs, this may be accomplished by equivalent elements within joint functional and/or Service components. The chief of staff facilitates the assessment process and determination of CCIRs by incorporating them into the headquarters' battle rhythm. Various elements of the JFC's staff use assessment results to adjust both current operations and future planning.

(4) Friendly, adversary, and neutral diplomatic, informational, and economic actions applied in the operational environment can impact military actions and objectives. When relevant to the mission, the commander also must plan for using assessment to evaluate the results of these actions. This typically requires collaboration with other agencies and multinational partners — preferably within a common, accepted process — in the interest of unified action. For example, failure to coordinate overflight and access agreements with foreign governments in advance or to adhere to international law regarding sovereignty of foreign airspace could result in mission delay, failure to meet US objectives, and/or an international incident. Many of these organizations may be outside the CCDR's authority. Accordingly, the CCDR should grant some joint force organizations authority for direct coordination with key outside organizations — such as USG interagency elements from DOS or the Department of Homeland Security, national intelligence agencies, intelligence sources in other nations, and other combatant commands — to the extent necessary to ensure timely and accurate assessments.

b. **Levels of War and Assessment**

(1) Assessment occurs at all levels and across the entire range of military operations. Even in operations that do not include combat, assessment of progress is just as important and can be more complex than traditional combat assessment. **As a general rule, the level at which a specific operation, task, or action is directed should be the level at which such activity is assessed**. To do this, CCDRs and their staffs consider assessment ways, means, and measures during planning, preparation, and execution. This properly focuses assessment and collection at each level, reduces redundancy, and enhances the efficiency of the overall assessment process. See Figure 63 on the following page.



Figure 63. Assessment Levels and Measurements

(2) Assessment at the operational and strategic levels typically is broader than at the tactical level (e.g., combat assessment) and uses MOEs that support strategic and operational mission accomplishment. Strategic- and operational-level assessment efforts concentrate on broader tasks, effects, objectives, and progress toward the end state. Continuous assessment helps the CCDR and joint force component commanders determine if the joint force is "doing the right things" to achieve objectives, not just "doing things right." The CCDR also can use MOEs to determine progress toward success in those operations for which tactical-level combat assessment ways, means, and measures do not apply.

(3) Tactical-level assessment typically uses MOPs to evaluate **task accomplishment.** The results of tactical tasks are often physical in nature, but also can reflect the impact on specific functions and systems. Tactical-level assessment may include assessing progress by phase lines; neutralization of enemy forces; control of key terrain or resources; and security, relief, or reconstruction tasks. Assessment of results at the tactical level helps commanders determine operational and strategic progress, so CCDRs must have a comprehensive, integrated assessment plan that links assessment activities and measures at all levels.

(4) **Combat assessment** is an example of a tactical-level assessment and is a term that can encompass many tactical-level assessment actions. Combat assessment typically focuses on determining the results of weapons engagement (with both lethal and nonlethal capabilities), and thus is an

important component of joint fires and the joint targeting process (see JP 3-60, *Joint Targeting*). **Combat assessment is composed of three related elements: battle damage assessment, munitions effectiveness assessment, and future targeting or reattack recommendations**. However, combat assessment methodology also can be applied by joint force functional and Service components to other tactical tasks not associated with joint fires (e.g., disaster relief delivery assessment, relief effectiveness assessment, and future relief recommendations).

c. **Assessment Process and Measures**

(1) **The assessment process uses MOPs to evaluate task performance at all levels of war and MOEs to determine progress of operations** toward achieving objectives. MOEs help answer questions like: "are we doing the right things, are our actions producing the desired effects, or are alternative actions required?" MOPs are closely associated with task accomplishment. MOPs help answer questions like: "was the action taken, were the tasks completed to standard, or how much effort was involved?" Well-devised measures can help the commanders and staffs understand the causal relationship between specific tasks and desired effects.

KEY TERMS

measure of performance — A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment.

measure of effectiveness — A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.

(a) **MOEs assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment**. They measure the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect**;** they do not measure task performance. These measures typically are more subjective than MOPs, and can be crafted as either qualitative or quantitative. MOEs can be based on quantitative measures to reflect a trend and show progress toward measurable threshold.

(b) **MOPs measure task performance.** They are generally quantitative, but also can apply qualitative attributes to task accomplishment. MOPs are used in most aspects of combat assessment, since it typically seeks specific, quantitative data or a direct observation of an event to determine accomplishment of tactical tasks. But MOPs have relevance for noncombat operations as well (e.g., tons of relief supplies delivered or noncombatants evacuated). MOPs also can be used to measure operational and strategic tasks, but the type of measurement may not be as precise or as easy to observe.

(2) The **assessment process and related measures should be relevant, measurable, responsive, and resourced** so there is no false impression of accomplishment. Quantitative measures can be helpful in this regard.

(a) **Relevant.** MOPs and MOEs should be relevant to the task, effect, operation, the operational environment, the end state, and the commander decisions. This criterion helps avoid collecting and analyzing information that is of no value to a specific operation. It also helps ensure efficiency by eliminating redundant efforts.

(b) **Measurable**. Assessment measures should have qualitative or quantitative standards they can be measured against. To effectively measure change, a baseline measurement should be established prior to execution to facilitate accurate assessment throughout the operation. Both MOPs and MOEs can be quantitative or qualitative in nature, but meaningful quantitative measures are preferred because they are less susceptible to subjective interpretation.

(c) **Responsive**. Assessment processes should detect situation changes quickly enough to enable effective response by the staff and timely decisions by the commander. The CCDR and staff should consider the time required for an action or actions to produce desired results within the operational environment and develop indicators that can respond accordingly. Many actions directed by the CCDR require time to implement and may take even longer to produce a measurable result.

(d) **Resourced**. To be effective, assessment must be adequately resourced. Staffs should ensure resource requirements for data collection efforts and analysis are built into plans and monitored. Effective assessment can help avoid both duplication of tasks and unnecessary actions, which in turn can help preserve combat power.

(3) Commanders and staffs derive relevant assessment measures during the planning process and reevaluate them continuously throughout preparation and execution. They consider assessment measures during mission analysis, refine these measures in the CCDR's initial planning guidance and in commander's and staff's estimates, wargame the measures during COA development, and include MOEs and MOPs in the approved plan or order. An integrated data collection management plan is critical to the success of the assessment process, and should encompass all available tactical, theater, and national intelligence sources.

(4) Just as tactical tasks relate to operational- and strategic-level tasks, effects, and objectives, there is a relationship between assessment measures. By monitoring available information and using MOEs and MOPs as assessment tools during planning, preparation, and execution, commanders and staffs determine progress toward creating desired effects, achieving objectives, and attaining the military end state, and modify the plan as required. Well-devised

MOPs and MOEs, supported by effective information management, help the commanders and staffs understand the linkage between specific tasks, the desired effects, and the CCDR's objectives and end state. (JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, Signature Draft, 23 Oct 2006)

SUMMARY

In today's fluid operating environment (OE) we, as joint planners, must change our view of the adversary and battlespace. As Figure 64 visualizes, today's adversary is a dynamic, adaptive foe who operates within a complex, interconnected operational environment that we need to understand and penetrate. One way of gaining that increased (never complete) understanding is to break out the OE into its major parts, examine the individual parts and then study the relationships and interaction between major elements – Using Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructure (PMESII) as a way to break down and examine the Operational Environment – to know not only what is going on but why its happening.



Figure 64. Expanding Our Perception

General Luck (Ret) in his paper titled "Insights on Joint Operations: The Art and Science," September 2005 says the challenge for us then is how to understand and visualize this new adversary so that we can effectively defend our national interests. The traditional military-centric single center of gravity focus that worked so well in the cold war doesn't allow us to accurately analyze, describe, and visualize today's emerging networked, adaptable, asymmetric adversary. This adversary has no single identifiable 'source of all power.' Rather, because of globalization, the information revolution, and, in some cases, the non-state characteristic of our adversary, this form of adversary can only be described (and holistically attacked) as a system of systems.

"Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact."

President Dwight D. Eisenhower
Special Message to the Congress on Reorganization
of the Defense Establishment, 3 April 1958

You should now hopefully be able to dissect the "tornado" below and explain the joint process in great detail.



JWFC, Integration of an Effects Based Approach

APPENDIX A

Planning Times and Dates

Times — (**C-, D-, M-days** end at 2400 hours Universal Time (Zulu time) and are assumed to be 24 hours long for planning.) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff normally coordinates the proposed date with the commanders of the appropriate unified and specified commands, as well as any recommended changes to C-day. **L-hour** will be established per plan, crisis, or theater of operations and will apply to both air and surface movements. Normally, L hour will be established to allow C-day to be a 24-hour day.

a. **C-day.** The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo, weapon systems, or a combination of these elements using any or all types of transport. The letter "C" will be the only one used to denote the above. The highest command or headquarters responsible for coordinating the planning will specify the exact meaning of C-day within the aforementioned definition. The command or headquarters directly responsible for the execution of the operation, if other than the one coordinating the planning, will do so in light of the meaning specified by the highest command or headquarters coordinating the planning.

b. **D-day.** The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence.

c. **F-hour.** The effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units.

d. **H-hour.** The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences.

e. **H-hour (amphibious operations).** For amphibious operations, the time the first assault elements are scheduled to touch down on the beach, or a landing zone, and in some cases the commencement of countermine breaching operations.

f. **I-day** (CJCSM 3110.01A/JSCP). The day on which the Intelligence Community determines that within a potential crisis situation, a development occurs that may signal a heightened threat to U.S. interests. Although the scope and direction of the threat is ambiguous, the Intelligence Community responds by focusing collection and other resources to monitor and report on the situation as it evolves.

g. **L-hour.** The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence.

h. **L-hour (amphibious operations).** In amphibious operations, the time at which the first helicopter of the helicopter-borne assault wave touches down in the landing zone.

i. **M-day.** The term used to designate the unnamed day on which full mobilization commences or is due to commence.

j. **N-day.** The unnamed day an active duty unit is notified for deployment or redeployment.

k. **R-day.** Redeployment day. The day on which redeployment of major combat, combat support, and combat service support forces begins in an operation.

l. **S-day.** The day the President authorizes Selective Reserve callup (not more than 200,000).

m. **T-day.** The effective day coincident with Presidential declaration of national emergency and authorization of partial mobilization (not more than 1,000,000 personnel exclusive of the 200,000 callup).

n. **W-day.** Declared by the President, W-day is associated with an adversary decision to prepare for war (unambiguous strategic warning).

Indications and warning — Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time sensitive intelligence on foreign developments that could involve a threat to the United States or allied and/or coalition military, political, or economic interests or to US citizens abroad. It includes forewarning of enemy actions or intentions; the imminence of hostilities; insurgency; nuclear/non-nuclear attack on the United States, its overseas forces, or allied and/or coalition nations; hostile reactions to US reconnaissance activities; terrorists' attacks; and other similar events. Also called **I&W.** See also **information; intelligence** (JP 2-01).

APPENDIX B

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APPENDIX C

Commander's Estimate

1. Purpose

a. The commander's estimate, submitted by the supported commander in response to a CJCS Warning Order, provides the Chairman with time-sensitive information for consideration by the NCA in meeting a crisis situation. Essentially, it reflects the supported commander's analysis of the various COAs that may be used to accomplish the assigned mission and contains recommendations as to the best COA (recommended COAs submitted for NCA approval may be contained in current OPLANs or CONPLANs or may be developed to meet situations not addressed by current plans. Regardless of origin, these courses of actions will be specifically identified when they involve military operations against a potential enemy). Although the estimative process at the supported commander's level may involve a complete, detailed estimate by the supported commander, the estimate submitted to the Chairman will normally be a greatly abbreviated version providing only that information essential to the NCA and the Chairman for arriving at a decision to meet a crisis.

b. Supporting commanders normally will not submit a commander's estimate to the Chairman; however, they may be requested to do so by the supported commander. They may also be requested to provide other information that could assist the supported commander in formulating and evaluating the various COAs.

2. When Submitted

a. The commander's estimate will be submitted as soon as possible after receipt of the CJCS Warning Order, but no later than the deadline established by the Chairman in the Warning Order. Although submission time is normally 72 hours, extremely time-sensitive situations may require that the supported commander respond in 4 to 8 hours.

b. Follow-on information or revisions to the commander's estimate should be submitted as necessary to complete, update, or refine information included in the initial estimate.

c. The supported commander may submit a commander's estimate at the commander's own discretion, without a CJCS Warning Order, to advise the NCA and Chairman of the commander's evaluation of a potential crisis situation within the AOR. This situation may be handled by a SITREP instead of a commander's estimate.

3. How Submitted. The commander's estimate is submitted by record communication, normally with a precedence of IMMEDIATE or FLASH, as appropriate. GCCS Newsgroup should be used initially to pass the commander's estimate but must be followed by immediate record communication to keep all crisis participants informed.

4. Addressees. The message is sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with information copies to the Services, components, supporting commands and combat support agencies, USTRANSCOM, TCCs, and other appropriate commands and agencies.

5. Contents

a. The commander's estimate will follow the major headings of a commander's estimate of the situation as outlined in Appendix A to Enclosure J but will normally be substantially abbreviated in content. As with the Warning Order, the precise contents may vary widely, depending on the nature of the crisis, time available to respond, and the applicability of prior planning. In a rapidly developing situation, a formal commander's estimate may be initially impractical, and the entire estimative process may be reduced to a commander's conference, with corresponding brevity reflected in the estimate when submitted by record communications to the Chairman. Also, the existence of an applicable OPLAN may already reflect most of the necessary analysis.

b. The essential requirement of the commander's estimate submitted to the Chairman is to provide the NCA, in a timely manner, with viable military COAs to meet a crisis. Normally, these will center on military capabilities in terms of forces available, response time, and significant logistic considerations. In the estimate, one COA will be recommended. If the supported commander desires to submit alternative COAs, an order of priority will be established. All COAs in the Warning Order will be addressed.

c. The estimate of the supported commander will include specific information to the extent applicable. The following estimate format is desirable but not mandatory and may be abbreviated where appropriate.

(1) Mission. State the assigned or deduced mission and purpose. List any intermediate tasks, prescribed or deduced, that the supported commander considers necessary to accomplish the mission.

(2) Situation and Courses of Action (COA). This paragraph is the foundation of the estimate and may encompass considerable detail. Because the CJCS is concerned primarily with the results of the estimate rather than the analysis, for purposes of the estimate submitted, include only the minimum information necessary to support the recommendation.

(a) Considerations Affecting the Possible Courses of Action. Include only a brief summary, if applicable, of the major factors pertaining to the characteristics of the area and relative combat power that have a significant impact on the alternative COAs.

(b) Enemy Capability. Highlight, if applicable, the enemy capabilities and psychological vulnerabilities that can seriously affect the accomplishment of the mission, giving information that would be useful to the President, SecDef, and the CJCS in evaluating various COAs.

(c) Terrorist Threat. Describe potential terrorist threat capabilities to include force protection requirements (prior, during, and post mission) that can affect the accomplishment of the mission.

(d) Own Courses of Action. List COAs that offer suitable, feasible, and acceptable means of accomplishing the mission. If specific COAs were prescribed in the WARNORD, they must be included. For each COA, the following specific information should be addressed:

1. Combat forces required; e.g., 2 FS, 1 airborne brigade. List actual units if known.

2. Force provider.

3. Destination.

4. Required delivery dates.

5. Coordinated deployment estimate.

6. Employment estimate.

7. Strategic lift requirements, if appropriate.

(3) Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action. Highlight enemy capabilities that may have significant impact on US COAs.

(4) Comparison of Own Courses of Action. For the submission to the CJCS, include only the final statement of conclusions and provide a brief rationale for the favored COA. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative COAs, if significant, in assisting the President, SecDef, and the CJCS in arriving at a decision.

(5) Recommended Course of Action. State the supported commander's recommended COA (Recommended COA should include any recommended changes to the ROE in effect at that time). (CJCSM 3122.01A, 1 September 2005)

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Sample Commander's Estimate

IMMEDIATE (OR FLASH AS APPROPRIATE)
FROM: COMUSCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
TO: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO: CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
COMUSELEMNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
COMUSJFCOM NORFOLK VA
COMUSEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//

COMUSPACOM HONOLULU HI
COMUSNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO
COMUSSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

DISTR: COMBATANT
COMMANDER/DCOM/CCJ1/CCJ2/CCJ3/CCJ4/7/CCJ5/CCJ6
DRAFTER: LTC CHUCK SWANSON, USA CCJ7, EXT 53046
COMUSSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE
COMUSSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE
COMUSSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
COMUSTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
DISA WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DLA FT BELVOIR VA
DIRECTOR DTRA FAIRFAX VA
CIA WASHINGTON DC
NGA HQ BETHESDA MD
COMSDDC FALLS CHURCH VA
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-OPF/G-OPD//
COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//
COMUSNAVCENT
COMLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
CORMARFORLANT
COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
COMPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
CORMARFORPAC
COMUSNAVEUR LONDON UK

C L A S S I F I C A T I O N
OPER/BLUENOSE//
MSGID/COMESTIMATE/COMUSCENTCOM//
REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV _____ /____/NOTAL//
AMPN/CJCS Warning Order//
REF/B/DOC/USCENTCOM OPLAN XXXX//
AMPN/USCENTCOM OPLAN FOR CONTINGENCY OFPERATIONS XXXX.//
GENTEXT/MISSION/
1. ( ) MISSION. WHEN DIRECTED BY THE SECDEF, USCENTCOM COMMANDER WILL CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BLUELAND (GOB) TO PROTECT AND DEFEND BLUELAND STRONG POINTS AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOCS).//
GENTEXT/SITUATION/
2. ( ) SITUATION

A. ( ) THE INTERNAL STABILITY AND SECURITY OF BLUELAND AND ORANGELAND HAVE DETERIORATED BECAUSE OF CONTINUED YELLOWLAND SUPPORT OF THE REBEL FORCES SEEKING THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT. TENSIONS BETWEEN YELLOWLAND, BLUELAND, AND ORANGELAND HAVE BEEN HIGH BECAUSE OF OVERT YELLOWLAND SUPPORT OF THE COUP ATTEMPT, YELLOWLAND ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE REBELS, AND A RECENT ALLIANCE OF HERETOFORE ANTAGONISTIC REBEL FORCES. ALL OF THESE ACTIONS AGAINST BLUELAND AND ORANGELAND BY YELLOWLAND REQUIRE PRUDENT CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION OF USCENTCOM OPLAN XXXX.

B. ( ) ASSIGNED AND SUPPORTING FORCES ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT USCENTCOM OPLAN XXXX.//

GENTEXT/ENEMY CAPABILITIES/
3. <statement on enemy capabilities>//
GENTEXT/OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS/
4. <list operational constraints>
GENTEXT/CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS/
5. <summary of concept of operations>
HEADING/COURSES OF ACTION/
GENTEXT/OWN COURSES OF ACTION/
6. ( ) USCENTCOM COMMANDER HAS DEVELOPED THE FOLLOWING COURSES OF ACTIONS (COAs):

A. ( ) COA 1. DEPLOY AND EMPLOY FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCENTCOM OPLAN XXXX TPFDD. TACTICAL FIGHTER AND RECONNAISSANCE WING TO USE BABA AFB AS MAIN OPERATING BASE. I MEF TO DEPLOY VIA STRATEGIC AIR TO JOIN WITH MPS

EQUIPMENT. CVBG TO OPERATE MODLOC VIA SOUTHEASTERN SEA. TWO ARMY BDES DEPLOY TO PORT WASI VIA STRATEGIC AIR TO JOIN WITH EQUIPMENT SHIPPED BY SEA. SUBSEQUENT MILITARY ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED AS REQUESTED BY GOB TO INCLUDE, BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO, *NON*COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO), SHOW OF FORCE, AND PROTECTION AND DEFENSE OF BLUELAND STRONG POINTS AND LOCS.

B. ( ) COA 2. DEPLOY AND EMPLOY AIR FORCE AND NAVAL FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCENTCOM OPLAN XXXX. HOLD MEF AND ARMY BDES ON CALL. SUBSEQUENT MILITARY OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED AS REQUESTED BY GOB. GENTEXT/OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION/

7. ( ) ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COA. ENEMY CAPABILITIES CANNOT SIGNIFICANTLY DELAY SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF US MILITARY OPERATIONS UNDER EITHER COA. UNDER COA 2, HOWEVER, THERE IS AN INCREASED POSSIBILITY OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE AGAINST ISOLATED AMERICANS IN RETALIATION FOR US FORCE ARRIVAL. ARRIVAL OF SMALL AIR FORCE AND NAVAL FORCE PACKAGES FOR SHOW OF FORCE RESTRICTS COMMANDERS POTENTIAL TO CONDUCT NEOS OR DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS WITHOUT GROUND FORCES.

GENTEXT/COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION/
8. ( ) COMPARISON OF OWN COAs

A. ( ) COA 1 PROVIDES FOR SIMULTANEOUS EMPLOYMENT OF THE ENTIRE TASK FORCE AND IS THE MOST DESIRABLE FOR TACTICAL EXECUTION. THE INITIAL PRESENCE OF AIR FORCE AND NAVAL FORCES COUPLED WITH THE ARRIVAL OF THE CG, I MEF (FORWARD) AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT ABOARD MPS, PROVIDES CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY FOR RAPID INSERTION OF SECURITY FORCES AS REQUIRED BY GOB. THIS COA REQUIRES THE LONGEST RESPONSE TIME (__ DAYS AIRLIFT AND __ DAYS SEALIFT (DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE) FOR CLOSURE OF THE ENTIRE TASK FORCE. EMPLOYMENT COULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY.

B. ( ) COA 2 HAS ADVANTAGE OF MOST RAPID RESPONSE (____ DAYS AIRLIFT AND ____ DAYS SEALIFT (DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE)) FOR AIR FORCE AND NAVAL FORCES. IT PROVIDES FOR A REPRESENTATIVE FORCE TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO GOB AND DEMONSTRATE US RESOLVE IN AREA. ITS PRIMARY DISADVANTAGE IS THAT ALL GROUND FORCES ARE ON CALL. HOWEVER, RESPONSE TIME FOR MEF AND ARMY BDES COULD BE MINIMAL AS MPS AND

MSC SHIPS COULD BE IN MODLOC POSITION OFF COAST OF PORT WASI PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL.
COAIDENT/

9. ( ) DECISION. RECOMMEND COA 1.

10. ( ) GENTEXT/OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE/
GENTEXT/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION/ FORCE, LOGISTIC, AND TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENT DETAILS HAVE BEEN LOADED INTO THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES) AND ARE AVAILABLE UNDER PLAN IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (PID) XXXXT (COA 1) AND PID XXXXU (COA 2).//

DECL/<source for classification>/<reason for classification>/<downgrade instructions or date>/<downgrading or declassification exemption code>//

(CJCSM 3122.01A, JOPES Volume I, Enclosure J, 1 September 2005)

APPENDIX D

GLOSSARY

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A

AA	Attack Assessment
AADC	Area Air Defense Commander
AAGS	Army Air-ground System
AAR	After-Action Report/Review
AAW	Antiair Warfare
ABCCC	Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center
ABM	Airborne
ACA	Airspace Control Authority
ACINT	Acoustic Intelligence
ACO	Airspace Control Order
ACP	Airspace Control Plan
ACR	Armored Calvary Regiment
ACT	Activity
ADA	Air Defense Artillery
ADC	Air Defense Commander, Area Damage Control
ADMIN	Administration
ADVON	Advanced Echelon
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
ADW	Air Defense Warning
AFCAP	Air Force Contract Augmentation Program
AFIS	Armed Forces Information Service
AFFOR	Air Force Forces
AFM	Air Force Manual
AFSATCOM	Air Force Satellite Communications
AFSC	Armed Forces Staff College
AFRTS	Armed Forces Radio and Television Service
AI	Air Interdiction
AJBPO	Area Joint Blood Program Office/Officer
AJMRO	Area Joint Medical Regulating Office
ALCC	Airlift Control Center
ALCON	All Concerned
ALSP	Aggregate Level Simulations Protocol
AMC	Air Mobility Command; Army Materiel Command
AMCIT	American Citizen
AMEMB	American Embassy
AMHS	Automated Message Handling System
AMPE	Automated Message Processing Exchange
ANGLICO	Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
AO	Area of Operations

AOA	Amphibious Objective Area
AOC	Air Operations Center (USAF)
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APMT	Automated Planning and Management Tools
APOD	Aerial Port of Debarkation
APOE	Aerial Port of Embarkation
ARFOR	Army Forces
ARM	Anti-Radiation Missiles
ASBPO	Armed Services Blood Program Office
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASD (PA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
ASLT	Assault
ASOC	Air Support Operations Center
ASUW	Antisurface Warfare
ASW	Antisubmarine Warfare
ATACMS	Army Tactical Missile System
ATC	Air traffic Control
ATDS	Airborne Tactical Data System
ATO	Air Tasking Order
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
AUTOSEVOCOM	Automatic Secure Voice Communications Network
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
AWSIM	Air Warfare Simulation

B

BCC	Battlefield Circulation Control
BCE	Battlefield Coordination Element
BDA	Bomb or Battle Damage Assessment
BDE	Brigade
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
BSA	Beach Support Area

C

C2	Command and Control
C2W	Command and Control Warfare
C2WC	Command and Control Warfare Commander
C3	Command, Control, and Communications
C3I	Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
C3IC	Coalition, Coordination, Communications, and Integration Center
C4	Command, Control, Communications, and Computers
C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
C4S	Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
C-day	Unnamed day on which a deployment operation begins
C-E	Communications-Electronics
CA	Civil Affairs
CAP	Crisis Action Planning; Combat Air Patrol
CAS	Close Air Support
CAT	Crisis Action Team

CATF	Commander Amphibious Task Force
CAX	Computer-Assisted Exercise
CB	Chemical-Biological
CBS	Corps Battle Simulation
CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirements
CD	Counterdrug
CDR	Commander
CE	Communications-Electronics; Command Element (MAGTF)
CED	Captured Enemy Documents
CEE	Captured Enemy Equipment
CEOI	Communications-Electronics Operating Instructions
CESP	Civil Engineer Support Plan
CFL	Coordinated Fire Line; Contingency Planning Facilities List
CGFOR	Coast Guard Forces
CHAP	Chaplain
CHATH	Chemically Hardened Air Transportable Clinic
CI	Counterintelligence; Civilian Internees
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIAP	Command Intelligence Architecture Plan
CID	Criminal Investigation Division
CIDC	Criminal Investigation Division Command
CISO	Counterintelligence Support Staff Officer
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
CJTF	Commander Joint Task Force
CJTMP	CJCS Joint Training Master Plan
CL	Class (of supply)
CLF	Commander Landing Forces; Combat Logistics Force
CLIPS	Communications Link Interface Planning System
CMBT	Combatant
CMD	Command
CMDT	Commandant
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Center
CMST	Collection Management Support Tools
CNA	Computer Network Attack
CNO	Computer Network Operations
COA	Course of Action
COCOM	Combatant Command (Command Authority)
COE	Common Operating Environment
COG	Center of Gravity
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COINS	Community On-Line Intelligence System
COLT	Combat Observation and Lasing Team
COM	Collection Operations Management; Commander
COMARFOR	Commander of Army Forces
COMCAM	Combat Camera
COMDT	Commandant

COMINT	Communications Intelligence
COMMARFOR	Commander of Marine Forces
COMMZ	Communication Zone
COMP	Component
COMPT	Comptroller
COMPUSEC	Computer Security
COMSEC	Communications Security
COMPT/CMPT	Comptroller
CONCAP	Navy Contract Augmentation Program
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CONPLAN	Operation Plan in Concept Format
CONUS	Continental United States
COORD	Coordination
COS	Critical Occupational Specialty; Chief of Staff
CPG	Contingency Planning Guidance
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CSAR	Combat Search and Rescue
CS	Combat Support; Call Sign; Coastal Station; Creeping Line Single-Unit; Controlled Space; Circuit Switch
CSS	Combat Service Support
CSSA	Combat Service Support Area
CSSE	Combat Service Support Element (MAGTF)
CSSTSS	Combat Service Support Training Simulation System
CT	Counter Terrorism
CTAPS	Contingency Theater Automated Planning System
CWC	Composite Warfare Commander

D

D-day	Unnamed day on which operations commence or are scheduled to commence
D3A	Decide, Detect, Deliver and Assess
DA	Direct Action
DALS	Downed Aviator Locator System
DARS	Daily Aerial Reconnaissance Syndicate
DASC	Direct Air Support Center
DC	Displaced Civilian
DCA	Defensive Counterair
DCJTF	Deputy Commander JTF
DCS	Defense Communications System
DCTN	Defense Commercial Telecommunication Network
DD	Defense Department (administrative form designator)
DDN	Defense Data Network
DE	Directed Energy; Delay Equalizer
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DECEP	Deception
DEFCON	Defense Readiness Condition
DEP	Deputy
DEPMEDS	Deployable Medical Systems

DFSC	Defense Fuel Supply Center
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
D-IO	Defensive Information Operations
DIR	Director
DIRLAUTH	Direct Liaison Authorized
DIRMOBFOR	Director of Mobility Forces
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DISN	Defense Information Systems Network
DISUM	Defense Intelligence Summary; Daily Intelligence Summary
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DMRT	Defense Medical Regulating Teams
DMS	Defense Message System
DNSO	Defense Network Systems Organization
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense Directive
DODIIS	Department of Defense Intelligence Information System
DODI	Department of Defense Instruction
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State; Disk Operating System; Day of Supply
DOT	Department of Transportation
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance
DSCS	Defense Satellite Communications System
DSN	Defense Switched Network
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
DV	Distinguished Visitor
DZ	Drop Zone

E

EA	Electronic Attack
EAP	Emergency Action Procedures
EC	Electronic Combat
ECC	Evacuation Control Center
EED	Electro-Explosive Device
EEFI	Essential Elements of Friendly Information
EEI	Essential Elements of Information
ELECTRO-OPTINT	Electro-Optical Intelligence
ELD	Emitter Locating Data
ELINT	Electronics Intelligence
EMC	Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI	Electromagnetic Interface
EMP	Electromagnetic Pulse
EMPINT	Electromagnetic Pulse Intelligence
EMS	Electromagnetic Spectrum
ENDEX	Exercise Termination
ENGR	Engineer
ENWGS	Enhanced Naval Warfare Gaming System
EO	Electro-Optical; Eyes Only

EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EP	Electronic Protection; Execution Planning
EPW	Enemy Prisoner of War
ES	Electronic Warfare Support
EW	Electronic Warfare
EWO	Electronic Warfare Officer
EZ	Extraction Zone

F

F-hour	Effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units
FA	Field Artillery; Feasibility Assessment
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration; Foreign Assistance Act
FAD	Force Activity Designator; Feasible Arrival Date
FASCAM	Family of Scatterable Mines
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FEO	Forcible Entry Operations
FER	Final Exercise Report
FFA	Free Fire Area
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FISINT	Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence
FLTSAT	Fleet Satellite
FLTSATCOM	Fleet Satellite Communications
FM	Frequency Modulation; Field Manual
FMFM	Fleet Marine Force Manual
FMO	Frequency Management Office
FOB	Forward Operations Base
FRAG	Fragmentation Code
FSA	Fire Support Area; Forward Support Area
FSCL	Fire Support Coordination Line
FSCOORD	Fire Support Coordinator
FSE	Fire Support Element
FSN	Foreign Service National
FSSG	Force Service Support Group (Marine Air-Ground Task Force)
FTS	Federal Telecommunications System; Federal Telephone System; File Transfer Service
FTX	Field Training Exercise

G

GAT	Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting Cell
GCE	Ground Combat Element (MAGTF)
GCI	Ground Control Intercept
GCS	Ground Control Station
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
GCSS	Global Combat Support System
GDSS	Global Decision Support System
GENSER	General Service (message)
GENTEXT	General Text

GI&S	Geospatial Information and Services
GMD	Global Missile Defense
GMF	Ground Mobile Forces
GMFSCS	Ground Mobile Forces Satellite Communications System
GP	Group
GPALS	Global Protection Against Limited Strikes
GPMRC	Global Patient Movement Requirements Center
GRREG	Graves Registration
GSM	Ground Station Module
GTN	Global Transportation Network

H

H-hour	Specific time an operation or exercise begins; seaborne assault landing hour
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HARM	High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile
HCA	Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
HF	High Frequency
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HLZ	Helicopter Landing Zone
HN	Host Nation
HNG	Host-Nation Government
HNS	Host-Nation Support
HOC	Humanitarian Operations Center
HOIS	Hostile Intelligence Service
HPT	High-Priority/Payoff Target(s)
HQ	Headquarters
HQ COMDT	Headquarters Commandant
HSS	Health Service Support
HTLV	Human T-Lymphotropic Virus
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
HVT	High-Value Target(s)

I

I&W	Indication and Warning
IA	Information Assurance
IAW	In Accordance With
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICN	Interface Control Network
ICO	Interface Control Officer
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDAD	Internal Defense and Development
IDB	Integrated Data Base
IDHS	Intelligence Data Handling System
IED	Improved Explosives Devices
IES	Imagery Exploitation System
IEW	Intelligence and Electronic Warfare
IFF	Identification, Friend or Foe

IGPS	Global Positioning System
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
INFOSEC	Information Security
INSCOM	United States Army Intelligence and Security Command
INTACS	Integrated Tactical Communications System
INTELSITSUM	Daily Intelligence Summary
INTREP	Intelligence Seaport
INTSUM	Intelligence Summary
IO	Information Operations
IOM	Installation, Operation, and Maintenance
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
IPDS	Inland Petroleum Distribution System; Imagery Processing and Dissemination System
IPL	Integrated Priority List
IPW	Interrogation Prisoners of War
IR	Information Requirements
IRINT	Infrared Intelligence
ISA	Inter-Service Agreement
ISB	Intermediate Staging Base
ISSA	Inter-Service Support Agreement
ITEM	Integrated Tactical Engagement Model
ITW	Integrated Tactical Warning
IW	Irregular Warfare

J

J-1	Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a Joint Staff
J-2	Intelligence Directorate of a Joint Staff
J-3	Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff
J-4	Logistics Directorate of a Joint Staff
J-5	Plans Directorate of a Joint Staff
J-6	Command, Control, Communications, and Computer System Directorate of a Joint Staff
J/CLIPS	Joint/Communications Link Interface Planning System
J-SEAD	Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
J-STARS	Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
JAAT	Joint Air Attack Team
JACC/CP	Joint Airborne Communications Center/Command Post
JAG	Judge Advocate General
JAO	Joint Area of Operations
JAOC	Joint Air Operations Center
JAPO	Joint Area Petroleum Office
JATF	Joint Amphibious Task Force
JBP	Joint Blood Program
JBPO	Joint Blood Program Office, Joint Blood Program Officer
JC2WC	Joint Command and Control Warfare Center
JCAT	Joint Crisis Action Team
JCATF	Joint Civil Affairs Task Force
JCCC	Joint Communications Control Center; Combat Camera Center

JCCMT	Joint Combat Camera Management Team
JCCP	Joint Casualty Collection Point
JCEOI	Joint Communications-Electronics Operating Instructions
JCEWS	Joint Force Commander's Electronic Warfare Staff
JCGRO	Joint Central Graves Registration Office
JCIOC	Joint Counterintelligence Operations Center
J/CIPS	Joint/Combined Interoperability Planning System
JCM	Joint Conflict Model
JCMEB	Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board
JCMEC	Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center
JCMOTF	Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force
JCMT	Joint Collection Management Tools
JCN	Joint Communications Network
JCSAR	Joint Combat Search and Rescue
JCSC	Joint Communications Satellite Center
JCSE	Joint Communications Support Element
JDB	Joint Deployment Board
JDEC	Joint Document Exploitation Center
JDG	Joint Deployment Group
JDISS	Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
JDS	Joint Deployment System
JDSS	Joint Decision Support System
JECEWSI	Joint Electronic Combat Electronic Warfare Simulation
JECG	Joint Exercise Control Group
JFACC	Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFAST	Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JFCA	Joint Force Contingency Account
JFLCC	Joint Force Land Component Commander
JFMCC	Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
JFSOCC	Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander
JFUB	Joint Facilities Utilization Board
JIACG	Joint Interagency coordination Group
JIB	Joint Information Bureau
JIC	Joint Intelligence Center
JICG	Joint Information Coordination Group
JIDC	Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Operations Center
JIEO	Joint Interoperability Engineering Organization
JIF	Joint Interrogation Facility
JILE	Joint Intelligence Liaison Element (CIA)
JINTACCS	Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems
JIOP	Joint Interface Operational Procedures
JIPB	Joint Imagery Processing Board, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
JIPC	Joint Imagery Production Complex
JIPTL	Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List
JISE	Joint Intelligence Support Element

JLOTS	Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore
JLPSB	Joint Logistics Procurement Support Board
JLRC	Joint Logistics Readiness Center
JMAO	Joint Mortuary Affairs Office or Officer
JMB	Joint Munitions Board
JMC	Joint Movement Center; Joint Military Command
JMCIS	Joint Maritime Command Information System
JMET	Joint Mission Essential Task
JMETL	Joint Mission Essential Task List
JMFU	Joint Force Meteorological and Oceanographic Forecast Unit
JMMO	Joint Materiel Management Office
JMO	Joint Maritime Operations/Joint Meteorological Officer
JMO (AIR)	Joint Maritime Operations (Air)
JMPA	Joint Military Police Agency
JMPAB	Joint Material Priorities and Allocation Board
JMRO	Joint Medical Regulating Office
JOA	Joint Operations Area
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOTS, JOTS-1, JOTS-2	Joint Operational Tactical System
JP	Joint Pub
JPB	Joint Blood Program
JPEC	Joint Planning and Execution Community
JPG	Joint Planning Group
JPMRC	Joint Patient Movement Requirements Center
JPO	Joint Petroleum Office
JPOTF	Joint Psychological Operations Task Force
JPOTG	Joint Psychological Operations Task Group
JPRC	Joint Personnel Reception Center
JRA	Joint Rear Area
JRAC	Joint Rear Area Coordinator
JRACO	Joint Rear Area Communications Officer
JRC	Joint Reconnaissance Center
JRFL	Joint Restricted Frequency List
JRC	Joint Reconnaissance Center
JRD	Joint Reporting Structure
JROC	Joint Rear Area Operations Center
JRSOI	Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
JRTOC	Joint Rear Tactical Operations Center JS Joint Staff
JSAR	Joint Search and Rescue
JSC	Joint Spectrum Center
JSE	Joint Support Elements
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSIR	Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution
JSOA	Joint Special Operations Area
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
JSRC	Joint Search and Rescue Center
JSST	Joint Space Support Team

JSTARS	Joint Surveillance, Target Attack Radar System
JTAGS	Joint Tactical Air Ground System
JTAO	Joint Tactical Air Operations
JTASC	Joint Training, Analysis and Simulations Center
JTB	Joint Transportation Board
JTCB	Joint Targeting Coordination Board
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTFEODO	Joint Task Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal Office(r)
JTF HQ	Joint Task Force Headquarters
JTIDS	Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
JTL	Joint Target List
JTLS	Joint Theater Level Simulation
JTMD	Joint Theater Missile Defense
JTTP	Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
JULLS	Joint Universal Lessons Learned System
JVB	Joint Visitors Bureau
JVIDS	Joint Visual Integrated Display System
JWFC	Joint Warfighting Center
JWICS	Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System

K

KIA	Killed In Action

L

L-hour	Specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence
LAN	Local Area Network
LASINT	Laser Intelligence
LDR (S)	Leader(s)
LEA	Law Enforcement Agencies
LIMDIS	Limited Distribution
LNO	Liaison Officer
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
LOC	Lines of Communications
LOI	Loss-of-Input / Letter of Instruction
LOTS	Logistics Over-the-Shore
LPI/D	Low Probability of Intercept / Detection
LRC	Logistics Readiness Center
LZ	Landing Zone

M

M-day	Unnamed day on which full mobilization of forces commences or is to commence
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MACCS	Marine Air Command and Control System
MACG	Marine Air Control Group
MAG	Marine Aircraft Group
MAGTF	Marine Air-Ground Task Force

MAP	Military Assistance Program
MARFOR	Marine Corps Forces
MASINT	Measurement and Signature Intelligence
MCA	Military Civic Action; Mission Concept Approval
MC	Military Community / Multi-Channel
MCC	Movement Control Center
MCEB	Military Communications-Electronics Board
MCM	Mine Countermeasures / Military Classification Manual
MCS	Maneuver Control System
MCT	Movement Control Team(s)
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MEDINT	Medical Intelligence
METOC	Meteorological and Oceanographic
METT-T	Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops and Time Available
MFC	Meteorological Forecast Centers
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers
MIA	Missing in Action
MIDB	Modernized Integrated Database
MIIDS	Military Intelligence Integrated Data System
MIIDS/IDB	Military Intelligence Integrated Database System / Integrated Database
MILCON	Military Construction
MILGP	Military Group (assigned to American Embassy in host nation)
MIO	Maritime Intercept Operations
MIW	Mine Warfare
MLRS	Multiple Launch Rocket System
MMC	Materiel Management Center
MODLOC	Miscellaneous Operational Details, Local Operations
MOE	Measure of Effectiveness
MOG	Maximum (aircraft) on the Ground
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MOP	Memorandum of Policy
MOPP	Mission Oriented Protective Posture
MP	Military Police
MPF	Maritime Pre-Positioning Force
MPO	Military Police Operations
MPS	Maritime Prepositioning Ships
MRE	Meal, Ready to Eat
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MSE	Mobile Subscriber Equipment
MSEL	Master Scenario Events List
MSR	Mission Support Request; Main Supply Route
MTF	Message Text Formats; Medical Treatment Facility
MTG	Master Training Guide
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
MTT	Mobile Training Team
MTWS	Marine Tactical Warfare System
MWR	Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

N

NAI	Named Area of Interest
NAVAIDS	Navigational Aids
NAVFOR	Navy Forces
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVATAC	Navy Antiterrorism Analysis Center
NBC	Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NCS	National Communications System; Net Control Station
NCSC	National Computer Security Center
NCWC	Naval Coastal Warfare Commander
NDCS	National Drug Control Strategy
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
NFA	No-Fire Area
NGFS	Naval Gunfire Support
NIMA	National Imagery and Mapping Agency
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NIST	National Intelligence Support Team
NLT	Not Later Than
NMD	National Missile Defense
NMIST	National Military Intelligence Support Team (DIA)
NOK	Next of Kin
NOPLAN	No Operation Plan Available or Prepared
NRO	National Reconnaissance Office
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
NSFS	Naval Surface Fire Support
NSTL	No-Strike Target List
NTACS	Navy Tactical Air Control System
NTCS-A	Naval Tactical Command System - Afloat
NTDS	Naval Tactical Data System
NTS	Naval Telecommunications System
NUCINT	Nuclear Intelligence
NWP	Naval Warfare Publication
NWS	National Weather Service

O

OB	Order of Battle
OCA	Offensive Counterair
OCONUS	Outside the Continental United States
OEG	Operational Exposure Guide
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OGA	Other Governmental Agency
OIC	Officer In Charge
O-IO	Offensive Information Operations
OIR	Other Intelligence Requirements; Operational Intelligence Requirements
OOB	Order of Battle

OOTW	Operations Other Than War
OP	Operational (level task)
OPCON	Operational Control
OPDEC	Operational Deception
OPDS	Offshore Petroleum Discharge System
OPFOR	Opposing Forces
OPG	Operations Planning Group
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPLAW	Operational Law
OPORD	Operation Order
OPREP	Operational Report
OPSEC	Operations Security
OPTASKLINK	Operational Tasking Data Link
OPTINT	Optical Intelligence
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSINT	Open-Source Intelligence
OT, O/T	Observer/Trainer
OTCIXS	Tactical Command Exchange System

P

PA	Public Affairs; Probability of Arrival; Parent Relay
PAG	Public Affairs Guidance
PAO	Public Affairs Office; Public Affairs Officer
PAT	Public Affairs Team
PEO	Peace Enforcement Operations
PGM	Precision-Guided Munitions
PHIBGRU	Amphibious Group
PHIBRON	Amphibious Squadron
PHOTINT	Photographic Intelligence
PHSD	Port Security and Harbor Defense
PIR	Priority Intelligence Requirements
PIREP	Pilot Report
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PLL/ASL	Prescribed Load List/Authorized Stock Level
PLRS	Positioning Location Reporting System
PLS	Personnel Locator System
PM	Provost Marshal
PMO	Provost Marshal Office; Program Management Office
PMIS	Psychological Operations Management Information Subsystem
POV	Privately Owned Vehicle
POADS	Psychological Operations Automated Data System
POAS	Psychological Operations Automated System
POC	Point of Contact
POD	Port of Debarkation
POE	Port of Embarkation
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
POLAD	Political Advisor
POMCUS	Pre-positioning of Material Configured to Unit Sets

POTF	Psychological Operations Task Force
POTG	Psychological Operations Task Group
POW	Prisoner of War
PR	Personnel Recovery
PRC	Populace and Resources Control
PSA	Port Support Activity
PSC	Provisional Support Company
PSHD	Port Security and Harbor Defense
PSN	Packet Switching Note
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
PSYWAR	Psychological Warfare
PVO	Private Volunteer Organizations
PWR	Pre-positioned War Reserves
PWRMS	Pre-positioned War Reserve Materiel Stock
PWRS	Pre-positioned War Reserve Stocks
PZ	Pickup Zone

Q

QRE	Quick Reaction Element
QTY	Quantity

R

R&D	Research and Development
RADFO	Radiation Forecast
RADINT	Radar Intelligence
RAOC	Rear Area Operations Center
RC	River Current; Reserve Component; Receive Clock
RCA	Riot Control Agents
RDA	Requirements Development and Analysis
RCC	Rescue Coordination Center
RDD	Required Delivery Date (at destination)
RECCE	Reconnaissance
RECON	Reconnaissance
RESA	Research, Evaluation, and Systems Analysis (simulation model)
RF	Radio Frequency; Response Force
RFA	Restricted Fire Area
RFI	Request for Information; Ready For Issue
RFID	Radio Frequency Identification
RFL	Restricted Fire Line
RINT	unintentional Radiation Intelligence
RMS	Requirements Management System
ROA	Restricted Operations Area
ROE	Rules of Engagement
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROWPU	Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit
ROZ	Restricted Operations Zone
RP	Release Point

RPV	Remotely Piloted Vehicle
RQMT	Requirement
RSSC	Regional Space Support Center; Regional Satellite Support Cell; Regional Signals Intelligence Support Center (NSA)
RSTA	Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition
RTL	Restricted Target List
RZ	Recovery Zone

S

SA	Security Assistance
SAAFR	Standard use Army Aircraft Flight Zone
SACC	Supporting Arms Coordination Center
SAFE	Selected Area for Evasion
SAGRO	Subarea Graves Registration Office
SALT	Supporting Arms Liaison Team
SAO	Security Assistance Organization
SAPO	Subarea Petroleum Office
SAR	Search and Rescue
SARTF	Search and Rescue Task Force
SAT	Satellite
SATCOM	Satellite Communications
SC	Strategic Communication
SCI	Sensitive Compartmented Information
SCIF	Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SDIO	Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
SEAD	Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SERE	Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape
SEW	Space and Electronic Warfare
SF	Special Forces
SHF	Super-High Frequency
SHFT	Shift
SI	Special Intelligence
SIF	Selective Identification Feature
SIG	Signal
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SIGSEC	Signal Security
SINCGARS	Single-channel and Airborne Radio System
SIR	Serious Incident Report
SITREP	Situation Report
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SLC	Satellite Laser Communications
SLOC	Sea Line of Communication
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SMIO	Search and Rescue (SAR) Mission Information Officer
SO	Special Operations
SOC	Special Operations Command

SOCCE	Special Operations Command and Control Element
SOCRATES	Special Operations Command, Research, Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOLE	Special Operations Liaison Element
SOP	Standing Operating Procedures
SOSE	Special Operations Staff Element
SP	Security Police
SPECAT	Special Category
SPECOPS	Special Operations
SPOD	Seaport of Debarkation
SPOE	Seaport of Embarkation
SPRINTCOM	Special Intelligence Communication Handling System
SPT	Support
SR	Special Reconnaissance
SRC	Standard Requirements Code; Survival Recovery Center
SRCC	Service Rescue Coordination Center
SSO	Special Security Office(r)
SSTR	Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction
SST	Space Support Team
STW	Strike Warfare
SURG	Surgeon
SVC	Service(s)
SVS	Secure Voice System
SWO	Staff Weather Officer
SYS	System
SYSCON	Systems Control

T

T&AO	Training and Assessment Outlines
TACAIR	Tactical Air
TACC	Tactical Air Command Center (USMC); Tactical Air Control Center (USN); Tanker/Airlift Control Center (USAF)
TACINTEL	Tactical Intelligence
TACON	Tactical Control
TACOPDAT	Tactical Operations Data
TACP	Tactical Air Control Party
TACS	Tactical Air Control System; Theater Air Control System
TACS/AAGS	Theater Air Control System/Army Air-Ground System
TACSAT	Tactical Satellite
TACSIM	Tactical Simulation
TACWAR	Tactical Warfare (simulation model)
TAD	Temporary Additional Duty (non-unit related personnel)
TADC	Tactical Air Direction Center
TADIL	Tactical Digital Information Link
TADS	Tactical Air Defense System
TAGS	Theater Air-Ground System

TAI	Target Area of Interest
TALO	Theater Airlift Liaison Officer
TAOC	Tactical Air Operations Center (USMC)
TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
TARPS	Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System
TASIP	Tailored Analytic Intelligence Support to Individual Electronic Warfare and Command and Control Warfare Projects TAT Technical Assistance Team
TBD	To Be Determined
TBM	Tactical Ballistic Missile
TBMCS	Theater Battle Management Core System
TBP	To Be Published
TCC	Telecommunication Center
TCF	Technical Control Facilities/Tactical Combat Force
TCN	Third Country National
TDC	Track Data Coordinator
TDY	Temporary Duty
TECH	Technical
TECHCON	Technical Control
TECHDOC	Technical Documentation
TECHINT	Technical Intelligence
TELINT	Telemetry Intelligence
TELNET	Telecommunications Network
TENCAP	Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program
TF	Task Force
TFCICA	Task Force Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority
TLAM	Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile
TLCF	Teleconference (WIN)
TM	Team Member; Tactical Missile; Technical Manual
TMD	Theater Missile Defense
TMIS	Theater Medical Information System
TNAPS	Tactical Network Analysis and Planning System
TNAPS+	Tactical Network Analysis and Planning System Plus
TNG	Training
TO	Task Outline
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOPINT	Technical Operational Intelligence
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data
TPFDL	Time-Phased Force and Deployment List
TPMRC	Theater Patient Movement Requirement Center
TR	Tactical Reconnaissance
TROPO	Tropospheric Scatter; Troposphere
TSN	Track Supervision Network
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
TW/AA	Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment
TWDS	Tactical Water Distribution System

U

UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UCCATS	Urban Combat Computer Assisted Training System
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
UCP	Unified Command Plan
UHF	Ultra High Frequency
UJT	Universal Joint Task
UJTL	Universal Joint Task List
UK	United Kingdom
ULN	Unit Line Number
UN	United Nations
UNAAF	United Action Armed Forces
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
US	United States
USA	United States Army; United States of America
USACIDC	United States Army Criminal Investigations Command
USACOM	United States Atlantic Command
USAF	United States Air Force
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USFJ	United States Forces Japan
USFK	United States Forces Korea
USFORAZORES	United States Forces Azores
USG	United States Government
USIA	United States Information Agency
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USMILGP	United States Military Group
USMTM	United States Military Training Mission
USN	United States Navy
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
USSS	United States Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) System
USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance

V

VF	Voice Frequency
VGT	View Graph Transparencies
VHF	Very High Frequency
VI	Visual Information
VI/COMCAM	Visual Information/Combat Camera
VIP	Very Important Person; Visual Information Processor
VTC	Video Teleconferencing

W

WAN	Wide-Area Network
WIA	Wounded in Action
WCS	Weapons Control Status
WHNS	Wartime Host-Nation Support
WIN	Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) Intercomputer Network
WPS	World Port System
WRM	War Reserve Materiel
WTCA	Water Terminal Clearance Authority
WX	Weather

XYZ

YR	Year
Z	Zulu
ZULU	Time Zone Indicator for Universal Time

APPENDIX E

Operational Plan Annexes

A Task Organization
B Intelligence
C Operations
D Logistics
E Personnel
F Public Affairs
G Civil-Military Affairs
H Meteorological and Oceanographic Services
J Command Relationships
K Communications System Support
L Environmental Considerations
M Geospatial Information and Services
N Space Operations
P Host Nation Support
Q Medical Services
R Reports
S Special Technical Operations
T Consequence Management
U Notional OPLAN Decision Guide
V Interagency Coordination
X Execution Checklist
Y Strategic Communication
Z Distribution
AA Religious Support

Annexes A-D, K, and Y are required annexes for a CAP OPORD per JOPES. All others may either be required by the JSCP or deemed necessary by the supported CCDR.

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APPENDIX F

Command Relationships



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APPENDIX G

Chain of Command



The President exercises authority and control of the Armed Forces through a single chain of command with two branches. One branch goes from the Secretary of Defense through combatant commanders to Service component commands and subordinate forces. It is for conducting operations and support. The other branch comes from the Secretary of Defense, through the military departments, to their respective major commands. (FM 3-0, for additional details, see JP 0-2.)

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APPENDIX H

Change Recommendation Sheet

1. Please note chapter, page number and paragraph when recommending changes/corrections.

2. To recommend additions please write out recommendation and include source i.e. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 17 Sept 2006, Chapter III, Page 26.